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Politicians and the public often view sports as a luxury or
pure recreation. Major professional sports are businesses,
however, and their impact on the economy warrants national
attention. The cost to taxpayers of subsidizing sports teams'
facilities runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars
annually.1  League decisions concerning the location of
franchises have significant impacts on local economies. 2 The
allocation of players among teams interests every fan who
desires that the hometown team acquire the talent necessary to
make the team a championship contender rather than an also-
ran. Decisions on the broadcasting of games have a profound
effect on consumers/fans.3 Imagine, for example, the public
reaction if next year's Super Bowl were available only on a pay-
cable station!
The economic policy of the United States, as expressed in
our antitrust laws, provides that firms should compete in an
open and free marketplace to supply consumers with the best
possible product at the lowest possible price and to allocate
society's resources efficiently.4 Professional baseball and, to a
1. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part I(D).
4. See generally Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
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lesser degree, football are shielded from the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court expressly exempted Major League
Baseball from the antitrust laws.5 The National Football
League (NFL) achieved its monopoly status in 1966 when
Congress enacted a specific statute permitting the league to
merge with its one major rival, the American Football League
(AFL).6
Economic theories underlying the federal antitrust statutes
suggest that monopolies result in higher prices, lower output,
and a transfer of wealth from consumers to the
producer/monopolist.7 Therefore, when economic or political
considerations lead Congress to suspend application of the
antitrust laws for particular industries, some form of
government regulation designed to protect consumers from the
harms that monopolists inflict almost always accompanies such
exemptions.8 Major League Baseball and the NFL are glaring
exceptions to this practice. They operate as monopolists with
no significant governmental check upon their ability to exercise
monopoly power.
The results of these policy decisions exempting
professional baseball from antitrust scrutiny and allowing
professional football to achieve monopoly status through
merger have been predictable. As lessees of stadiums built and
paid for by taxpayers' dollars, sports monopolists obtain
favorable contract terms that require the public treasury to
subsidize stadium operations.9 Monopoly sports leagues grant
fewer franchises than would exist in a competitive market.10
To hold salary levels below the competitive level, leagues adopt
restrictions on the mobility of players that limit the efficient
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 67-68 (1982).
5. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1293 (1982)).
7. See Lande, supra note 4, at 71-80.
8. See generally P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW 221-223
(1978) (reviewing application of antitrust analysis to regulated industries).
Indeed, regulated firms have faced antitrust liability for conduct in areas
beyond the scope of agency regulation. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1973) (finding antitrust liability for
monopolistic refusal to deal despite claim that required dealing was beyond
power of regulatory agency to issue); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 350-52 (1963) (finding that bank mergers valid under federal
regulatory scheme remain subject to antitrust challenge).
9. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I(B).
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allocation of players among teams." On the horizon, the
distinct possibility exists that sportscasts will shift from free
television to cable, forcing fans to pay for what they now
receive for free.12 Finally, monopoly sports leagues tolerate
inefficient and wasteful management practices by franchise
owners that leagues facing the pressure of competition could
not endure. 13
This Article argues that the government should break up
both Major League Baseball and the NFL to provide for
competing economic entities in each sport. The competitive
market resulting from the divestiture will correct the harms
that the monopoly sports leagues inflict on taxpayers and
fans.14 Competing leagues would vie against each other for the
right to play in public stadiums, driving rents up and tax
subsidies down. Leagues would be more eager to add new
expansion markets, lest those markets fall into the hands of a
rival league. Because the competing leagues would bid on
players, salaries would reflect more accurately the players' fair
market value, and no one league would unduly restrict intra-
league mobility of players. Teams thus could obtain more
readily the right player for the right position. Leagues would
hesitate to move prime games to cable for fear of losing their
audience, as well as the loyalty of their fans, to a league whose
games remained available on free television. The pressure of
competition would force each league to maintain intelligent and
efficient management.
This Article develops in five parts its thesis that the
government should break up the leagues and that the antitrust
laws provide a workable structure to govern competition
between rival leagues. Part I details the harm monopoly sports
leagues cause in several different markets, and explains why a
11. See infra Part I(C).
12. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I(E).
14. This Article considers only major league professional baseball and
football. Part I, infra, details a host of effects demonstrating that both Major
League Baseball and the National Football League (NFL) exercise monopoly
power in economically relevant markets. Although it is posssible to argue that
the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League
(NHL) possess monopoly power, their rivalry with other products and their
ability to exact monopoly profits in the various markets discussed in Part I is
less clear. Because the import of this Article is that government should break
up monopoly leagues in any sport, the Article leaves to another day the
question of whether this thesis should apply to those leagues. The economic
and litigation experiences of the NBA and the NHL, however, are discussed
because of their relevance to this Article's discussion and its conclusions.
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competitive league structure can correct such harms. Part II
discusses why regulatory solutions are poor substitutes for
competition as a means of redressing these harms. Part III
explains why neither baseball nor football is a "natural
monopoly" and argues that no persuasive evidence suggests
that rival leagues cannot exist in those sports. Part IV
examines how the antitrust laws provide a workable
framework for regulating conduct between competing leagues.
Finally, Part V explains why legislation effectuating the
divestiture is preferable to a judicial decree.
I. MONOPOLY SPORTS LEAGUES HARM TAXPAYERS,
FANS, AND PLAYERS
Monopoly sports leagues and their member teams operate
in a variety of markets. Local owners of stadiums, usually pub-
lic stadium authorities,15 lease their facilities to individual
teams. Leagues organize, with limited membership, to sponsor
exhibitions of major league talent. Teams contract for the serv-
ices of players. Leagues and individual teams sell the broadcast
rights for these exhibitions to radio, television, or cable stations
or networks.
In each of these markets, the monopoly sports leagues or
their member teams exercise monopoly power. No league
other than Major League Baseball features franchises that reg-
ularly can fill between one and three million seats over eighty-
one dates.' 6 No league other than the NFL can fill stadiums to
near or total capacity for eight Sundays.17 Localities regard
15. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Teams, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS 325, 326 (R. Noll ed. 1974) (stating that in 1970, public au-
thorities owned 53 of 73 professional sports stadiums).
16. THE SPORTING NEWS, OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE 284 (1988) (stating
that all 26 major league baseball teams had home attendance figures between
one and three million in 1987).
17. THE SPORTING NEWS, PRO FOOTBALL GUIDE 399 (1988). The football
and baseball seasons overlap only briefly during the months of September and
October. Compare THE SPORTING NEWS, OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE 524-27
(1988) (providing 1988 Major League Baseball schedule) with THE SPORTING
NEWS, PRO FOOTBALL GUIDE 393-95 (1988) (providing 1988 NFL schedule).
College football teams usually do not play on Sundays because they simply
cannot compete with what the public views as a superior professional football
product. See 1988 NCAA FOOTBALL 375-80. Division I-A or I-AA college foot-
ball teams played only three games on Sundays during the 1988 season. In
September, San Diego State played Air Force on a Sunday. In November, Bos-
ton College and Richmond met in London, England on a Sunday, although it
was Saturday in the United States. In December, Oklahoma State played
Texas Tech on a Sunday in Tokyo, Japan, although again it was Saturday in
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neither a minor league professional baseball team, nor a major
college football program, nor a professional football team in a
new league as a sufficient substitute for their fans. As a result,
local officials and civic groups organize to beseech the monop-
oly sports leagues for expansion franchises- 8 A special exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws permits league members to agree
among themselves to limit the games they each televise and to
offer a single package of broadcast rights to television net-
works.19 For many fans, no acceptable substitutes for Major
League Baseball and NFL televised contests exist. Monopoly
sports league members agree among themselves to limit compe-
tition for the services of players; for most professional athletes,
no other employment offers a realistic alternative to profes-
sional sports.20 This portion of the Article details the injury
that local treasuries, fans, and players suffer because of the ex-
ercise of monopoly power Major League Baseball and the NFL
possess.21
the United States. Id. Indeed, their inability to compete has led college foot-
ball to lobby for, and receive, legislation that significantly inhibits professional
football from scheduling games on Friday nights or Saturdays. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1293 (1982); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TELECASTING OF
PROFESSSIONAL SPORTS CONTESTS, H.R. REP. No. 1178, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1961).
18. See Wendel, Shake Out, SPORTS, INC., Mar. 13, 1989, at 24-28.
19. See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). A package sale
grants one or more networks exclusive or semi-exclusive rights to broadcast
NFL games. Prior to the enactment of the statute, a district court held that an
agreement among NFL owners to prohibit the broadcasting of football games
in a league city when the home team played away was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 326-27 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
20. See, e.g., Nack, What Goes Up Comes Down, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Dec. 14, 1987, at 68, 76 (relating sentiments toward professional football of re-
placement player for New Orleans Saints during 1987 NFL strike: "It sounds
greedy, but it's addictive. You want more and more and more. Once you get
into it, once you taste the life, once you get the money ... there's not one
other thing you want to do in the world.").
21. The exercise of monopoly power may not necessarily result in monop-
oly profits for each league owner. The absence of monopoly profits, however,
does not justify the continued existence of a monopoly. United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). A team owner in a monop-
oly sports league may fail to enjoy monopoly profits for a number of reasons-
the team may operate inefficiently; the league or the team owner may have
bargained away monopoly profits in negotiations with the players' union or in-
dividual players; or the future stream of monopoly profits may have been built
into the purchase price of the team. For example, San Francisco 49ers owner
Edward DeBartolo, Jr., who purchased the team in 1977 for $17 million, must
use revenues to service a significant debt, especially when compared to Pitts-
burgh Steelers owner Art Rooney, Jr., who purchased his team in 1933 for
[Vol. 73:643
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A. TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES
United States cities eagerly seek professional sports
franchises. The teams confer "major league" prestige upon the
city, its citizens, and its public officials. Many believe that a
franchise brings the city significant economic benefits as well.22
To attract and retain sports teams in their communities, local
governments find it necessary to provide the franchises with
substantial subsidies, paid for out of the public treasury.23
Franchises may insist on large subsidies because cities lack bar-
gaining power when dealing with members of monopoly sports
leagues.
Tax subsidies may take a number of forms. These typically
include rents priced below the economic value of a facility or
forgone taxes on stadium property.24 Other types of subsidies
include the development and construction of new stadiums and
improved highway and parking facilities.25
In a major study of this issue for the Brookings Institution,
economist Benjamin Okner concluded that in 1971, stadium
subsidies exceeded eight million dollars.26 From the taxpayers'
$2,500. See 1 R. BERRY & G. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUs-
TRIES 59 (1986).
22. See Professional Sports Community Protection Act of 1985: Hearings
on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Danforth 85 Hear-
ings) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton); id. at 125 (testimony of Maryland Gov.
Harry Hughes). Some economists dispute this. See, e.g., R. BAADE, Is THERE
AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR SUBSIDIZING SPORTS STADIUMS? 18 (Heartland
Institute Policy Study No. 13, Feb. 23, 1987) (arguing that sports franchises do
not cause true economic growth, but merely serve to realign existing jobs and
spending from manufacturing economy to service economy); Okner, supra
note 15, at 347 (concluding that 83% of sports facilities run at loss and benefits
probably accrue disproportionately to upper and middle classes).
23. See Johnson, Municipal Admininstration and the Sports Franchise
Relocation Issue, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 519, 519 (1983).
24. See Okner, supra note 15, at 325. In special situations, subsidies may
be even more direct. Faced with the imminent sale of the San Diego Padres to
an owner bent on moving the team to the east coast, the San Diego City Coun-
cil voted to advance the team enough cash to cover bonus payments owed to 10
players, while efforts to find a local owner continued. See L. SOBEL, PROFES-
SIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 531-32 (1977).
25. Rosentraub, Financial Incentives, Locational Decision-Making, and
Professional Sports: The Case of the Texas Ranger Baseball Network and the
City of Arlington, Texas, reprinted in, HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL SPORTS, INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H. REP. No. 1786, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1977) [hereinafter SISK REPORT].
26. Okner, supra note 15, at 341. Economic theory predicts that a monop-
oly lessee will be able to extract concessions until the rent paid to the lessor
covers only the direct (i.e., marginal) costs of operating the facility on the day
1989]
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perspective, recent developments are even bleaker. A 1983
study reported that in the preceding two years alone, teams in
at least thirteen of the forty-two localities hosting sports
franchises demanded increased subsidies.2 7 Recent examples
abound.28
Team owners use their significant advantage in bargaining
power to extract subsidies from local treasuries. The number
of cities desiring teams greatly exceeds the number of major
league franchises. 29 Incumbent owners thus use the threat of
of the game. Id. at 331-32. Indeed, Okner concluded that stadium rents gener-
ally cover only marginal operating costs and relatively insignificant fixed ad-
ministrative expenses. Id. at 340-41. Fixed costs other than debt servicing
include office and administrative expenses, routine maintenance not directly
related to games, and insurance. Okner estimated these costs to be $250,000
annually, in 1971 dollars, for a stadium used for both baseball and football. 1d.
at 340.
27. Johnson, supra note 23, at 520.
28. Recent examples of wealth transfers from taxpayers to sports team
owners include:
New Orleans Saints-The State of Louisiana decided to remit to the
Saints all Superdome revenue the team generated, except for a rental fee
based on ticket receipts, and abolished an amusement tax on tickets. These
measures annually add $2.5 million to the Saints' treasury. R. BAADE, supra
note 22, at 9 (citation omitted).
Philadelphia Phillies-Philadelphia phased out a ticket tax, provided the
Phillies with $1 million for a new outfield scoreboard, and assumed $745,000
annually in debt service payments for a Panavision scoreboard the Phillies in-
stalled. The city also allowed the Phillies to construct special baseball suites
and to keep 60% of the related revenue, resulting in a $2.5 million revenue re-
allocation from the city to the Phillies. Id.
Philadelphia Eagles-At the same time, Philadelphia constructed between
50 and 80 skyboxes for the Eagles. The team retained all lease revenues from
the boxes. The city also deferred the Eagles' rent payments until 1994, and
took over responsibility for game-day security, at a total cost of $30 million.
Id.
Los Angeles Rams-The City of Anaheim provided the Rams with 95
acres of prime real estate valued at $25 million, at no charge, to induce their
move from downtown Los Angeles. Johnson, supra note 23, at 521-22.
Texas Rangers-To induce the relocation of a professional baseball team,
the City of Arlington purchased local broadcasting rights for 10 years from the
team owners for $3 million more than it could recover. Arlington also publicly
funded the renovation of Texas Stadium and provided a highly advantageous
lease. The total price tag was estimated at $21 million. Professional Sports
Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 172, S. 259, and S. 298 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (1985) [hereinafter Thur-
mond 85 Hearings] (testimony of Joseph Tydings); SISK REPORT, supra note
25, at 201-15.
29. Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports: Oversight Hearings on HR.
823, H.R. 3287, and H.R. 6467 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
618 (1982) [hereinafter Rodino 82 Hearings,] (testimony of City of Oakland
[Vol. 73:643
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relocation to a city currently without a major league franchise
to extort concessions from local taxpayers.30 For example, the
City of Philadelphia gave the Eagles a new lease with addi-
tional concessions of thirty million dollars after the football
team's owners threatened to move to Phoenix. 31
In addition, leagues use the scarcity of franchises to wring
concessions out of potential expansion cities. For example, in
1975, the NFL, after considering proposals from a host of cities,
tentatively decided to expand to Tampa and Seattle.32 When
the initial terms Seattle offered for the lease of its publicly-
owned stadium were not to the League's liking, the NFL did
not mention Seattle in its expansion franchise announcements.
Seattle officials soon succumbed to League pressure and shortly
thereafter the NFL announced that Seattle would be the latest
expansion franchise. 33 Similarly, Baseball Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn explained to a Louisiana member of Congress that
although the league was considering New Orleans as a possible
expansion city, the city's inability to afford parking facilities
and other concessions created a roadblock to expansion.
34
counsel David Self) (stating that cities compete for few available franchises in
seller's market); see also Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 2 (remarks of
Sen. Slade Gorton) ("Teams threaten to move not because the present city is
not supporting teams in a totally adequate fashion-very frequently at a
profit-but simply because the artificial shortage of teams creates a great bid-
ding war .... ).
30. "Simply put, were there no Denver to threaten to move to .... the
[baseball] owners could not coerce concessions from existing franchise cities
and/or potential expansion cities." Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at
143 (testimony of Major League Baseball Players Executive Director Donald
Fehr); see also id. at 134 (remarks of Sen. Charles Mathias) ("Only the owners
can win these bidding wars"); D. HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DE-
CLINE OF THE NFL 614-15 (1986) (discussing City of San Francisco's funding of
$30 million in concessions after 49ers owner Eddie DeBartolo implicitly
threatened to move team); id. at 642 (observing that Louisiana significantly re-
duced lease terms and guaranteed $15 million loan as part of sale of New Orle-
ans Saints to local owners).
31. See supra note 28. As Senator Frank Lautenberg from neighboring
New Jersey explained, the scarcity of football teams caused the subsidy: "If
there was a team already in Phoenix, could the owner have held a gun to Phil-
adelphia's head and to the heads of its many fans on both sides of the Dela-
ware? I think not." Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 6.
32. D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 175.
33. Id. at 174-77; see also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1394 (9th Cir.) (discussing evidence showing that in past
NFL had "remained expressly noncommitted on the question of team move-
ment" to provide "owners a bargaining edge when they were renegotiating
leases with their respective stadia."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). This Ar-
ticle will refer to this case as Raiders throughout.
34. 1 Inquiry into Professional Sports: Hearings Before the House Select
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Some may claim that cities bemoaning the need either to
pay tax subsidies or to lose a team have only themselves to
blame for poor bargaining. The cities, the argument goes, could
protect themselves adequately by entering into long-term leases
with the professional sports franchise. The possibility of long-
term contracts, however, does not solve the problems that the
scarcity of teams creates. Precisely because of the bargaining
power that monopoly sports league franchises have over cities,
franchise owners usually refuse to enter into long-term leases.
For example, when Oakland agreed to provide the Raiders with
the stadium improvements owner Al Davis demanded, the city
requested a long-term lease to secure bond financing for those
improvements, but Davis absolutely refused.35
Even if a city were able to negotiate a long-term lease, the
team's owner simply could break the lease, pay damages for
breach of contract, and receive an indemnity from a new city.
Although some courts have found damages an inadequate rem-
edy and have granted injunctive relief to prevent a team from
breaching its lease,36 many other courts, even in the home city
of the franchise, have refused to do so.3 7 This area of the law is
so uncertain that most city officials will grant the concessions
demanded rather than risk litigation.
Other observers claim that the league as a whole will pro-
tect a city's interests adequately by preventing a team's owner
from moving solely to secure more favorable concessions from
another city.38 Indeed, leagues have acted periodically to pro-
Comm. on Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1977) [hereinafter
Sisk Hearings] (testimony of Major League Baseball Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn).
35. D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 378. Indeed, Oakland's troubles really be-
gan in the early 1960s with the Raiders' initial lease. Then-Raiders owner
Wayne Valley refused to sign a 20-year lease that stadium authorities sought
and subsequently agreed to a five-year lease with five three-year options of re-
newal for the Raiders. Id. at 60; see also id. at 479 (reporting that Baltimore
Colts owner Robert Irsay rejected an offer from Maryland legislature to issue
$23 million bond to refurbish Memorial Stadium contingent upon his signing
15-year lease).
36. See, e.g., City of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc., 90
Misc. 2d 311, 316, 394 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
37. See, e.g., HMC Management Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club,
375 So. 2d 700, 707-12 (La. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 11 (La. 1980);
November v. National Exhibition Co., 10 Misc. 2d 537, 545, 173 N.Y.S.2d 490,
499 (Sup. Ct. 1958); L. SOBEL, supra note 24, at 516-21 (citing San Diego v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego Cty.
No. 343508 (unpublished opinion), aff'd, Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, No.
12741 (1973) (unpublished opinion)).
38. See, e.g., Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 75-76 (testimony of
[Vol. 73:643
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hibit a franchise from relocating in search of increased subsi-
dies. The NFL attempted to bar the Oakland Raiders from
moving to Los Angeles,39 and Baseball Commissioner Peter
Ueberroth acted to prevent the Minnesota Twins from moving
to the Tampa Bay area.40 Monopoly leagues occasionally, or
even frequently, may find it in their self-interest to prohibit
franchises from moving, although critics of the leagues can
point to other factors that might explain such actions.41 Such
moves may be unpopular among voters in the other cities that
currently have franchises, thus exposing the leagues to the risk
of legislative retribution.42 When a team threatens to leave a
major media market for a smaller market, television ratings on
Professor John Weistart) ("there is little evidence that the mechanism of
league control is inadequate to limit any potential for abuse" in franchise relo-
cation); Professional Sports Antitrust Immunity: Hearings on S. 2784 and S.
2821 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65
(1982) [hereinafter Thurmond 82 Hearings] (testimony of NFL Commissioner
Pete Rozelle) (stating that leagues have incentives to assure that local inter-
ests are served).
39. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1385.
40. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 55 (statement of Major
League Baseball Commissioner Peter Ueberroth).
41. For example, testimony in the Raiders case indicated that the decision
stemmed from personal animosity toward Raider owner Al Davis, Raiders, 726
F.2d at 1398, and from a desire to protect the Los Angeles Rams from intra-
metropolitan competition, id. at 1393-94. A desire to preserve Los Angeles as a
possible expansion city more valuable than Oakland is also a possible explana-
tion. See generally Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Per-
spective on Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 1013, 1021 n.29.
Shortly after the introduction of S. 2505, co-sponsored by Minnesota Sena-
tor Rudy Boschwitz, to regulate franchise movement in Major League Base-
ball, then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, American League President Bobby
Brown, and National League President Chub Feeney informed the prospective
Tampa purchasers of the Minnesota Twins that the League opposed the
purchase and relocation of the franchise. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, May 19,
1984, at Al, col. 1.
42. On at least three occasions, actual or threatened franchise relocations
spurred congressional action antithetical to the interests of Major League
Baseball owners. Although in each case the proposals did not succeed, these
reactions explain why political good will may be an important factor in base-
ball franchise relocation decisions.
Shortly after the Dodgers and Giants relocated to the west coast in 1958,
legislation reported to the Senate proposed to limit Major League Baseball's
antitrust exemption. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS ANTITRUST AcT OF 1960, S. REP. No. 1620, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960).
By a narrow vote of 45-41, the Senate deleted provisions that Major League
Baseball opposed and the legislation died after referral to committee. 106
CONG. REC. 14748-50 (1960).
In response to the relocation of the Washington Senators to Texas, Con-
gress established a Select Committee on Professional Sports, which held ex-
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the league's network package may suffer and the league there-
fore may act to protect its ratings.43 Moreover, franchise moves
may decrease fan loyalty to the detriment of the league as a
whole.44
Nevertheless, taxpayers cannot rely on monopoly sports
leagues for adequate protection. There is no reason to expect
that franchise owners routinely will interfere with their joint-
venturers' efforts to make more money at the taxpayers' ex-
pense.45 In fact, leagues often have permitted franchises to
move when cities without teams offer more lucrative opportu-
nities. The most famous example is the Dodgers' move from
Brooklyn to almost 300 acres of free land in Los Angeles.
46
Perhaps a more typical exercise of league authority involved
construction of the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome in Minne-
apolis. The Minnesota Vikings desired a domed stadium, but
the owners' efforts to get legislative approval of that costly pro-
ject stalled.47 When the NFL discovered that opponents of the
domed stadium believed that acquiescing to the Vikings' de-
mand was unnecessary because the League would not permit
tensive hearings and issued a report fairly critical of Major League Baseball's
antitrust exemption. See SISK REPORT, supra note 25, at 35-60.
In 1984, investors from Tampa, Florida, purchased 43% of the stock in the
Minnesota Twins, with the possible intent of relocating the franchise. Minne-
sota Senator Rudy Boschwitz testified that in 1983 he introduced legislation, S.
2505, restricting franchise relocations because of rumors concerning the sale of
the Twins. Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act: Hearings on
S. 2505 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984) [hereinafter Danforth 84 Hearings].
43. For example, when the Baltimore Colts moved to Indianapolis, the
NFL owners voted to take no action, pleading impotence in the face of the an-
titrust verdict rendered against the NFL for barring the Oakland Raiders'
move to Los Angeles. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1984, at A27, col. 1. Conversely,
when the Eagles threatened to leave Philadelphia, the fourth largest television
market in the country, for smaller Phoenix, the NFL filed suit to bar the
move. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A43, col. 1.
44. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1396; J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF
SPORTS 151 (Supp. 1985).
45. See Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional
Sports, 38 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 47 (1973) ("[F]ranchise moves emerge
as a device to permit small city franchises to capture short-run profits in a new
market," so "fans in small cities can expect little protection from franchise
moves from the self-regulation of the typical sports league.").
46. See Thurmond 82 Hearings, supra note 38, at 233 (testimony of How-
ard Cosell); see also id. at 181 (testimony of Los Angeles County Coliseum
Commissioner William Robertson) (stating that City of Anaheim sold 95 acres
of prime real estate valued at $25 million to Rams for fraction of its market
value); Danforth 84 Hearings, supra note 42, at 159-60 (statement of Professor
Arthur Johnson) (same).
47. D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 370.
[Vol. 73:643
SPORTS MONOPOLIES
the team to move, Commissioner Pete Rozelle held a special
press conference emphasizing the League's willingness to per-
mit the Vikings to move if efforts to obtain a new stadium
failed.48
Economic theory suggests that if sports leagues did not
hold monopoly power in the stadium market, taxpayers would
fare better. The existence of competing sports leagues would
significantly reduce subsidies. An incumbent team, with its res-
ervoir of good will and fan loyalty, still would obtain some sub-
sidies to prevent it from moving. A city's knowledge that a
rival league probably would replace the franchise eagerly, how-
ever, would limit the amount of the subsidy. Moreover, com-
peting sports leagues can be expected to expand.49 As the
number of desirable cities without a major league team dwin-
dles, a city's current team will be less able to set off a bidding
war by threatening to relocate.5 0
Rival leagues battled for sole rights to an expansion city on
only one occasion in recent history: in 1960 both the NFL and
the fledgling AFL sought to establish a franchise in Houston.5 '
In contrast to the demands upon taxpayers described above,
Houston Oilers owner Bud Adams secured a five-year lease on
an existing stadium by promising to spend $150,000 of his own
money to expand the seating capacity.5 2 Twenty-seven years
later, with a secure membership in a monopoly sports league,
the same Bud Adams threatened to relocate the Oilers to Jack-
48. Id. at 370-71.
49. See infra Part I(B).
50. For example, Colts' owner Robert Irsay negotiated with two cities, In-
dianapolis and Phoenix, that did not have NFL franchises, while continuing
negotiations with Baltimore. D. HARRIs, supra note 30, at 601-07. Economic
theory predicts that if Indianapolis or Phoenix could support the Colts, those
cities probably already would have a franchise in the NFL or in a rival league.
See infra Part I(B).
51. In the early 1960s, the two leagues competed against one another in
several metropolitan areas. By the time of the merger, New York still sup-
ported both the Jets and the Giants, and the San Fransciso Bay area still sup-
ported both the 49ers and the Raiders. See Professional Football League
Merger, Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary on S. 3817 and similar bills, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1966) [here-
inafter NFL 66 Hearings] (setting forth special terms for merger in these "two
team" areas). The AFL also attempted to compete with the already estab-
lished Rams in Los Angeles, but gave up after one year and moved the Charg-
ers to San Diego. D. HARRis, supra note 30, at 104. In 1963, Lamar Hunt
moved his AFL team, the Dallas Texans, to Kansas City, and renamed them
the Chiefs. Id. The two leagues battled for stadium rights in Houston when
the NFL decided to expand there in 1959. See Houston Post, Oct. 31, 1959.
52. Houston Post, Oct. 30, 1959, § 5, at 2, col 3.
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sonville, relenting only after the Houston Astrodome's operator
agreed to add, at its expense, an additional 10,000 seats and sev-
enty-two sky boxes, as well as granting Adams a more
favorable lease.5
3
Experience demonstrates that Major League Baseball and
the NFL have monopoly power in negotiating with stadium au-
thorities for the lease of public sporting arenas and that the
monopoly sports leagues exercise that power to the detriment
of taxpayers. Economic theory, buttressed by the one example
in which two rival leagues both sought to enter a new market,
confirms that divestiture of monopoly sports leagues into com-
peting economic entities will significantly reduce taxpayer sub-
sidies. Competition would decrease the ability of team owners
to demand that stadiums be built or renovated at public ex-
pense and similarly would increase the ability of stadium au-
thorities to secure rent that would cover the cost of operating
arenas.
B. INSUFFICIENT ExPANsION
One benefit of a free enterprise system is that the market
usually responds to increased consumer demand for a product
by spurring increased output of the product.54  Monopoly
sports leagues, in contrast, exercise their power deliberately to
hold down the number of available franchises. As a result, fans
in cities without Major League Baseball or NFL franchises lose
the opportunity to have a team that they may call their own.
Leagues exploit fans in cities with franchises by threats of relo-
cation to the many "have-not" areas.55 Of course, fans in mar-
kets capable of supporting expansion franchises but unable to
obtain them suffer the major harm of not having a team to fol-
low. Monopoly sports leagues have significant economic incen-
tives to keep the number of franchises below the number that
would exist in a free market. The fewer the franchises, the
more incentive for have-not cities to provide generous tax sub-
sidies to induce an existing team to relocate.56 In addition, with
fewer available franchises, "the competition among cities for
53. Deford, This Bud's Not For You, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 2, 1987, at
70.
54. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 12 (5th ed. 1985).
55. See supra Part I(A).
56. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 236 (testimony of NFL Players'
Association Executive Director Edward Garvey); D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at
152.
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teams will push the rents to essentially nothing. '57
Even owners with no intention of relocating their own
teams have powerful incentives to resist expansion. Limiting
the number of teams enhances the value of each franchise. 58
An increase in the number of team owners also means an in-
crease in the number of people who will share the revenues
from lucrative national television packages. With more owners,
each owner gets a smaller piece of the "pie. ' 59 Although ex-
pansion franchises pay huge sums of money to the existing
owners as the price of entry, the smaller share of television rev-
enue offsets the benefit of the one-time entry fee in just a few
years.60
When a market can support multiple teams, monopoly
sports league owners are unlikely to agree to an expansion that
jeopardizes a fellow owner's local territorial monopoly.61 One
57. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 145 (testimony of economist
Roger Noll).
58. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(3) (1985), reprinted in Danforth 85
Hearings, supra note 22, at 40.
59. American League President Lee McPhail explained this: if baseball
owners "share their national television package with two more clubs, that
means that there is a lessening of income for them when they do so, so it is no
financial bonanza to the existing clubs." 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at
424. See also S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 302(3) (1985), reprinted in Dan-
forth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 40; Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22,
at 105 (testimony of United States Football League (USFL) Players' Associa-
tion Director Doug Allen); Professional Sports Team Community Protection
Act. Hearing on H.R 5388 and H.. 5430 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90 (1984) [hereinafter Florio Hearings] (testimony of
NFL General Counsel Jay Moyer); D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 148.
If the number of franchises increases, the "pie" also may increase if the
national network telecasts receive higher ratings in a city after it acquires a
franchise to root for. This increase, however, may be more than offset by the
reduced share of the "pie" that each current owner must take when new
teams enter a league.
60. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 62-63 (testimony of NFL Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle). A monopoly joint venture in a typical industry would
continue to expand and simply allow the expansion franchise to collect margi-
nal increases in revenues attributable to expansion. Such a plan, however,
makes it unlikely that the expansion franchise ever will field a contending
team, thereby harming the league's long-term goal of competitive balance. See
infra Part I(C). Accordingly, Major League Baseball and the NFL each divide
league television revenues equally among their franchises, with an inexorable
adverse effect on expansion. See Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 62-63
(testimony of NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle) (discussing football expan-
sion); Baseball Bats Over $300 Million in 1986, BROADCASTING, Mar. 3, 1986, at
43, 46 (discussing Major League Baseball revenue).
61. See Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 65-66 (testimony of econo-
mist Gerald Scully); D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 28 (Redskins' owner blocked
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study concluded that franchises sharing a local market "can ex-
pect revenues to fall nearly $3.8 million below their monopolis-
tic counterparts."6 2 It is no surprise, then, that the location of
two franchises within large metropolitan areas is more likely to
occur when there are separate competing leagues.63 For exam-
ple, the AFL had targeted Anaheim, California, as a prime ex-
pansion site prior to the AFL's merger with the NFL.64 After
the merger, however, Southern California waited fourteen
years for its second team, and received one only after the Oak-
land Raiders prevailed in antitrust litigation over the NFL
owners' unanimous rejection of the Raiders' proposal to relo-
cate to Los Angeles.65 Similarly, in 1973, the NFL commis-
sioned a major study to determine the optimal locations for a
planned expansion. The Stanford Research Institute study con-
cluded that Long Island, Chicago, and Anaheim ranked "sub-
stantially above all the candidate areas, even when dividing
any southern expansion because he owned extensive broadcast rights in that
region, relenting only after future Cowboys' owner bought song rights to "Hail
to the Redskins" and refused to sell them without withdrawal of expansion
opposition); id. at 511 (Raiders' attorney Joseph Alioto claimed that settlement
of Raiders' suit granting Los Angeles an expansion team failed because Rams
did not want competition).
Both leagues have special provisions in their rules to protect local territo-
rial monopolies. See Major League Agreement, art. V, § 2(b)(3)(iii), reprinted
in BASEBALL BLUE BOOK 507 (1987) ("the transfer of a Club to any city in the
Circuit of the other Major League shall require the three-quarters approval of
the Clubs in such other League .... "); Major League Rule 1(c), reprinted in
BASEBALL BLUE BOOK 511 (1987) (requiring approval of three-quarters of
clubs in other league for expansion into city within circuit of other league);
National Football League Constitution and By-Laws, art. IV, § 4.2, reprinted
in Thurmond 82 Hearings, supra note 38, at 83 (exhibit attached to NFL Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle's testimony) ("Each member shall have the exclusive
right within its home territory to exhibit professional football games").
62. Sommers & Quinton, Pay and Performance in Major League Basebalk
The Case of the First Family of Free Agents, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 426, 431
(1982).
63. Thurmond 85 Hearings, supra note 28, at 404 (written response of
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Charles F. Rule to questions of Sen.
Charles Grassley and Sen. Charles Mathias).
64. D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 308.
65. See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1401. If the Raiders' move to Los Angeles was
in the overall best interests of the league, Al Davis theoretically could have
offered his fellow owners enough money to persuade them to permit the relo-
cation. Two reasons, however, suggest that this type of bargaining will not en-
sure that local monopolists embrace efficient relocations. First, there are
significant transaction and information costs to arriving at the correct "price"
for the league's permission to move. Second, many owners may be reluctant to
set a precedent that would allow a maverick rival to relocate into their terri-
tory by paying off three-fourths of their colleagues.
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data by two or three to account for a shared market. '66
The League's owners summarily dismissed these
recommendations. 67
Some expansion may be sound strategy even for a monopo-
list. Limited expansion can be a potent political tool. As a mo-
nopolist, the NFL faces difficulties when important initiatives
cannot go forward without congressional exemptions from the
antitrust laws. The NFL has had considerable success in per-
suading Congress to grant such exemptions and invariably has
used expansion teams as a political reward to key legislators.68
Passage of the Sports Broadcasting Act 69 followed quickly on
the heels of the addition to the NFL of the Dallas Cowboys in
1960 and the Minnesota Vikings in 1961.70 The Act granted an
antitrust exemption to sports leagues, allowing them to sell lu-
crative exclusive packages of broadcast rights to network televi-
sion.71 Expansion to Atlanta and New Orleans coincided with
the passage of the 1966 legislation allowing the NFL-AFL
merger.72 In 1974, when the NFL succeeded in persuading Con-
gress to forgo additional statutory limitations on the League's
ability to black out games in home areas, Tampa Bay and Seat-
tle received franchises. 73 Most recently, in the early 1980s,
Commissioner Pete Rozelle resorted explicitly to "dangling"
66. D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 151-52 (quoting Stanford Research Insti-
tute's Report of December 1973, Socioeconomic Information on Candidate Ar-
eas for NFL Franchises).
67. Id. at 152.
68. Expansion was "the principal currency of the League's political influ-
ence." Id. at 147. See also Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 101 (testi-
mony of NFL Players Association Director Gene Upshaw); id. at 129
(testimony of Maryland Gov. Harry Hughes). But see id. at 62 (NFL Commis-
sioner Pete Rozelle claimed that all expansions were "without dictate or pres-
sure from Congress").
69. Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-
1295 (1982)).
70. See AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D. Md. 1962) (detailing expan-
sion of NFL), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). In 1960, Lyndon Johnson of
Texas was the Senate Majority Leader. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE
TO CONGRESS 184-A (2d ed. 1976). The Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives was Sam Rayburn of Texas. Id. at 178-A. The Senate Majority Whip
was Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota. Id. at 184-A.
71. Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1982)).
72. Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966). See Danforth 85 Hearings,
supra note 22, at 129 (testimony of Gov. Harry Hughes); D. HARRIS, supra note
30, at 17 (describing explicit quid pro quo between NFL Commissioner Pete
Rozelle and Rep. Hale Boggs of Louisiana concerning passage of legislation
and expansion into New Orleans).
73. See Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 129-30 (testimony of Gov.
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the prospect of expansion before key legislators7 4 in an unsuc-
cessful attempt to secure further antitrust exemptions.
75
Although Major League Baseball enjoys a judicial exemption
from antitrust scrutiny, it too has used expansion to retain the
political good will necessary *to maintain favorable antitrust
treatment.
76
The NFL also has nonpolitical incentives for permitting
limited expansion. If the NFL leaves too many obvious mar-
kets without a franchise, the NFL opens itself to challenge
from a rival league.7 7 In 1960, for example, the NFL occupied
only thirteen of the thirty-one available markets for major pro-
fessional football franchises.78 As a result, the AFL was able
to enter the market in 1960 and to compete successfully with
the NFL.7 9
Because the NFL and Major League Baseball are now so
large, however, the threat of entry by a new league featuring
franchises in locations currently without teams no longer de-
ters either league from creating an artificial scarcity of
franchises. The NFL currently has twenty-eight franchises.80
Even if a new league could find room for the eight franchises it
Harry Hughes). At the time, Sen. Warren Magnuson of Washington chaired
the committee with jurisdiction over this legislation.
74. D. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 516.
75. The NFL sought legislation that would require courts to treat the
league as a "single entity" not subject to the provisions of § 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), condemning conspiracies in restraint of trade. D.
HARRIS, supra note 30, at 516-21.
76. In 1982, Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois made the following remarks to
Major League Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn:
How far along does this legislation to remove the antitrust ex-
emption for baseball have to move before Washington, D.C., is going
to get a baseball team?
You do not have to answer that, but I do know that in 1968, when
baseball left Kansas City, Senator Symington threatened baseball
with the removal of its antitrust exemption, and in response to that
threat, or maybe just coincidentally, Kansas City was given another
major league baseball team.
Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 461; see also Bavasi Says Padres Were
Used as Bribe, L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1973, § III, at 1, col. 1 (reporting San Diego
Padres executive Buzzie Bavasi's claim that commissioner Kuhn admitted urg-
ing baseball owners to relocate San Diego franchise to Washington, D.C. to
promote political good will).
77. See J. MARKHAM & P. TEPLITZ, BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 22-23 (1981) [hereinafter J. MARKHAM].
78. See AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 62, 76 (D. Md. 1962), affl'd, 323 F.2d
124 (4th Cir. 1963).
79. Id. at 77.
80. See 1988 NFL Standings, The Sporting News, Feb. 23, 1989, at 9 (list-
ing 28 teams currently in NFL).
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probably would need to begin operations,8 1 the new league
would face greater difficulties in competing with today's
twenty-eight team league than the AFL faced in 1960 with the
thirteen-franchise league.8 2 Moreover, as discussed below, a
dominant sports league can more easily engage in predatory
practices to rebuff new entrants than can a similarly dominant
monopolist in a more typical industry.8 3 Fear of entry by a ri-
val league therefore no longer deters a monopoly sports league
from deliberately restricting the number of its members in or-
der to maintain and exploit its monopoly power.
Some might respond to those protesting sluggish expansion
by claiming that the market will not support additional teams.
The available empirical evidence suggests, however, that the
current number of franchises is artificially small. As Senator
Frank Lautenberg has observed: "There is an artificial scarcity
of teams that results from joint decisions of league members
and their anticompetitive behavior. Demand is not met by sup-
ply; it is met by ransom and higher price franchises.
8 4
It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain precisely the
optimal number of franchises in major league sports. Economic
models can predict, for example, the population characteristics
necessary to produce a given amount of revenue for a team that
wins half its games.8 5 Models cannot predict, however, whether
81. The success of the National and American Leagues with eight teams
each from 1900 through 1960, the NHL with six teams for most of its history,
and the AFL from its formation until its merger with the NFL with eight
teams, is strong evidence that the minimum number is not greater than eight.
See AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. at 65 (minimum of six, but probably eight teams
needed for successful operation of a league), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
82. See AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D. Md. 1962) (listing NFL teams
in 1960), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 392-406.
84. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 6.
85. These models attempt to predict attendance for expansion cities based
upon attendance patterns for current franchises. Thus, the models assume
that expansion will not cause such a reduction in quality that attendance will
drop precipitously. The success of baseball, football, and hockey in expanding
without suffering a significant reduction in attendance indicates that this as-
sumption is justified. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
These models also assume that a team plays its entire home schedule in
one metropolitan area. Cf. Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERN-
MENT AND THE SPORTS BusiNEss 115, 129-30 (R. Noll ed. 1974). Possibly, base-
ball leagues truly interested in tapping available markets could arrange for a
split schedule with teams playing spring games in southern cities and moving
north when the weather warmed up. Such an innovation would allow smaller
cities to support a team and would increase broadcast revenues, because fans
in each city would follow the team on television and radio. Similarly, a split
schedule would make season tickets more attractive by reducing their cost.
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that revenue is sufficient to enable the owners to make a nor-
mal return on their investment. Profitability depends on
player salary levels, revenue from national broadcast rights,
and other factors unascertainable in advance and not necessar-
ily constant as the number of franchises increases.
Several empirical studies conducted in the 1970s attempted
to estimate the number of additional locations that could sup-
port a Major League Baseball franchise.8 6 Such a study, how-
ever, requires an estimate of the amount of revenue a team
owner must realize in order to earn a modest but reasonable
profit. Since these studies were completed, two major new de-
velopments have changed this "bottom line." First, from 1976
to 1985, competitive bidding for players significantly increased
salaries.87 Second, Major League Baseball's revenues from the
sale of broadcast rights have increased dramatically. The new
network contracts signed in 1983 brought in almost $200 million
annually, compared to the 1979 agreement that was worth ap-
See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 491 (testimony of Louisiana Superdome
official William J. Connick); cf H. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMIcs OF PROFES-
SIONAL TEAM SPORTS 88-89 (1973).
86. Roger Noll conducted the first major effort to determine empirically
whether baseball franchise expansion was feasible, based on data from the
1970 and 1971 seasons. Noll concluded that expansion was feasible into Wash-
ington, Toronto, and Newark, and that New York City could support a third
team. He also concluded, however, that Kansas City, Milwaukee, and San Di-
ego had insufficient populations to support franchises and that San Francisco-
Oakland probably could not support their two existing teams. Thus, Noll's
data suggested no net expansion of baseball franchises. See Noll, supra note
85, at 130-31.
In a study commissioned by Major League Baseball completed in 1978,
Jesse Markham and Howard Teplitz estimated that baseball feasibly could ex-
pand by a net of three teams. J. MARKHAM, supra note 77, at 68-69. The eco-
nomic model for that study estimated that a Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area with a population of 1.25 million could support a team, all "other things
being equal." Id. at 68. At the time their study was produced, this suggested
that Buffalo, Miami-Fort Lauderdale, Denver, Washington, Indianapolis, New-
ark, New Orleans, and Tampa-St. Petersburg all could support teams,
although Atlanta, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and San Diego might not be able
to, and that the San Francisco-Oakland area could not support both the Giants
and the A's. Id. at 68-69. An unpublished study based on 1975-76 data reached
similar results regarding the profitability of Atlanta, Milwaukee, San Diego,
and San Francisco. R. Lucke, Antitrust Policy and the Professional Sports In-
dustry 18-19 (Aug. 4, 1977) (unpublished honors thesis, Univ. of Cal.).
87. Major League Baseball Players Association, Average Salaries in Major
League Baseball 1967-1987, at 3 (filed as exhibit in Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n v. The Twenty-Six Major League Baseball Clubs, Grievance No.
86-2 (Sept. 21, 1987) (Roberts, Arb.) [this Article will refer to this arbitration
as Collusion I throughout] (average salary increased from $51,501 to $371,157
between 1976 and 1985)).
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proximately $46 million per season.8 8 Moreover, many individ-
ual team owners recently have made money by selling local
broadcast rights to cable and pay television.8 9
Some empirical evidence nevertheless shows, at least with
regard to baseball,90 that monopoly sports leagues can comfort-
ably expand. Baseball should expand to any market in which
an average team can draw one and one-half million fans per
season. This proposition is supported by the 1986 season, in
which only nine of the current twenty-six teams drew fewer
fans,91 and by recent evidence indicating that well-managed
franchises achieve profitability even when their home attend-
ance is lower.92 The evidence suggests that at least four of the
five smallest population markets that currently have baseball
franchises-San Diego, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, and Kansas
City-will draw one and one-half million fans when their teams
88. See It's a Whole New Ball Game, BROADCASTING, Mar. 7, 1988, at 27
(two networks signed six-year contracts in 1983 for a total of $1.125 billion);
Rights Go Out of the Park, BROADCASTING, Mar. 10, 1980, at 33 (two networks
signed four-year contracts in 1979 estimated at a total of $185 million).
89. See Baseball Bats Over $300 Million in 1986, BROADCASTING, Mar. 3,
1986, at 43, 47-50.
90. The economic literature has not provided useful economic models for
predicting optimal expansion in football. Although this issue played a key role
in determining whether the NFL had committed illegal monopolization by
taking the Dallas-Fort Worth and Minneapolis-St. Paul markets away from
the AFL, the only trial court findings were the testimony of AFL owner La-
mar Hunt that a market of 500,000 population could support a well-managed
team and the judge's own conclusory assertion that "700,000 appears more rea-
sonable." AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 76 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124
(4th Cir. 1963).
Reasons for the difficulty in economic modeling for football include the
small number of home games played in football and the reliance by profes-
sional football on network television packages. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra
note 34, at 149 (memorandum by NFL attorneys). The relative paucity of
games suggests that perhaps 100 markets are large enough to entice 50,000-
60,000 fans eight times a year. Such a sizable expansion, however, would seri-
ously erode team quality and revenue per team from the network television
package. Id.
Although discussion of expansion in the NHL is beyond the scope of this
Article, see supra note 14, one economic model has demonstrated that there
are a number of viable locations without NHL franchises. Jones & Ferguson,
Location and Survival in the National Hockey League, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 443,
455 (1988). Moreover, if the NHL engaged in more revenue sharing, overall
profitability would increase, id. at 455 n.18, which could make additional loca-
tions feasible for expansion.
91. THE SPORTING NEWS, OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE 286 (1987).
92. See, e.g., Hertzel, Thrift Leyland Rewarded as Bucs Leave Basement,
The Sporting News, Oct. 19, 1987, at 23, col. 4 (reporting that Pittsburgh Pi-
rates expected to draw 1.4 million fans and to turn profit).
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win half of their games.93 Moreover, the demographic charac-
teristics of five markets that do not currently have baseball
teams-Washington, D.C., Miami-Fort Lauderdale, Tampa-St.
Petersburg, Phoenix, and Denver-indicate that teams in those
areas could draw at least as many fans as the smaller markets
in which franchises already exist.94 Finally, several commenta-
tors have noted that very large metropolitan areas probably can
accommodate additional expansion teams.9 5
The major policy argument against expansion is a lack of
"sufficient player talent to produce a proper caliber of play in
expanded leagues. 96 Any expansion reduces the average cali-
ber of major league players somewhat. 97 Even if this reduction
in quality noticeably affects the fans' enjoyment of the game,
however, the dramatic increase in satisfaction in the new ex-
pansion cities will usually counterbalance any decreased satis-
faction among fans in cities with teams. If live gate attendance
measures enjoyment,98 expansion and the alleged dilution of
player quality does not appear to have a negative impact on the
fans' enjoyment of the game. For example, overall attendance
increased in 1962, 1969, and 1977 after each Major League Base-
93. See Appendix A, infra.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 93; Noll, supra note 85, at 130.
96. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 64 (testimony of Cincinatti Reds
official Robert Howsam). But see B. JAMES, THE BILL JAMES BASEBALL AB-
STRACT 1988 at 21 (1988) (estimating talent sufficient for Major League Base-
ball to expand to 60 major league teams and 150 minor league teams).
Expansion also may reduce the enjoyment of current fans by reducing the
number of games against popular rivals, requiring greater effort by fans to fol-
low all teams, and by cheapening records when stars players attain heights
previously thought impossible by playing against players who, but for expan-
sion, would not be major league players. If this reduced enjoyment were sig-
nificant, it would result in reduced attendance and lower broadcast ratings.
97. Cf. Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, in
GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BuSiNESS 81, 96-97 (R. Noll ed. 1974) (citing ris-
ing attendance during World War II in cities where teams' records improved,
although overall league attendance declined because of lower quality due to
military service of many major league players).
Assuming that the ability to play baseball is distributed normally among
the population, a slight decrease in the level of quality of players will permit a
significantly larger number of men to play on the major league level. This
suggests that any realistic expansion plan will not significantly lower the
quality of play.
98. This Article assumes that the number of people attending a game re-
flects fan satisfaction and pleasure with the team from an entertainment
standpoint. Although the Article does not necessarily suggest this is the only
manner of gauging enjoyment, such a measure appears to be roughly accurate
and, more importantly, easily quantifiable.
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ball expansion.9 9 Similarly, overall attendance at NFL games
increased after each expansion.10 0 Indeed, when the National
Hockey League (NHL) expanded overnight from six to twelve
teams in 1967, overall attendance at NHL games continued to
increase,10 1 despite the significant decrease in player quality
one would expect with such a rapid expansion.
If competing leagues form, economic theory suggests that
all of the leagues would have a greater incentive to expand to
available markets. 10 2 Each league probably would have a sepa-
rate network television contract whose value ultimately would
depend on how many fans viewed the league's games. Each
league therefore would be eager to tap into new markets to at-
tract new viewers to its network package. For example, if the
NFL had a contract with CBS and the AFL had a rival contract
with NBC, CBS's ratings most likely would be higher in NFL
cities, whereas NBC's ratings would be higher in AFL areas. In
markets distant from any current franchise, such as Memphis,
ratings probably would be more equal. The NFL, however,
could expect to see a favorable increase in its ratings if it ex-
panded to Memphis. Conversely, NBC's AFL games would at-
tract fewer viewers in Memphis because the fans there would
have an NFL team to follow. AFL owners would have the
same incentive to expand. Thus, a league stands to profit by
expansion and to suffer if it sits by while a rival league expands
into a good market.10 3
99. See H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, THE OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASE-
BALL 71 (1979) (citing annual attendance figures for 1960-77).
100. See THE SPORTING NEWS PRO FOOTBALL GUIDE 391 (1987) (listing NFL
attendance figures).
101. See NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, OFFICIAL GUIDE & RECORD BOOK
1987-88 at 130 (1987) (listing NHL attendance figures).
102. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (testimony of Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General Joe Sims) (testifying that rival leagues encourage ex-
pansion into new cities).
103. For example, in 1983 the Colts were in Baltimore; in 1984 they moved
to Indianapolis. NFL football on NBC's Indianapolis affiliate (which shows
American Football Conference (AFC) contests) jumped from a 10 rating (29%
market share) to a 17 rating (41%1 market share). During the Colts' last year
in Baltimore, the Baltimore NBC affiliate enjoyed a 19-10 rating edge (47% to
27% market share); when the Colts left, the margin decisively narrowed.
(NBC had a 15 rating or 34% market share and CBS had a 13 rating or 31%
market share). For comparison, in Phoenix the ratings were both lower and
more equal. (NBC had a 13 rating or 39% market share; CBS had an 11 rating
or 32% market share). See ARBITRON RATINGS (1983-84).
These figures provide a useful comparison of the different incentives to
expand for a monopoly league and a competitive league. Even without a team,
NFL football still drew a rating of 28 in Baltimore after the Colts left, com-
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Again, because rival leagues seldom have existed, there is
only meager data about the expansion practices of such leagues.
The available evidence, however, supports the theoretical argu-
ment. For example, Major League Baseball traditionally re-
quired a unanimous vote of all the owners in each league to
approve any expansion. When the rival Continental League
was organized in the late 1950s, Major League Baseball changed
its rules to require a three-fourths majority, and both leagues
quickly expanded for the first time this century.10 4 In addition,
Major League Baseball dispensed with its rules protecting ex-
clusive territories and minor league teams.10 5
Fans in areas without franchises suffer without a local
team. Monopoly sports league owners, however, face strong
economic incentives not to expand, but rather deliberately to
restrict the number of available franchises. Economic models
nonetheless predict that Major League Baseball, for example,
easily could expand. With competing leagues, fans in expansion
cities would have something to cheer about.'
0 6
pared to a 29 rating during the Colts' last year there. The difference of one
rating point is unlikely to motivate 28 owners to reduce their share of the net-
work contract from 1/28 to 1/29. But assuming the Colts were part of an in-
dependent AFL, the incentives would be different. Without a team in
Baltimore, the independent AFL's ratings would have dropped four ratings
points. This suggests that the AFL may have barred the Colts' relocation to
Indianapolis or quickly granted Baltimore an expansion franchise.
104. Davis, Self-Regulation in Basebal, 1909-71, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS 349, 371-72 (R. Noll ed. 1974) [hereinafter Davis].
105. Id. (noting that expansion decisions were in direct conflict with rules
until compromise was reached between American and National Leagues).
106. Insufficient expansion of monopoly sports leagues also causes a divi-
sive debate among elected representatives when scarce teams relocate among
cities. During one set of hearings following the Philadelphia Eagles'
threatened move to Phoenix, Senator Howard Metzenbaum decried the "un-
seemly battles that pit friendly Senators against each other, defending their
home communities as they are exploited by sports monopolies." Thurmond 85
Hearings, supra note 28, at 32; see also id. at 31 (statement of Sen. Howard
Metzenbaum) ("The Nation faces serious problems with the deficit approach-
ing $200 billion. We are in the middle of an arms race .... Unemployment has
gone up, and the U.S. Senate is here debating sports franchises. Why?").
One virtue of a free enterprise system which the antitrust laws promote is
that "competitive market processes solve the economic problem impersonally,
and not through the personal control of entrepreneurs or bureaucrats. There
is nothing more galling than to have the achievement of some desired objec-
tive frustrated by the decision of an identifiable individual or group." F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 13
(2d ed. 1980).
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C. INEFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF PLAYERS
Sports fans should prefer a system of allocating players
among teams that gives their own favorite team the opportu-
nity to win the championship, but at the same time provides for
close, competitive games. To maximize both fan attendance at
games and ratings for broadcasts, thereby maximizing revenue,
leagues have an incentive to establish player allocation systems
that create the greatest fan interest. A monopoly league, how-
ever, has an anti-consumer incentive for establishing a player
allocation system. In sports in which all teams are members of
a single league, teams can agree among themselves on rules
that create a monopsony10 7 in the acquisition of players. Mo-
nopoly leagues therefore can create systems of allocating play-
ers that do not enhance the fans' enjoyment of the game, but
instead allow league owners artificially to hold down player sal-
aries. These restrictions, of course, have the most direct impact
on players. In addition, however, these systems do not allocate
players to maximize fan interest. This negative impact on the
fans may be of greater importance, but often is overlooked. L S
The following section will discuss systems of allocating
players, focusing primarily on the two that have sparked the
most debate and litigation: Major League Baseball's reserve
clause 0 9 and the National Football League's Rozelle Rule.110
The reserve clause, which was modified substantially in 1976,
allocated the exclusive rights to the services of each player to
one team.1 11 Unless a team waived, traded, sold, or otherwise
assigned those rights to another team, an individual wishing to
play baseball remained property of the team with whom he
signed his first contract.' 1 2 The Rozelle Rule, both in its origi-
nal and its modified form,11 3 permits a player to sign with any
107. Monopsony is the flip side of monopoly-a single firm buying goods or
services from sellers. See F. SCHERER, supra note 106, at 299.
108. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 1975)
(finding Rozelle Rule unlawful, although focusing solely on harm to players
and failing to address harm to consumer fans), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
109. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (reciting text
of reserve clause), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
110. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 779 (D. Minn. 1988) (quoting Ro-
zelle Rule).
111. See Atlanta Nat'l Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1215
(N.D. Ga. 1977).
112. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 273-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
113. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1976). In 1976, sev-
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NFL team at the expiration of a contract term.11 4 To sign the
player, however, the new team must provide significant "com-
pensation" to the player's former team.115 Originally, the Rule
provided that the Commissioner set the compensation.1 6 Cur-
rently, a team must give up one or two top draft choices for
most football players.1 17 The modified Rozelle Rule has virtu-
ally eliminated any free agency in football.311
The player allocation systems that Major League Baseball
and the NFL adopted have provided fodder for extensive de-
bate in court,11 9 before congressional committees,1 20 and among
eral football players challenged the Rozelle Rule, claiming it violated antitrust
laws. The court agreed, holding that parties must engage in collective bargain-
ing before a court could construe such a rule to avoid antitrust liability. Id. at
623. Consequently, the modified Rozelle Rule, termed the "Right of First Re-
fusal/Compensation System," gives a player's old club the right to match any
offer and keep the player. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779. If the team refuses to
match an offer, it receives draft choice compensation. Id. The Powell litiga-
tion has caused the NFL further to modify its rules, which are subject to still
further change during the pendency of the litigation. See Scorecard-A Semi-
open Field, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 10, 1987, at 14 (describing new NFL
plan permitting clubs to reserve 37 players but allowing remaining players to
become unrestricted free agents).
114. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779 (quoting Rozelle Rule).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 779-80 & n.2.
119. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 269-82 (1972) (reviewing legal
background of reserve system); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-
88 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing anticompetitive effects of NFL rules on player
market), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976); Reyn-
olds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1978) (evaluating settlement of liti-
gation challenging Rozelle Role); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding Rozelle Role unduly restrictive and violative of antitrust law);
Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781-89 (D. Minn. 1988) (renewing challenge to
Rozelle Role following expiration of collective bargaining agreement); Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 85-86 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (challenging NFL draft and stan-
dard player contract), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part, 586 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1978).
120. See, e.g., Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 67 (testimony of econo-
mist Gerald Scully) (refuting claims of harm to players and fans should anti-
trust law apply); id. at 454 (prepared statement of economist Jesse Markham)
(advising that leagues design player restraints to promote competitive balance,
continuity, and local identification with star players); 1 Sisk Hearings, supra
note 34, at 19-20 (testimony of Bowie Kuhn) (arguing reserve system is
mandatory for existence of baseball); id. at 80 (testimony of Pete Rozelle)
(contending NFL system is carefully designed to maintain competitive bal-
ance); id. at 217 (testimony of Edward Garvey) (arguing reserve clause holds
salaries down, not necessarily achieving competitive balance); id. at 312 (testi-
mony of George Sisler) (concerning viability of minor leagues without reserve
systems); 2 id. at 153 (memorandum of NFL) (same); id. at 162-63 (letter of
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academics.121 This Article's thesis suggests that monopoly
sports leagues, under the present scheme, employ inefficient
player allocation systems that harm fans. Competing leagues
have much less incentive to adopt such allocation systems,
although they might desire to impose some restraints on the
free market to promote exciting, competitive seasons. Unfortu-
nately, both industry defenders and critics in the debate do not
currently share this view that existing player allocation sys-
tems harm fans. Rather, the consensus viewpoint is that player
restraints do not result in an inefficient allocation of players.
Industry defenders of the current restraints argue that the
rules promote competitive balance and thus increase fan inter-
est in the sport.122 Critics charge that the restraints have no ef-
Roger Noll) (calculating effects on competitive balance); id. at 116 (testimony
of Gerald Scully) (alleging financial instability of teams and lowered quality of
play after antitrust application).
121. See, e.g., H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 35, 90-91 (discussing market
differences affecting talent distribution and noting practical considerations and
effects of athlete mobility, suggesting benefits of collective control over new
team entry); J. MARKHAM, supra note 77, at 110-11 (arguing that absence of
reserve system gives star athletes monopoly power); Daly & Moore, Externali-
ties, Property Rights and the Allocation of Resources in Major League Base-
ball, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 77, 84-94 (1981) (surveying consequences of change in
reserve system on competitive balance); Holahan, The Long-Run Effects of
Abolishing the Baseball Player Reserve System, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 129, 137 (1978)
(concluding teams will not suffer financially in absence of reserve system);
Hunt & Lewis, Dominance, Recontracting, and the Reserve Clause: Major
League Baseball, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 936, 937-41 (1976) (using mathematic mod-
els in assessing monopsonistic restrictions); Medoff, On Monopsonistic Ex-
ploitation in Professional Baseball, 16 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 113, 116-19 (1976)
(expanding on previous economic models to determine player value); Quirk &
el Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League, in GOVERN-
MENT AND THE SPORTS BusiNEss 33, 45-58 (R. Noll ed. 1974) (contrasting theo-
retical model with historical fact); Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and
Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints,
75 GEo. L.J. 19, 23 (1986) (analyzing plausible immunity from antitrust en-
forcement for league practices); Rottenberg, The Baseball Players'Labor Mar-
ket, 64 J. POL. ECON. 242, 254-58 (1956) [hereinafter Rottenberg Article]
(discussing whether reserve system is needed for competitive balance); Scully,
Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 915, 927-29
(1974) (measuring economic loss to players due to reserve clause); Topkis, Mo-
nopoly in Professional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691, 696-702 (1949) (discussing mo-
nopoly effects, most notably absence of player bargaining equality); Note, The
Super Bowl and the Sherman Act- Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust
Laws, 81 HARV. L. REV. 418, 430-34 (1967) [hereinafter HARvARD Note] (sug-
gesting alternative antitrust analysis to promote competition); Rottenberg,
Book Review, 13 J. ECON. LIT. 87, 88 (1975) [hereinafter Rottenberg Book Re-
view] (commenting on ambivalence about monopsonistic practices).
122. See, e.g., 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 80 (testimony of NFL Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle).
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fect, positive or negative, on player allocation, and serve only to
exploit the players.123 Those on both sides of this chasm are
incorrect.
1. The Desirability of Competitive Balance
Virtually all commentators on this subject agree that "com-
petitive balance" is a desirable goal for a sports league.124 Com-
petitive balance occurs when "there is relative parity among
the member teams and . . . each team has the opportunity of
becoming a contender over a reasonable cycle of years and a
reasonable chance of beating any other team on any given
night."125
Competitive balance in a league and the close competition
it creates enhance fans' enjoyment of sporting events.126 Econ-
omists Roger Noll and Henry Demmert have demonstrated em-
pirically that attendance increases when championship races
are closely contested.127 Similarly, courts have recognized that
sports leagues have a unique interest in maintaining competi-
tive balance. 128 The key issue in assessing player mobility re-
123. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d at 1176 ("Evenly-matched teams make for
closer games, tighter pennant races, and better player morale, thus maximiz-
ing fan interest, broadcast revenues, and overall health of the sport."); 2 Sisk
Hearings, supra note 34, at 167 (testimony of Gerald Scully) ("Uncertainty of
outcome is a necessary feature of competitive team sports, and this uncertainty
is determined primarily by the relative playing strengths of the teams.").
125. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
126. Thurmond 85 Hearings, supra note 28, at 384 (testimony of Charles F.
Rule); Canes, supra note 97, at 93 & n.26; HARVARD Note, supra note 121, at
421.
127. H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 11; Noll, supra note 85, at 155-56.
Using data from the 1971 Major League Baseball season, Demmert ex-
amined the average attendance at contests between two good teams, two bad
teams, or a mismatch. His data follow:
Table 6
Home Team
Good Poor
Visiting Team Good 24,610 (42) 11,349 (35)
Poor 16,066 (32) 9,806 (43)
H. DEMMERT, sup'ra note 85, at 11.
128. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting league's
"strong and unique" interest in balance); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984) (recognizing legitimate interest in "maintaining a com-
petitive balance").
[Vol. 73:643
SPORTS MONOPOLIES
strictions therefore is their effect on competitive balance. 129
2. Restraints Historically Imposed on Player Mobility Harm
Competitive Balance
The reserve clause and the Rozelle Rule are inefficient be-
cause cash is superior to barter as a means of allocating goods
in a market.130 Under these rules, any change in the current
allocation of players effectively is limited to a direct transaction
among two or three teams at most. In many circumstances,
the rules therefore result in an inefficient allocation of players.
Suppose, for example, that Baseball Team A has a surplus
of outfielders, but needs relief pitching. If Team B happens to
have extra relievers but is weak in the outfield, a trade may re-
sult. Suppose that Team B can part with a reliever, however,
but needs a power-hitting pinch hitter, and that Team C has a
power-hitting pinch hitter but needs a utility infielder. In the-
ory, some complex deal involving a number of teams-might be
arranged, but the transaction costs would be significant.' 3 '
Cash is simply more efficient than trading as a means of allo-
cating players. Team A would pay a premium for relief pitch-
ers, but not for outfielders. Team B could acquire a free agent
pinch hitter. Team C could acquire the utility infielder it
needs. In this way, all three teams would improve their player
talent and satisfy their fans.13 2
129. A separate argument league officials raise is that player restraints are
necessary to protect investment in player development. See infra text accom-
panying notes 200-09.
130. R. EKELUND & R. TOLLISON, MICROECONOMICS 14-15 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting that "[b]arter may have been sufficient in primitive societies," but that
a common denominator, money, replaces barter as individuals become special-
ized and the number of commodities grow).
131. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 1975)
(finding that Rozelle Rule decreases movement of players from one club to an-
other because it effectively restricts number of clubs interested in free agent
to those with trading material agreeable to current employer), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
132. In this example, Team B no doubt values Team A's extra outfielder
more than Team A does. With player restraints, the outfielder remains on
Team A's bench unless the teams arrange a direct transaction. Without player
restraints, Team B signs the player to a contract. Because Team B values the
player more, the salary will be higher. Thus, the player, as well as Team B's
fans, suffer from a system that prevents Team B from employing the out-
fielder. Cf. 104 CONG. REC. 12088 (1958) (Remarks of Rep. Roland Libonati)
(arguing that there is no reason to deprive star of his maximum earning poten-
tial merely because major league club owning him is not yet in need of his
services).
Major League Baseball recognizes this inefficiency. Rather than allowing
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Relying on trades or other forms of noncash direct transac-
tions also is inefficient and anti-consumer in situations in which
a team, perhaps because of bad luck or poor management deci-
sions, has a current shortage of talented players. In such cases,
trades are unlikely to be helpful because a team usually must
give up quality players to obtain quality players. Intelligent
drafting and development of young talent takes a long time. 3 3
In a free market, however, an owner recognizing that improved
player quality will result in increased attendance 3 4 could get
immediate results by acquiring top players in the open market.
Thus, fans of teams with inferior talent clearly suffer from re-
a free market to naturally and efficiently move players to teams on which they
are most needed, however, Major League Baseball has adopted an elaborate
set of waiver and other rules, including farm systems, designed to prevent the
better teams from stockpiling talent. J. MARKHtA, supra note 77, at 32 n.6.
For example, one rule allows a club to obtain for a small fee the services of a
player who has spent several years in the minor leagues and still has not made
the parent club's 40-man major league roster. Id. at 53. Allowing inferior
teams to obtain talent the superior franchises clearly consider surplus in ex-
treme cases is less efficient than allowing all teams to bid on all surplus talent.
Professors Quirk and el Hodiri argue that a draft and a complete ban on
free agency or sale of player contracts can secure competitive balance. Quirk
& el Hodiri, supra note 121, at 69 (proposition 5). Their proposal is inferior to
a free agent market for two reasons. First, management talent is not equally
distributed among franchises. Teams with superior scouts and player person-
nel directors and higher salaries will dominate. A free agent market allows
individual owners the ability to decide whether it is more efficient to invest in
scouts who can identify top-quality players to invest in developing, or whether
it is more efficient to outbid other teams for proven veterans. Second, draft
selection involves a significant element of chance, because even the best of
scouts cannot predict with accuracy how players will develop. A free agent
market allows franchises that are unlucky to provide their fans with contend-
ing teams.
133. The NFL's draft is a procedure under which exclusive negotiating
rights to graduating college football players are allocated each year among the
teams in inverse order of the club's standing. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Although some justify the draft, like the
Rozelle Rule, as promoting competitive balance, id., the draft actually limits
the ability of poorer teams to quickly improve. If there were no draft, poorer
teams could bid for several of each year's top rookies. With a draft, they may
bid on only one of the top 28, unless they trade one of the few top players cur-
rently on their roster for additional high draft choices.
134. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 402 (testimony of Milwaukee
Brewers owner Edmund B. Fitzgerald) ("the belief of fans that you can im-
prove is one thing that provides attendance").
Studies have demonstrated that a baseball team's win-loss record strongly
affects attendance. Demmert concluded, for example, that a club finishing five
games behind will draw 253,000 more fans than a similar club finishing 15
games behind. H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 66. Lucke was even more pre-
cise, concluding that each additional victory will attract, on average, almost
19,000 fans through the turnstiles. Lucke, supra note 86, at 18.
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strictions on player mobility. At the same time, dominant
teams with excess talent have no incentive-if cash sales are
difficult-to transfer a surplus player to a team that may value
the player more. It is ironic that a rule supposedly designed to
promote competitive balance actually appears to impede poorer
teams' efforts to improve themselves and to become more
competitive.
Empirical evidence documenting the extent of competitive
balance in Major League Baseball and the NFL corroborates
that the reserve clause and the Rozelle Rule are perverse ways
to prevent a small number of teams from dominating pennant
races. 135 This observation emerges from a comparison between
the level of competition in Major League Baseball during the
last seven years in which the reserve clause was in effect and a
comparable period of time following the Messersmith136 arbi-
tration decision, which effectively abolished the reserve
clause. 37 The theory presented above predicts that more teams
135. In Smith v. Pro Football, the court found that the NFL "was unable to
produce any credible evidence of a significant correlation between the oppor-
tunity to draft early in the draft (i.e. the preferred position) and improvement
in team performance." 420 F. Supp. at 746. In the three seasons prior to the
court's opinion in 1976, nine teams captured 22 of the 24 possible playoff spots.
Id.
136. Major League Baseball owners historically had construed a Uniform
Players Contract provision that gave them the right to renew the contract for
one year on the same terms as a right they could exercise after each season in
perpetuity. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (re-
viewing baseball history), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). Arbitrator Seitz, however, construed the contract as giving the team
the right to renew the contract for one year only, after which time the player
would be free to sign with any baseball team. Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l
League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101, 110-11 (Dec. 23, 1975) [hereinafter Messersmith].
137. The "pre-Messersmith" period consists of the 1969-1975 seasons. Prior
to 1969, Major League Baseball did not use divisional play; therefore compari-
sons of team standing or games behind a leader become difficult involving sea-
sons prior to that date. The author then sought to find a comparable seven-
year period after Messersmith. The 1981 strike season, which involved fewer
games and playoff contenders selected based on team performance in two dif-
ferent halves of the season, was eliminated. The author also eliminated the
1986 and 1987 seasons. Two arbitrators have sustained the contentions of the
Major League Baseball Players Association that owners conspired not to bid
on free agents during these seasons. In re Arbitration Between Major League
Baseball Players Association and The 26 Major League Clubs, Grievance No.
87-3 (Aug. 31, 1988) (Nicolau, Arb.); Collusion I, Grievance No. 86-2 (Sept. 21,
1987) (Roberts, Arb.). This left nine seasons in which there were no signifi-
cant limits on player mobility (1976-80, 1982-85). To attain a period of seven
seasons comparable with the pre-Messersmith period, the author eliminated
the first two seasons of free agency (1976 and 1977) because the effects of free
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should be "in the pennant race"13 8 after Messersmith substan-
tially impaired the reserve clause and lowered transaction costs
for obtaining the talent necessary to improve to the level of a
pennant contender. Indeed, in the pre-Messersmith period, a
total of thirty-four teams were in the pennant race; in the post-
Messersmith period, forty-eight teams were contenders.139 Ac-
cording to economist Henry Demmert, a franchise in a metro-
politan area of 2.5 million people will attract 275,000 more fans
if the team is in a close pennant race, 140 suggesting that aboli-
tion of the reserve clause made Major League Baseball more at-
tractive to fans.
Another measure of competition is the number of different
teams that win pennants. Fan interest increases if more teams
realistically vie for that prize. Roger Noll found that
"[w]inning a pennant apparently has a strong effect on attend-
ance in the winning season and also in several succeeding
years"141- due to the positive effect on season ticket sales.
142
Thus, overall league attendance, a proxy for consumer/fan in-
terest, "will be substantially higher if several teams alternate in
winning pennants than if one team tends to dominate."1 43 If
the increased ability to use cash made it easier for teams to
build a pennant winner by signing free agents, then a greater
variety of teams should win pennants following Messersmith
than during the era of the reserve clause. Once again, the data
support this theory. From 1969 through 1975, the seven years
immediately preceding Messersmith, eleven separate franchises
won division titles;1 4 4 in the seven post-Messersmith seasons
agency would not be as pronounced in the period immediately following a
half-century of total monopsony in the major league baseball player market.
The data were compiled from standings in the Baseball Encyclopedia and
the Sporting News. See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 483-585 (7th ed. 1988);
THE SPORTING NEWS, 1986 BASEBALL YEARBOOK 139, 147.
138. This Article defines a team in the pennant race as one that finished
no more than 10 games behind the pennant winner.
139. See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 137, at 438-585.
140. H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 66. This Article's definition differs
slightly from Demmert, who defines being in the race as being within 15
games of the leader at the end of the season. Id. Demmert provides no ex-
plicit rationale for this necessarily arbitrary definition; a 10-game margin
seems more accurately to reflect fans' perceptions.
141. Noll, supra note 85, at 122-23.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 123. Noll suggests that the domination of the American League
in the 1950s by the New York Yankees explains the wide divergence in attend-
ance between the two leagues during that period. Id.
144. See S. SIWoFF, THE BOOK OF BASEBALL RECORDS 267-72 (1988) (listing
participants in League Championship series from 1969 to 1987).
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studied, seventeen different franchises won.145 The Oakland
A's, Pittsburgh Pirates, Cincinnati Reds, and Baltimore Orioles
each won their divisions in four of the seven seasons immedi-
ately preceding Messersmith. In the seven seasons studied
when the reserve clause was not in effect, only the Kansas City
Royals achieved that level of dominance.146
Competitive balance also can be measured by examining
the number of pennant races in which the goal of competitive
balance failed because no team finished within ten games of the
winner. Again, this Article's theory predicts that this domi-
nance would occur less frequently -f teams used the free agent
market and quickly acquired players needed to stay in the race.
The data supports this Article's theory. Eight "blowout" races
occurred in the pre-Messersmith period, but only three oc-
curred after Messersmith.147
A common statistical measurement, the standard deviation,
also demonstrates that significant player restraints harm com-
petitive balance. The smaller the standard deviation, the
greater the degree of competitive balance. 48 Because Major
League Baseball has significantly modified its reserve clause,
placing relatively modest restrictions on a veteran player's abil-
ity to sign with any team, while the NFL retains rules that ef-
fectively bar free agency, analysis of competitive balance in the
NFL should reveal a much larger standard deviation than in
Major League Baseball. Indeed, the standard deviation for
NFL teams among the final four during the 18-year period
from 1970 to 1987 was 2.74.149 In contrast, the standard devia-
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. .
148. The standard deviation is a common statistic used to measure the dis-
persal of observed data. R. PARSONS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: A DECISION-
MAKING APPROACH 79-80 (1974). The standard deviation if the four division
titles in the National and American League East and West Divisions were ran-
domly distributed over a 10-year period would be 0.51. If four teams won their
division titles every time during a 10-year period, the standard deviation would
be 3.6. See id at 80-81 (setting forth formula for standard deviation).
149. During the 1970 to 1987 period, if all NFL teams were equal they
would statistically have progressed to the conference championship game 2.67
times. The standard deviation measures the gap between that statistical aver-
age and the reality that seven teams never were Super Bowl semi-finalists,
while eight franchises were among the final four five or more times. Only six
of the 28 NFL franchises went two or three times, as would occur if the league
were balanced. See SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA: PRO FOOTBALL 187-510 (D. Neff &
R. Cohen eds. 1987) (listing NFL standings from 1970-86); PRO FOOTBALL
GUIDE 6-114 (1988).
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tion for Major League Baseball division winners from 1976 to
1985, a period of relatively free player movement, was only
1.66.150
Owners in a monopoly league willingly adopt inefficient
player allocation schemes because their own profits from elimi-
nating competitive player salaries far exceed any losses due to
diminished fan interest in their sport. For example, attendance
at Major League Baseball games rose fifty-seven percent, from
29,789,913 in 1975, the last year of the reserve clause, to
46,824,379 in 1985, showing a strong increase in fan attendance
after Messersmith substantially eliminated the reserve
clause.15' Salaries rose to a competitive level at the same time,
however, with the average player's salary increasing from
$44,676 to $371,157.152 In constant dollars, this amounts to a 316
percent increase in costs.' 53 Thus, although players and, most
important, fans, profit from free agency for baseball veterans,
owners do not.
Accordingly, monopoly sports leagues have adopted many
rules that increase the league's power in the player market sig-
nificantly, but which have little effect on league competitive-
ness.1m For example, a reserve clause that eliminates almost
150. A team in perfectly balanced Major League Baseball would make it to
the League Championship Series 1.53 times during the 10 year period from
1976 to 1985. Fourteen of the 26 Major League Baseball franchises made it one
or two times. See S. SIWOFF, supra note 144, at 267-72 (listing all participants
in league championship series from 1969 to 1987).
151. See THE SPORTING NEWS OFFICIAL BASEBALL GUIDE 287 (1986) (at-
tendance based on 1985 data); H. TURKIN & S. THOMPSON, supra note 99, at 71
(1975 data).
152. Collusion I, Grievance No. 86-2, at 3.
153. The Consumer Price Index rose from 161.2 in 1975, UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 478 (1986),
to 322.2 in 1985, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 463 (1987). Thus, had average player salaries risen only
with inflation, the 1985 average would have been $89,296.57, less than a third
of the actual 1985 average.
154. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d at 622 (agreeing that even if some com-
pensation for loss of free agents is essential to maintain competitive balance,
"the Rozelle Rule is significantly more restrictive than necessary to serve any
legitimate purposes"); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (con-
cluding that Rozelle Rule imposes "restraint virtually unlimited in time and
extent, goes far beyond any possible need for fair protection of the interests of
the club-employers or the purposes of the NFL . . ."), aff'd, 586 F.2d 664 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).
A classic example of this phenomenon is the NFL's policy of conducting a
12-round draft of college players. See Minneapolis Star Tribune, April 28,
1988, at 2C, col. 1 (discussing 1988 NFL college draft). Even accepting argu-
endo the league's claim that a draft with a reverse selection process (the worst
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all free player mobility is unnecessary to achieve competitive
balance. 155 If certain teams become dominant-because of loca-
tion, winning tradition, or size of the market-a league can fos-
ter competitive balance by temporarily prohibiting the
dominant teams from signing free agents.15 6 A system that al-
lows poorer teams to draft players from the rosters of the more
successful teams, with minimal compensation paid to the domi-
nant franchise, also could correct any competitive imbalance
free agency caused.1 5 7 Also, some form of revenue sharing
among franchises could address the fear that teams in cities
with larger markets would dominate teams from smaller
markets.,5 8
team gets to pick first) allows the poorer teams to tap the best college players
and thus improve, most evidence suggests that no difference in ability exists
between those drafted after the third round and those undrafted players
signed as free agents. See Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 66 (testimony
of Gerald Scully).
Neither Major League Baseball nor the NFL ever have claimed that a free
market in average or mediocre players would affect competitive balance. Yet
the reserve clause and the Rozelle Rule applied to these players as well.
The current NFL rule granting a player's old team the right to retain the
player's services by simply matching any offer the player may receive from an-
other team is another example of a rule limiting mobility with no effect on
competitive balance. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. at 779. The ability to sell
or buy goods or services as long as one merely equals offers from rivals long
has been recognized as anticompetitive. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 12 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 397 (1947). No reason exists to believe that the team exercising the
right will be a poor team seeking to prevent a dominant franchise from gain-
ing further strength. Indeed, common sense suggests the reverse-superior
teams will have more top quality players and inferior teams will have a
greater incentive to enter the free agent market to improve.
155. See Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. at 746 (noting that, "even con-
ceding the need for some such system [a college draft], the current structure is
significantly more restrictive than necessary. In fact the current system is ab-
solutely the most restrictive one imaginable.").
156. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 217 (testimony of Edward Gar-
vey) (suggesting that prohibiting top eight playoff teams from signing free
agents would promote competitive balance).
157. HARVARD Note, supra note 121, at 425 n.35. The NHL used this proce-
dure in the mid-1960s when that league rapidly expanded from six to 12
franchises.
158. A number of league critics as well as league officials strongly advocate
revenue sharing as a means for promoting competitive balance. See, e.g., Thur-
mond 82 Hearings, supra note 38, at 56 (testimony of Pete Rozelle); 1 Sisk
Hearings, supra note 34, at 651 (testimony of National Basketball Players' As-
sociation General Counsel Lawrence Fleischer) (advocating gate revenue shar-
ing to keep rich teams from getting richer); 2 id. at 111 (testimony of Roger
Noll).
Conversely, other commentators suggest that revenue sharing is anticom-
petitive because it erodes the individual incentive for franchises to improve
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Substantial restraints on free agency like the reserve
clause and the Rozelle Rule hurt fans and competition. This is
true as a theoretical matter: a cash economy is simply a more
efficient way to allocate goods and services than a barter econ-
omy.15 9 It is also true as an empirical matter: under Major
League Baseball's recent regime of free agency, competitive
balance and exciting pennant races have flourished; under base-
ball's ill-fated reserve clause and football's continuous re-
straints on mobility, there are fewer new champions and
greater dominance by a few teams. 160
themselves and thus eliminates the need to bid to obtain quality players. See,
e.g., Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 99 (testimony of NFL Players' As-
sociation Executive Director Gene Upshaw) (arguing against special antitrust
exceptions for professional sports teams to pool revenue); id. at 105 (testimony
of USFL Players' Association Executive Director Doug Allen); Thurmond 82
Hearings, supra note 38, at 384 (testimony of Major League Baseball Players'
Association General Counsel Donald Fehr) (opposing "carte blanche to share
revenues in any manner"); Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 36 (testi-
mony of NFL Players' Association Executive Director Edward Garvey); 1 Sisk
Hearings, supra note 34, at 166-68 (testimony of World Hockey Association
(WHA) New England Whalers Hockey Club owner Harrison Vickers) (stating
that "the greatest incentive to having a balanced league and competitive teams
is to impress upon the owner he must do his job or he won't make it."); 2 id. at
142 (remarks of Rep. B.F. Sisk) (expressing concern that across-the-board rev-
enue sharing would cause teams to become lax and deprive them of incentive
to promote their product); id. at 403 (testimony of Milwaukee Brewers owner
Edmund B. Fitzgerald). Revenue sharing deprives each team of a key aspect
of the competitive process-the knowledge that higher profits reward a
greater investment in producing a superior product. Michael Duberstein of
the NFL Players' Association compiled statistics demonstrating the disincen-
tive to invest that significant revenue sharing in the NFL creates. Studying
the 1983 to 1986 seasons, he found that the top seven teams in the league aver-
aged 9.6 wins, paid their players an average base salary of $156,400, and re-
ceived average gross revenues of $27.4 million. Letter from Michael
Duberstein to Stephen F. Ross (May 3, 1988). Conversely, the bottom seven
teams averaged only 6.1 wins and paid their players an average base salary of
only $142,800, yet their average gross revenues were virtually the same as the
top teams-$27.0 million. Id.
To address these critics of revenue sharing, economist Gerald Scully has
advocated a system in which league champions receive a portion of the pooled
revenues. See Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 69; 2 Sisk Hearings, supra
note 34, at 175; see also Thurmond 85 Hearings, supra note 28, at 390-91; (testi-
mony of Acting Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division Charles F.
Rule) (stating that although "some revenue pooling can be an appropriate
means for promoting on-field parity under certain circumstances, it can also go
too far, creating an unjustified restraint on competition.").
159. See supra note 130.
160. See also Besanko & Simon, Resource Allocation in the Baseball Play-
ers' Labor Market: An Empirical Investigation, REV. Bus. & ECON. RE-
SOURCES, Fall 1985, at 71, 74-78 (concluding that empirical research shows
"within-season competitive equality has increased since free agency"); cf.
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3. The Leagues' Thesis: Player Allocation Will Be Distorted
Absent Significant Restraints on Player Mobility
League officials argue that restrictions on player mobility
serve to promote competitive balance and to enhance fan inter-
est.161 They observe that the size of the various markets in
which major league franchises play differs widely, resulting in
a disparity in the revenue each team obtains from live gates
and broadcasts.162 The leagues fear that without restrictions on
Drahozal, The Impact of Free Agency on the Distribution of Playing Talent in
Major League Baseball, 38 J. ECON. & Bus. 113, 119 (1986) (reporting mixed
results using standard deviations for pooled winning percentages, with de-
crease in balance in American League and increase in balance in National
League).
161. See, e.g., 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 19-20 (testimony of Major
League Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn).
Kuhn also justified the reserve clause as necessary to protect against tam-
pering with players under contract to another team. Id at 20. If a player on
Team A is negotiating or contracting with Team B for future services, he may
not play his best for Team A. This arguably would compromise the integrity
of the game. Restrictions such as the reserve clause are totally unnecessary to
address this concern. Even if players were free to sign with whatever team
they wish at the expiration of their present contract, league rules could pre-
vent other teams from negotiating or contracting during the term of the cur-
rent contract. Indeed, Major League Baseball has such rules, which
Commissioner Kuhn has enforced vigorously. See, e.g., Atlanta Nat'l League
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (upholding
Commissioner's suspension of Braves owner Ted Turner for one year for pre-
maturely negotiating with player another team previously had employed).
Jesse Markham offers yet another justification for a reserve clause: with-
out significant restrictions on player mobility, the identity between a player
and a franchise weakens. Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 454 (testi-
mony of Professor Jesse Markham). Presumably, fans are worse off because
their hometown favorite might play for the evil arch-rival next season. Mark-
ham does not suggest, however, why an unrestrained market could not address
these problems. If a player is beloved in one locale not only for his playing
talent but for the history of his service on the local club, he will be more valu-
able to that club than to others. The local club, therefore, should outbid
others to maintain his services. Moreover, teams anticipating problems with
instability can offer players long-term contracts to remain where they are. See
id at 67 (testimony of Gerald Scully); H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 91.
162. See, e.g., Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 103 (testimony of At-
lanta Braves owner Ted Turner) (noting that New York Yankees received $5
million for local television rights in 1980, while Kansas City Royals-who de-
feated the Yankees in previous year's league championship series-received
less than $1 million); 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 75 (testimony of Oak-
land A's owner Charles 0. Finley) (stating that A's did not receive any money
for local television and radio broadcasts while Boston Red Sox earn $2 million
annually); i&i at 123 (letter from San Diego Padres President Emil A. Bavasi)
(pointing out that Padres get $23,000 from local television and radio broadcasts
and Los Angeles Dodgers earn $1.8 million).
Empirical studies also demonstrate the effect of population on paid attend-
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player mobility, the richer teams in major media markets will
outbid their poorer rivals for the best players and dominate the
league, ruining competitive balance and reducing fan inter-
est. 63 Significantly, monopoly leagues often have avoided
adopting other rules-such as restrictions on investments in
player development, coaches, or executive talent-that may sig-
nificantly increase competitive balance, but do not provide the
dividend of monopsonization of the player market.16
4
ance at the gate. See H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 49-50; Noll, supra note 85,
at 152-53; Lucke, supra note 86, at 18. Revenue sharing can significantly miti-
gate the effects of this disparity. See supra note 158.
163. See Smith v. Pro Footbal, Inc., 420 F. Supp. at 746.
Some economists argue that the problem of competitive balance is purely
a function of the league's decision to confer exclusive territories upon their
franchises. See, e.g., 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 118-19 (testimony of
Gerald Scully). There is some truth to the notion that franchises in New York
and Los Angeles would not dominate as they do if they faced multiple rivals
from their own metropolitan area. Indeed, under this Article's proposal to es-
tablish rival leagues, the major metropolitan areas may host an increased
number of franchises. Abolishing exclusive territories, however, will not solve
competitive balance problems. Even if a league selects the optimal number of
franchises the league and its fans may be better off if franchises are spread
throughout the country rather than concentrated in a few major metropolitan
areas. Additionally, divisibility problems always will mean that some markets
are larger than others. Thus, leagues still must deal with the effects on player
allocation, if any, of unequal markets.
164. Major League Baseball and the NFL have failed to adopt rules to pro-
mote competitive balance in the following areas:
Revenue Sharing. The control of league decisions by the owners of in-
dependent franchises prevents substantial revenue sharing in Major League
Baseball. The current decision-making structure creates conflicts between the
League's interest and various owners' self-interest. A cartel, which is essen-
tially what a league is, has difficulty with proposals that redistribute income
among members, even if the redistribution is best for the overall league or will
increase overall profits. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 348. In principle,
if all were better off, the owners could devise a compensation scheme to re-
flect this optimality. In practice, it is extremely difficult to reach agreement
on a scheme to compensate the losers. See Davis, supra note 104, at 352. In
the 1950s, Chicago White Sox owner Bill Veeck proposed that the visiting
team's share of gate attendance increase to 40%. Id. This would help equalize
disparities between the cities, and it would appear to preserve a substantial in-
centive for teams to engage in promotion and to maintain quality. Id at 357.
Veeck's proposal failed to receive the three-fourths approval the American
League Constitution required because of oppositon from the three richest
teams: New York, Detroit, and Boston. Id.; see also H. DEMMERT, supra note
85, at 32 (observing that "the redistribution of playing talent will not be a
unanimously acceptable solution within the league, and the rich market clubs
may be able to block such a collective policy").
Investment in Minor Leagues. Wealthy teams in large markets have a
greater ability to acquire top talent than teams with less wealth in smaller
markets. Wealthy teams also have a greater ability to invest in their farm sys-
tems. Major League Baseball, however, has no limits on the amount teams can
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League officials vigorously reject the contention that an
open market will allocate players efficiently.165 They claim
that free agents will flock to cities with the richest teams or
owners-to "glamor" cities like New York, Los Angeles, and
Miami-and to teams with winning records. 166 The league's
critics have denied this claim with equal vigor. For example,
former NFL Players' Association director Edward Garvey testi-
fied that during the brief period when football teams were free
to sign players without penalty, the fears of NFL officials did
not come true.167 Garvey concluded:
invest in player development. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 172 (tes-
timony of Gerald Scully).
Investment in Coaches. As one football observer commented, "the great-
est threat to competitive influence in the NFL is Don Shula because he keeps
winning ...." 1 id, at 230 (testimony of Edward Garvey). The court of appeals
in Smith v. Pro Football found that six teams consistently had entered the
playoffs and won titles despite receiving some of the lowest draft picks each
year, because of continuity under successful coaches. 593 F.2d at 1184-85 n.46.
The court specifically noted the experience of four franchises: the Green Bay
Packers, Washington Redskins, Miami Dolphins, and Pittsburgh Steelers. Id.
at 1185 n.46. Each of these teams suffered a number of losing seasons with the
continuing reward of top draft choices, but continued to flounder until the ar-
rival of a top coach. Id. The court concluded that "the effects of fine coaching
swamp whatever effect the draft may have on team performance." Id. Simi-
larly, an analysis of the effect of managerial talent in Major League Baseball
revealed that top managers, such as Earl Weaver of the Baltimore Orioles,
were as valuable to their teams as top superstars such as Sandy Koufax.
Porter & Scully, Measuring Managerial Efficiency: The Case of Baseball, 48 S.
ECON. J. 642, 649 (1982). Yet neither the NFL nor Major League Baseball sets
limits on the market for coaches or managerial talent.
Judge MacKinnon, in defending the draft as a promoter of competitive
balance, noted that "[i]n only one of 12 seasons from 1964-1975 did those teams
in the bottom half of the NFL's standings fail to win a greater number of
games in the next season following priority selections in the draft. Statistical
analysis shows that this could not have been the product of chance occurring
without regard to the draft." Smith, 593 F.2d at 1202 n.45 (MacKinnon, J., dis-
senting). This statistic misses the point: competitive balance is not merely
served by devices that minimally improve poorer teams; the goal of competi-
tive balance is to give all teams a realistic chance to vie for the championship.
See Philadelphia Hockey, 351 F. Supp. at 486 (asserting that competitive bal-
ance occurs when "each team has the opportunity of becoming a contender
over a reasonable cycle of years and a reasonable chance of beating any other
team on any given night"). The data suggest that this is far less true in the
NFL with its host of restraints than it was in Major League Baseball during
the reign of veteran free agency.
165. See Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. at 745-46; see also Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d at 621.
166. Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. at 745-46.
167. This brief period of free agency existed between the Eighth Circuit's
1976 decision in Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609, which upheld a district court judg-
ment enjoining enforcement of the Rozelle Rule, and the 1977 settlement of
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The simple fact is that professional athletes have as many geographi-
cal preferences as lawyers, teachers, machinists, or Congressmen.
Some people want to live on the coast, some in the Midwest and some
in the South. Their choices are based on family background, where
their families live, where they went to school, where they wish to
raise a family, where they have educational and vocational opportuni-
ties. While obviously money is a factor, there are many others. The
primary one that I have found in talking with professional athletes is
that they will go where they can perform.1 6 8
Veteran Major League Baseball players were not subject to
any significant restraints on mobility during a period from 1976
through 1985.169 An examination of the actual movement of
free agents during this ten-year period tests the league officials'
claims that unrestricted player mobility results in an exodus of
talent to contenders in warm-weather cities with large popula-
the litigation, reached concurrently with a new collective bargaining agree-
ment between the NFL and its players. See Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,730, at 72,984 n.2 (D. Minn. 1977). During this period, the Los
Angeles Rams, a contender and a warm-weather franchise, re-signed Fred
Dryer from their own roster. 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 215 (testimony
of NFL Players' Association Executive Director Edward R. Garvey). Calvin
Hill and Jean Fugett left the Super Bowl champion Dallas Cowboys because of
a preference for residing in the Washington area. Id. at 216. Paul Warfield left
the Miami Dolphins to sign with the Cleveland Browns. Id. The Kansas City
Chiefs signed no free agents, although it was feared that Chiefs owner Lamar
Hunt would use his personal fortune to stockpile talent. See id at 215-16 (tes-
timony of Edward R. Garvey).
168. 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 216 (emphasis added); see also
Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d at 1183-84 n.46 (repeating evidence that deci-
sive factors affecting free agents' choice of teams included unrelated business
opportunities, racial discrimination and general community atmosphere, pref-
erence for NFL over rival league, dispute with prior owner, climate, educa-
tional opportunities, and disagreements with coaching staff or management);
Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. at 746 (observing that "the little empirical
evidence available with regard to the movement of free agents and former
World Football League players since the 1975 season ended does not show" a
trend to teams offering money, glamour, and success); Professional Basketball:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2373, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 871 (1972) [hereinafter
Hoop Hearings] (testimony of National Basketball Players' Association Vice
President Bill Bradley) (suggesting that free agency promotes competitive bal-
ance because stars are unlikely to switch from team to team but reserves on
dominant teams like the Celtics or Lakers would be willing to go to other
teams where they could get more playing time).
169. Before the 1976 season, Major League Baseball entered into a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with its players' union allowing players with at
least six years of major league service to become free agents at the expiration
of their contracts with minimal compensation to their former teams. See R.
BERRY, W. GOULD & P. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS 61-62 (1986). In 1985, however, the owners began to collude with each
other to stop the free movement of players. See Collusion I, Grievance No. 86-
2 (Sept. 21, 1987) (Roberts, Arb.).
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tions. First, a multiple regression analysis assessed the impact
of the net movement of free agents each year, characterizing
each franchise by the population of its home city, previous
year's place in the standings, and median temperature in April.
This analysis revealed no systematic relationship between a
franchise's place in the standings and its ability to sign free
agents.170 Multiple regression analysis also revealed only a
very weak positive relationship that was not statistically signifi-
cant, over the entire ten-year period, between both tempera-
ture and population and a franchise's net success in signing-
versus losing-players in the free agent market. 7 1 Even if
valid, the analysis shows that a city that is eight degrees
warmer than another city will sign only one more free agent
over a ten-year period, hardly cause for concern. Moreover,
franchises in the larger cities have a limited edge in attracting
free agents in an open market; for every additional million resi-
dents, a team will sign fewer than one free agent a decade.1 72
Indeed, over the decade of active free agency, the Los Angeles
Dodgers and the New York Mets lost more free agents than
they signed.
Evaluating the effect of an open market in the NFL is
more difficult because there never has been a significant period
of time in recent history during which an open market existed
in that league. A substantial movement of free agents occurred
just prior to the 1976 season when an injunction briefly barred
enforcement of the Rozelle Rule.1 73 In that year, however,
football players did not flock to dominant teams in warm
170. See Appendix B, infra. Another empirical study actually showed a
clear trend of movement of free agents from good teams to poorer ones.
Besanko & Simon, supra note 160, at 83. This would reflect the natural incli-
nation of owners of inferior teams to seek to improve their teams rapidly by
acquiring an established veteran player rather than patiently waiting several
years for the possible development of younger talent.
This empirical evidence appears to contradict the anecdotal evidence the
NFL presented in Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621, that players flocked to winners.
See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 153 (reprinting extracts from NFL de-
fendants' post-trial brief).
171. See Appendix B, infra. For example, San Diego is only 15 degrees
warmer in April than Montreal; under this analysis, all other things being
equal, the Padres would sign only two more agents than the Expos over the
course of a decade.
172. See also Drahozal, supra note 160, at 117 (stating that empirical study
finds "no movement of free agents in the sample from small cities to big cit-
ies"). But see Besanko & Simon, supra note 160, at 82-83 (1985) (noting some
movement of free agents from small to larger cities).
173. See supra note 167.
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weather climates.17 4 The empirical evidence appears to dis-
credit the claim that an open market, which tends to improve
the quality of other products in our free enterprise economic
system, nevertheless diminishes the quality of baseball and
football.
4. The Critics' Thesis: Restraints Have No Effect on
Competitive Balance
The reserve clause, the Rozelle Rule, and other significant
restraints on a free market for players have come under exten-
sive attack from academics who claim that the restraints have
no effect on the allocation of players, but merely allow owners
in monopoly sports leagues to act collusively so as to reduce the
salaries paid to players. These critics argue that a free market
does exist because a team can sell a player's contract to another
team. The only difference between a system using a reserve
clause and a free market system, they maintain, is that under
the former, the premium needed to acquire a player is paid to
the player's prior team, not to the player himself.175 These crit-
ics conclude that the owners' desire for monopsony power alone
motivates any restrictions on player mobility.
176
174. The free agents who moved in 1976 are listed at 1 Sisk Hearings,
supra note 34, at 221 (testimony of Edward Garvey). For a description of the
collective bargaining agreement provisions reinstating player mobility restric-
tions, see Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 286-87 & n.8 (8th Cir. 1978).
175. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 620 n.28 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that
"Alan Page testified that the Rozelle Rule was a hindrance to free player
movement, but that the principal effect is on players' salaries."); SISK REPORT,
supra note 25, at 47 (illustrating contradiction that although restrictions are
justified as necessary to equalize playing stength, teams "have almost complete
freedom to purchase contracts of players from other teams"); H. DEMMERT,
supra note 85, at 35 (concluding that actual effect of draft and reserve clause
on distribution of athletic quality is "likely to be quite insignificant"); id at 75-
76 (noting that Connie Mack's sales of Philadelphia Athletics' star players dur-
ing Depression and Kansas City Athletics' constant sale of players to New
York Yankees illustrate "the ultimate failure of the reserve system as a tool
for impeding the movement of athletic talent to the richer markets"); Canes,
supra note 97, at 91 (stating that restrictive league rules do not alter the distri-
bution of player talent from what would occur in open market situation);
Quirk & el Hodiri, supra note 121, at 33; Rottenberg Article, supra note 121;
Rottenberg Book Review, supra note 121, at 88 (adding that "so long as recon-
tracting through trading of players among teams and the purchase and sale by
teams of rights to players' services is permitted, monopsony will leave unaf-
fected the allocation of playing talent among teams but will affect only wealth
distribution").
176. Economists correctly observe that the exercise of monopsony power
by sports leagues does not result--as would be expected for most markets-in
an inefficiently low number of quality players willing to play. There is a huge
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This argument has two flaws. First, these critics falsely as-
sume that teams freely sell player contracts among themselves.
Second, the critics fail to recognize that some restraints on
player mobility may be necessary to achieve competitive
balance.
Virtually all critics of the reserve system have assumed
that teams can and do freely sell players for cash.177 This may
well have been true in Major League Baseball in the early and
middle part of the century.178 Recently, however, this assump-
tion has not held true. The courts now have sustained the com-
missioner of Major League Baseball's rulings that cash sales are
against the best interest of the sport.179 NFL regulations pro-
hibit cash sales of players.'8 0
If the critics' theory were correct, then the type of free
market for players that existed after the Messersmith decision
disparity between even the monopsony wage that owners pay and the best
wage that most players can attract from any other form of employment. Thus,
the industry still will attract nearly all the best athletes even if they receive
wages far less than their value. See, e.g., Noll, The Economics of Sports
Leagues, in THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS 17-20 (G. Uber-
stine ed. 1988).
177. See, e.g., SISK REPORT, supra note 25, at 47 (teams "have almost com-
plete freedom to purchase contracts from other teams"); H. DEMMERT, supra
note 85, at 36 (maintaining that if another team values a player more highly,
current club will sell rights to player); Canes, supra note 97, at 84 (describing
reserve system with assumption that reserve clause rights can be sold); Quirk
& el Hodiri, supra note 121, at 39-40 (contrasting effect of draft if sale of
player contracts were prohibited with present structure); Rottenberg Book Re-
view, supra note 121, at 88 (assuming that "the purchase and sale by teams of
rights to players' services is permitted").
178. Quirk and el Hodiri estimate that from 1920 to 1950, four of the 16
Major League Baseball franchises had net sales of players exceeding their net
profits. Quirk & el Hodiri, supra note 121, at 53. In other words, these teams
well may have folded without the ability to sell players, or without some other
form of wealth transfer from other owners. Holahan, supra note 121, at 137.
Today, shared revenue from network television contracts provides a substan-
tial wealth transfer. New York and Seattle share equally in network revenues
despite more viewers in New York. Drahozal, supra note 160, at 115 n.3 (not-
ing that national, but not local broadcast revenues are "divided evenly among
the teams"). This may explain the decline in cash sales.
179. Charles 0. Finley Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (recog-
nizing broad authority of Baseball Commissioner and concluding that Commis-
sioner Kuhn acted within the scope of his authority when he disallowed sales
of Joe Rudi, Rollie Fingers, and Vida Blue in "the best interests of baseball").
180. Letter from Paul Tagliabue (NFL counsel) to Stephen F. Ross (June
7, 1988). See also 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 149 (letter from NFL
counsel Hamilton Carothers) (stating that sale of players "is not an NFL prac-
tice"). But see Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 76 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (allowing Redskins sale of Kapp's rights to Vikings for $50,000).
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also should have existed prior to that decision and the Commis-
sioner's rulings. The only difference would be that the cash
went to the owners, rather than to the players. This free mar-
ket, however, does not appear to have existed. A free market
in player contracts may not have existed because owners were
reluctant to sell top players for cash because of the negative
press and fan reaction to transactions that so obviously weaken
the playing strength of the team solely for the financial sake of
the owner.181 The New York Yankees' experience after the in-
stitution of the major league draft for college and high school
baseball players is instructive. The Yankees' dominance of the
American League came to a halt shortly after the draft be-
gan.1 82 If the critics' theory were correct, the Yankees should
have attempted to reverse that trend by purchasing player con-
tracts from other teams, but the Yankees failed to do so.18 3 In-
deed, because cash is so much more efficient than barter, one
would expect that if teams freely sold as well as traded players,
teams would have sold many more players than they traded in
the pre-Messersmith era. In fact, the opposite was true.184
Moreover, if the critics' theory were accurate, the frequency of
cash sales between teams during the reserve clause era should
have approximated the frequency of cash sales and free agent
signings after substantial abolition of the reserve clause in 1975.
Again, the empirical evidence appears to refute the critics'
theory. 85
181. Two commentators suggest that the failure to engage in signficant
buying and selling of player contracts may be due to "potentially strong press
and fan reaction to cash deals, which weaken the playing strength of the home
team .... ." Hunt & Lewis, supra note 121, at 936. "Sizeable public indignation
over the weakening of a sports franchise could become a political issue, threat-
ening baseball's antitrust immunity, and weakening the perception of baseball
as a "sport" rather than a "business," id., or such indignation may simply be
bad for good will and public relations. Because of this reluctance to engage in
the wholesale buying and selling of players, changes in league rules to permit
or even facilitate such transactions will not permit the market to work as effi-
ciently as when players are free agents. Moreover, even if teams willingly par-
ticipate in an open market for assignment of player contracts, such a system
unjustifiably results in a significant wealth transfer from players to owners.
182. I& The first baseball draft was in 1965. The New York Yankees won
14 American League pennants from 1949 through 1964. The Yankees, how-
ever, failed to win another pennant until 1976. S. SIWOFF, supra note 144, at
326.
183. Daly & Moore, supra note 121, at 88.
184. An analysis of trades and sales made between 1969 and 1976 disclosed
593 players traded to other teams and 382 sold for cash. See THE BASEBALL
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 137, at 2253-2709.
185. An analysis by economists David Besanko and Daniel Simon appears
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Those who argue that restraints on player mobility have no
effect on the allocation of players overlook the need for re-
straints to achieve competitive balance that results from the in-
terdependence of the individual teams comprising sports
leagues. Although any given individual team may profit by be-
coming dominant, the rest of the league suffers from the result-
ing competitive imbalance. In economic terms, league balance,
like national defense, is a "public good."1 8 6 Although balance
benefits all teams, no individual team has any incentive to work
toward it. As a result, a league that relies solely on an open
market may not achieve competitive balance. L8 7 Without some
limitation on a free market, some franchises will be too strong,
some will be too weak, and fans everywhere will suffer from
decreased competition.1 8 8
to support the critics' theory. Their analysis of "all players changing teams in
both major leagues from the end of the 1969 season to the end of 1981" showed
the same level of player movement before and after Messersmith. See
Besanko & Simon, supra note 160, at 73. A better analysis, however, would
distinguish between trades and cash sales. This Article's analysis of the same
time period Besanko and Simon studied shows a modest but significant drop in
the relative number of trades to cash transactions. Between 1969 and 1975,
there were 975 transactions, 593 of which were trades (61%) and 382 of which
were cash sales (39%). See supra note 184. Between 1976 and 1981, there were
719 transactions, 376 of which were trades (52%), 230 of which were cash sales
(32%), and 113 of which were free agent signings (16%). TEE BASEBALL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, supra note 137, at 2253-2709. Because cash is more efficient than
barter, the increase in cash transactions since Messersmith suggests that the
market for allocating players is working more efficiently.
One commentator has suggested that teams evade the rules against cash
sales by trading superior players with hefty salaries for lesser players with
smaller paychecks. Drahozal, supra note 160, at 115 n.4. Thus, he suggests
that the critics' theory that restrictions on player mobility do not affect the al-
location of players may be correct. This attempted resucitation of the theory is
flawed. This Article's thesis that cash is a much more efficient means of allo-
cating resources than direct trades suggests that even if teams did engage in
widespread trades of unequal players in lieu of cash sales in the pre-Messer-
smith era, transaction costs probably precluded many other efficient player
movements.
186. See H. DEMIERT, supra note 87, at 83; Daly & Moore, supra note 121,
at 80.
187. As Demmert explains in economic terms:
[I]ncreases in the relative quality of a better than average team will
reduce the degree of competitive equality within the league, and if in-
deed this is a parameter of product quality, the demand functions for
all clubs will, other things equal, shift downward. The total effect
will however be largely external to the club which precipitated it, and
the effect of decreased competitive equality on its own demand will
likely be insignificant in comparison to the benefits derived from
winning.
H. DEMEERT, supra note 85, at 28-29.
188. Daly & Moore, supra note 121, at 81.
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In a free market, a player will go to the team that places
the highest value on his services. For example, if Rickey Hen-
derson were playing for the Seattle Mariners, but the New
York Yankees valued him most highly,'8 9 he would sign with
the Yankees when his contract expires. Acquiring Henderson
will, of course, please Yankee fans and further enrich the New
York franchise. The acquistion might also, however, make the
Yankees too dominant in the American League East, thereby
decreasing the enjoyment, and possibly the attendance, of the
fans in other American League East cities.190 In theory, if the
adverse marginal effect of the trade upon the Yankees' Ameri-
can League East rivals were greater than the marginal benefits
to New York, then the Red Sox, Orioles, Blue Jays, Indians,
Tigers, and Brewers could all get together and pay Seattle not
to sell Henderson to the Yankees. In reality, however, the high
transaction costs would prohibit this arrangement. An ineffi-
cient allocation of resources results: fans on the whole would
be worse off if Henderson moved to the Yankees than if he
stayed in Seattle. Maximizing fan interest may necessitate
some generalized restraint to prevent players from moving
freely to the team that values them most highly.' 91
189. In economic terms, a team values a player for his marginal revenue
product, defined as "the amount of money that adding a particular player
would contribute annually to the net revenues of a team." Selig v. United
States, 565 F. Supp. 524, 538 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir.
1984).
190. For example, one economic study suggested that if the average team
moves up one place in the standings, it will increase its home attendance by
84,000 fans per year; however, this will reduce the live gate for all other teams
by 69,000 fans. Canes, supra note 97, at 97-99. Of course, this is an average;
thus, it is plausible that a particular improvement in one team could result in
a net overall loss when considering its rivals' reduced attendance. Another
study demonstrated the external costs of one team's improvement. The study
estimated that New York maximizes its profits by securing a team sufficient to
win the pennant 80% of the time; the rest of the division is best off, however,
if New York wins 43% of the time. Hunt & Lewis, supra note 121, at 940.
191. In the 1976 collective bargaining agreement reached after the Messer-
smith arbitration, which included a substantial increase in contributions to the
union pension fund, the players agreed to a modified reserve system that ties
players to their original club for six years. Staudohar, Player Salary Issues in
Major League Baseball, ARB. J., Dec. 1978, at 17, 18. After two years of service,
players who could not agree to terms with management could submit salary
disputes to arbitration. Id. at 20. Commissioner Kuhn testified that the play-
ers agreed to limit free agency because they recognized the necessity of such
limits to the continued welfare of baseball. 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at
18.
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5. Rival Leagues' Imposition of Player Restraints
Henry Demmert's generally critical economic analysis of
major professional sports concedes that clubs may need to act
jointly to ensure the equal distribution of playing talent.192
This joint action likely would fall into two categories: direct
agreements not to bid for the services of certain players and
adoption of revenue sharing agreements. Revenue sharing
agreements reduce a team's financial incentive to acquire a
player who would contribute positively to the team's revenue if
the acquisition would have a net negative effect on overall
league revenues. 93
In establishing rules restricting player movement, sports
league owners have several incentives. For example, they wish
to prevent any team from becoming so dominant that overall
league competitive balance suffers, decreasing fan interest and
owners' collective profits. 194 Rules that limit an individual
owner's incentives to acquire the best talent, however, must not
go too far in diminishing the rewards for winning, lest the
owner lose the desire to improve the quality of the product. If
one of several rival leagues adopted overly restrictive rules, the
result would be less exciting games, poorer quality teams, and
lower ratings. Competition will provide the incentive for each
league to strive for the rules that foster the most exciting
contests.
Only owners of monopoly sports leagues have an addi-
tional, critically important incentive: to eliminate competition
for players in order artificially to reduce player salaries and re-
alize greater profits. 95 In contrast, owners in rival sports
leagues must pay a competitive salary to a player or he simply
will contract with a team from another league.196 Thus, rival
192. H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 35. He states that "given existing insti-
tutional arrangement in professional sports, without some joint action on the
part of the clubs, the distribution of playing talent... will not be equal." Id
193. Cf. 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 79 (testimony of Pete Rozelle)
(NFL shares revenue to prevent teams in major media markets from obtaining
economic advantages that would destroy competitive balance).
194. It is hard to envision a monopoly, as opposed to an efficiency, explana-
tion for Major League Baseball rules concerning waiver of players, the minor
league draft, and limited revenue sharing. Cf. J. MARKHAM, supra note 77, at
18-20; Canes, supra note 97, at 100.
195. Daly & Moore, supra note 121, at 81 & n.3; see Medoff, supra note 121,
at 119 (indicating that 1972 to 1974 data show players receive between 30% and
50% of worth); Scully, supra note 121, at 929 (noting that 1967-68 data show
players receive 11% of economic worth).
196. See Topkis, Monopoly in Professional Sports, 58 YALE L.J. 691, 708
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leagues would have an incentive to restrict player mobility only
if the restraints would promote competitive balance. Given the
efficiency of cash as a means of exchange, minimal restrictions
on player mobility with some form of revenue sharing would
most probably result.197 The players,198 as well as the fans,
would benefit. Fans would see more balanced competition, re-
tained incentives for individual team improvement, and a more
exciting product on the field.
6. Significant Player Restraints Are Not Necessary to
Preserve the Minor Leagues
The defenders of Major League Baseball's reserve clause
raise an additional argument against an open market in player
contracts. Regardless of the effect on competitive balance, they
claim that an open market will destroy minor league baseball,
depriving consumers in minor league cities of entertainment 9 9
(1949) (noting that with competing leagues "players would work for whomever
paid them the most.").
197. Atkinson, Stanley & Tschirhart, Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in
Any Agency Problem- an Example from the National Football League, 19
RAND J. ECON. 27 (1988) [hereinafter Atkinson] (suggesting that total revenue
sharing can achieve an efficient distribution of talent). Complete revenue
sharing, however, deprives individual owners of an incentive to put the best
possible product on the field. See supra note 158. One factual and one norma-
tive error also flaw this analysis. The authors assume that "the league's objec-
tive is to maximize league profit, or the joint profits of the owners." Atkinson,
supra, at 32. In fact, each owner votes on league rules based on whether the
rules will maximize his own individual profits. See infra notes 241-54 and ac-
companying text. The authors also assume that an efficient allocation of re-
sources will maximize joint profits. Atkinson, supra, at 32. The flaw is that a
given scheme relying on a free market for players may be more efficient, yet
will not maximize owner profits because the system forces owners to share
profits with players in the form of higher salaries. See, e.g., Merwin, Who's
Getting Clipped, FORBES, Nov. 5, 1984, at 38 (noting that NFL owners were
surrendering enormous broadcast revenues to escalating salary competition
which USFL brought about).
198. Because owners historically succeed in wielding their monopsony
power, see supra note 195, players initially will benefit from the freer market
that results from competing leagues. A competitive league structure, however,
will not necessarily benefit players in the long run. Monopoly sports league
owners can obtain revenues in the form of tax subsidies and increased broad-
cast rights that rival leagues could not. See supra Part I(A); in-fra Part I(D).
A strong players' union can force the monopoly league owners to share some
of these monopoly profits with the players. Thus, in a world of four baseball
leagues, tax subsidies and broadcast rights conceivably would be so much
lower that even if the leagues competed vigorously for player contracts, the
salary level would be lower than the level that would exist in a monopoly
league with a strong union.
199. In 1975, minor league games drew 11.7 million fans, more than the
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and diminishing the quality of Major League Baseball because
the sport will lose a means to develop talent.200
Baseball owners decided that, under the current structure
of the industry, they can profit by assuming the risk of develop-
NFL. 1 Sislk Hearings, supra note 34, at 320 (testimony of Bobby Bragan).
Concerns about minor league fans from Major League Baseball officials, how-
ever, should be viewed skeptically. Minor league franchises have suffered seri-
ously because of telecasting of major league contests, which keep fans at home
in front of the television. See, e.g., id. at 383 (testimony of Marvin Miller); H.
REP. No. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958) (stating that unlimited major
league telecasts could destroy the minor leagues); H. DEM=MRT, supra note 85,
at 23 (opinion of Bill Veeck); Davis, supra note 104, at 374 (noting that radio
and television broadcasts of major league games may be fatal competition for
minor league teams). Indeed, minor league officials unsuccessfully attempted
to secure governmental approval for limits on major league telecasts. See H.
REP. No. 1720, supra (antitrust exemption for limiting telecasts during minor
league games). Major League Baseball did agree to a blackout at the inception
of telecasting in the early 1950s. Shapiro, Monopsony Means Never Having to
Say You're Sorry-A Look at Baseball's Minor Leagues, 4 J. CoNTEMP. L. 191,
194 (1978). Since receiving an exemption for joint agreements, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1982), however, the major leagues never have shown any self-restraint
in telecasting major league games at the expense of the minor leagues or in
agreeing on compensation for minor leagues through a sharing of television
revenues. Shapiro, supra, at 194.
Roger Noll has observed that minor leagues are not profitable because
they do not operate to make profits; rather, they aid their major league par-
ents. 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 135-36. As a representative from a mi-
nor league town complained, minor league teams "are robbed of their star-
players by frequent raids in season. Thus, the minor league fans, in disgust,
lose interest in their teams with loss to the gate and finally the clubs fold up."
104 CONG. REc. 12088 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Roland V. Libonati); see also H.
DEMIERT, supra note 85, at 23 (observing that "many minor league owners
claim that the major-minor working agreements, allowing the major league
clubs in effect to 'raid' the rosters of their minor league affiliates, are the real
causes" of decline in minor league teams). American League President Lee
McPhail put this bluntly when he testified that "we have had to restrict to
some extent the size of the minor league structure to get it down to a struc-
ture that is just large enough to accommodate prospects for the major
leagues." 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 408; see also B. JAMES, BILL JAMES
BASEBALL ABSTRACT 1988 at 19-20 (1988) (suggesting that management's
demonstrated lack of interest in winning significantly hurt minor leagues).
The point is not that Major League Baseball should limit telecasts to pro-
tect minor league gate or to keep talented players down on the farm for the
benefit of local fans. Rather, current policies favor the dominant markets and
reflect consumer interest in Major League Baseball. An open market in
player contracts would do no more and no less.
200. See generally 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 19, 24 (testimony of
Bowie Kuhn) (stating that reserve clause is necessary to protect investment
and to make it affordable for clubs to subsidize minor leagues); id& at 312 (tes-
timony of George Sisler, President of International League) (contending that
without reserve system, "the minor leagues.., would undoubtedly perish in
[their] current form").
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ing new players. Thus, they underwrite most of the costs of de-
veloping player talent, spending millions each year to produce a
few players capable of filling spots on their rosters. In 1980, for
example, major league clubs spent forty million dollars on their
minor league operations. 20 1 Major league owners generally
train players at minor league franchises that the major league
parent either wholly owns or operates under exclusive working
agreements. These agreements generally provide that the ma-
jor league club will pay the salaries of all players and
coaches.20 2 This is a form of what economists call vertical inte-
gration, which occurs when the producer of a product also con-
trols the production of an important input.20 3 For example, a
steel company might "vertically integrate" by purchasing a coal
mine.204
Former Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, among others, has ar-
gued that without significant restraints on player movement to
guarantee that clubs will recoup their investment in developing
players, owners no longer would subsidize the minor leagues.
205
Empirical tests for this contention do not exist because Major
League Baseball has enjoyed a monopsony on player talent
since the demise of the Federal League in 1915.206 Although
veteran major league players have enjoyed some degree of free
agency since 1976, Major League Baseball still guarantees a
team a substantial period of time to recover its investment in a
player. Major League Baseball continuously has operated a
draft assigning college and high school players to one profes-
sional team,20 7 and unilaterally has prevented these players
from becoming free agents until they reach the major leagues
or complete six years of minor league service.20 8 The collective
bargaining agreements signed with the players' union since
201. Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 434 (testimony of Bowie Kuhn).
202. See id. at 254 (testimony of Bowie Kuhn) (stating that major league
subsidy of minor leagues comes to many millions of dollar each year).
203. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 106, at 78-80 (discussing vertical
integration in American industry); see also Shapiro, supra note 199, at 199-200
("The farm system of the major leagues in an example of vertical integration
204. F. SCHERER, supra note 106, at 78.
205. 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 24.
206. See BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 13 (1969) (noting that prior to 1916 sea-
son National and American Leagues assumed responsibility for $385,000 of
Federal League contracts and granted two franchises to Federal League
owners).
207. See Major League Rule 4, reprinted in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 529-35
(1987).
208. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 256 (testimony of Bowie Kuhn).
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1976 have forbidden free agency for any player with fewer than
six years of major league service.20 9
Despite the absence of empirical evidence, Kuhn's argu-
ment falters for several reasons. As a matter of antitrust pol-
icy, the courts correctly have rejected the argument that
owners can conspiratorially reduce players' salaries to recoup
the investment made in player development.210 Such expenses
are ordinary costs of doing business and, unlike the need to fos-
ter competitive balance, are not peculiar to professional sports
leagues.211 Moreover, Major League Baseball can find alterna-
tive means of efficiently developing talent in an open player
market.
Major League Baseball's vertical integration is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Historically, many teams relied on in-
dependent minor league franchises to assume the risk of player
development. These independent franchises contracted with
players and then sold the contract rights of a proven talent to a
major league team, or a higher-level minor league team, for a
profit. 2
This rule, which affects only minor league players, is not subject to collective
bargaining with the major league players' union.
209. Major League Baseball Players' Association, Average Salaries in Ma-
jor League Baseball 1967-1983, at 2 (filed as an exhibit in Collusion I, Grievance
No. 86-2).
210. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
211. Id. (noting club's "investment in player development costs" are "simi-
lar to those incurred by other businesses"); see also 2 Siskc Hearings, supra
note 34, at 454 (testimony of Baseball Players' Association Director Marvin
Miller) (observing that other industries invest in executive personnel with no
guarantee that employee will not leave after short period of time). But see
Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 879 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (finding that re-
serve system reflects "the need for some form of protective system to insure
the recoupment of investments-often large-made both to develop and to ac-
quire talented players").
212. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 104, at 360-61 (discussing the development
of the farm system). The founder of the initial development of farm systems
was the brilliant baseball legend Branch Rickey. H. DEMMERT, supra note 85,
at 74. Rickey instituted vertical integration out of frustration while serving as
an executive of the St. Louis Cardinals. Id. With little revenue sharing,
wealthier teams such as the New York Giants, out of respect for Rickey's rep-
utation for sound judgment, automatically topped any offer Rickey made to a
minor league team for a promising young player. Id.
Later, when major league teams recognized that the lack of integration al-
lowed minor leagues teams to appropriate a significant fraction of a player's
value, teams began to create farm systems. Davis, supra note 104, at 360-61. It
is noteworthy, in light of monopoly sports leagues placing emphasis today on
maintaining competitive balance, that those who feared it would unbalance the
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In an open market, an unproven baseball player coming
out of high school or most college programs will not command
a premium salary. Not only will he be paid relatively little, but
any team probably will require him to sign a long-term con-
tract.213 Furthermore, the probability exists that he never will
make it to the major leagues.214 As long as major league teams
benefit economically from bearing this risk, despite the in-
creased costs resulting from the slightly increased bargaining
power of the most promising young athletes, the teams will
continue to do so. Alternatively, if they find it more efficient to
purchase the rights to developed talent from others, minor
leagues will revert to their traditional organization as in-
dependent clubs.2 15
Indeed, if minor league franchises operated as independent
economic entities, the number of minor league clubs might in-
crease.216 In addition to stocking their rosters with players
whose contracts probably would be resold to major league
clubs, minor leagues would hire popular local players who,
although unlikely to go further, still could provide entertain-
ment for local fans.2 17 Providing a role for local stars increases
the number of players who could play profitably at the lowest
minor league levels and thereby increases the number of po-
tentially successful minor league franchises.
Monopoly sports leagues are not necessary to assure the in-
vestment in player development needed to maintain the minor
leagues bitterly--and unsuccessfully--opposed the introduction of farm sys-
tems. Id.
213. A long-term contract ensures that the club will benefit from any ap-
preciation in the player's value during the contract term. Of course, if the
player's performance is disappointing, the contract's terms typically will allow
the team to release the player. "All standard player contracts provide for ter-
mination rights exercisable by a club if [a] player fails to perform at acceptable
levels." 1 R. BERRY & G. WONG, supra note 21, at 159-61.
214. Only one of every six recruits entering professional baseball ever
makes it to the major leagues, and only one in 50 lasts more than six seasons.
J. MARKHAM, supra note 77, at 51-52.
215. See H. DEMMERT, supra note 85, at 34 (noting that in open market bur-
den of training would fall elsewhere than on major league clubs).
216. Presently, minor leagues have shrunk to almost the smallest size pos-
sible to continue to funnel sufficient players through the ranks to major
league teams. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 408 (testimony of Lee
McPhail).
217. Currently, vertically integrated baseball leagues adopt rules that pre-
clude lower division minor league clubs from employing more than a few play-
ers with more than four years of professional experience. See Shapiro, supra
note 199, at 198. Independent franchises that did not exist solely to support
the big league parent likely would not retain current rules.
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leagues. Obviously, particularly promising athletes or those
who have foregone several years of professional ball to demon-
strate their skills at top colleges may have greater bargaining
power. As long as some major or minor league team, however,
is taking the risk of training and developing a player's skills,
that team will profit in the open market from successful player
development. The owners need not agree among themselves to
fix the terms of the individual contracts young athletes sign.
2 18
D. PRESERVING OPPORTUNITIES TO WATCH GAMES
ON FREE TELEVISION
Competition forces firms operating in a free market to
lower the price of their goods and services to cost, although
many consumers willingly would pay far in excess of that
price.219 Economists refer to the difference between the maxi-
mum amount consumers would pay and the actual price as con-
sumer surlus.220 As one of its principal functions, antitrust
laws prevent firms from engaging in tactics that shift wealth
from consumers to producers by robbing consumers of this
surplus.221
Few markets permit consumers to enjoy a greater amount
of surplus than the telecasting of major professional sports.
The NFL broadcasts virtually all of its games on free televi-
sion.222 Each Major League Baseball team broadcasts a large
218. Michael Canes also argues that player restraints hold down costs and
therefore increase the number of viable franchises that a league may maintain.
Canes, supra note 97, at 82 n.2. The NFL has expressly disavowed this argu-
ment as a justification for its rules. 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 149 (tes-
timomy of counsel Hamilton Carothers). In any event, this argument is
unsound for several reasons. First, to hold down costs a league would have to
be a monopoly; otherwise rival leagues would bid up player salaries. As
demonstrated in Part I(B), monopoly leagues inevitably reduce, rather than
increase, the number of available franchises. Second, the argument Part I(C)
presents demonstrates that a free market in players actually improves the
quality and attractiveness of the product, increasing attendance and broadcast
viewership. Thus, a league as a whole will attract greater revenues to sustain
higher costs with free agency than with a restricted market. Canes may have
assumed that teams in smaller markets might not benefit from the increased
popularity of the sport to a degree sufficient to outweigh their higher payrolls.
Revenue sharing, however, can solve this problem.
219. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 15.
220. Id at 100.
221. Lande, supra note 4, at 140-41.
222. During 1987, for the first time, eight regular season games were shown
on the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN), a cable net-
work. The rest were shown on free television. See Antitrust Implications of
the Recent NFL Television Contract Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on
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number of its games on free television. 223 Any fan with a tele-
vision set can watch all post-season playoff contests, the World
Series, and the Super Bowl. 224
As technology makes it more feasible for monopoly sports
leagues to capture this surplus, many observers predict that
these leagues will do so. Ted Turner, who owns the Atlanta
Braves as well as the WTBS cable superstation, testified with
characteristic bluntness: "There is going to be more and more
movement from over the air, free telecasts to pay television for
sports events. '225 He predicted that "the only thing left to go
on to pay television will be the World Series and the Super
Bowl," and those games will remain on free television only be-
cause of congressional action.226 Major League Baseball re-
cently entered into a major contract with the Entertainment
and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) to nationally cable-
cast six games weekly beginning in 1990.227
This anticipated shift to cable probably will have several
effects. First, some fans no longer will be willing and able to
view games they now can see for free.2 28 Second, because many
fans will be willing to pay to watch their favorite team on tele-
Antitrust Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary on S. Res. 29, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1987) [hereinafter Metzenbaum
Hearings] (written statement of Pete Rozelle).
223. For a table of games shown on free and cable television according to
baseball team, see infra Appendix C.
224. In economic terms, the textual statement is not precisely correct.
Consumers pay nothing directly for the privilege of watching televised games.
They do pay indirectly, however, through the purchase of goods advertised
during the games. The cost to advertisers, however, for a 1986 NFL game on
CBS, for example, was less than 50 cents per household, a minimal amount
even if fans paid the cost directly. See Letters from Ronald W. Bess to Ste-
phen F. Ross, July 18, 1988 & Nov. 10, 1988 [hereinafter Bess Letters].
225. Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 97.
226. Id. at 97; see also id. at 147 (testimony of sports journalist Howard
Cosell) (stating that "In a now reasonably forseeable number of years, ...
[n]early all events will be in some form of pay TV or pay/cable TV."); id, at
159 (testimony of Lawrence Fleisher) (testifying that "almost everything else"
besides World Series and Super Bowl will be on cable).
227. See Justice, ESPN, Baseball Sign Four-Year, $400 Million Deal, Wash.
Post, Jan. 6, 1989, at D1, D5.
228. As the price rises, a growing number of consumers will choose not to
pay and will forgo viewing. Cf. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 21 (noting that
quantity demanded increases as price falls). The cable penetration nationwide
is only 52%. The Wide Wired World of Jim Mooney, BROADCASTING, May 2,
1988, at 38. Major markets such as Chicago (31%), New York City (38%), and
Philadelphia (44%) include a huge percentage of homes without cable. TELEVI-
SION DIGEST, CABLE & STATION COVERAGE ATLAS 4-5 (1987). This lack may
result in reduced viewership in these areas.
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vision, there will be a significant transfer of wealth from fans
to league owners. Fees cable networks generate from charging
a few dollars per household for top games will translate into of-
fers to the NFL for broadcast rights that will more than offset
the resulting decrease in revenues from contracts with free tel-
evision networks.229
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle has acknowledged that a
significant shift to cable television would raise serious public in-
terest concerns among fans and their representatives in Con-
gress.23 0  Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit has
recognized that the public interest in maintaining programming
on free television is so strong that a properly tailored regula-
tion requiring that programming capable of support by com-
mercial advertising remain on free television would satisfy
strict first amendment standards.
231
Not every league decision to shift some games to cable is
necessarily inefficient and contrary to the fans' best interest. A
cable contract may allow a league to televise nationally some
contests-Sunday night football, for example-that do not at-
tract the attention of the major networks. In such a case, fans
benefit by gaining the option of watching a cablecast of a con-
test that otherwise would not be broadcast at all.23 2
Competing leagues would be unlikely, however, to shift to
cable if free television has a strong interest in obtaining broad-
cast rights. Each team's football games would continue to be
telecast on free television back to home markets; networks
would continue to feature nationally the top weekly games;
large numbers of baseball games and a featured game-of-the-
week also would remain on free television, as would all post-
season contests. This is because if one league shifted to cable,
a rival league could remain on free television and pick up many
new viewers. A monopoly league, in contrast, would face no
retribution in the market for a decision to shift to cable in or-
der to capture the large consumer surplus.
229. In 1986, for example, networks received between 43 and 56 cents per
household from advertisers for broadcasting Sunday afternoon NFL games
over the air. See Bess Letters, supra note 224. Thus, if a monopoly sports
league charged only one dollar per household per game, it could increase its
profits substantially unless it lost half of its viewership and all of its advertis-
ing sponsorship, hardly a possibility.
230. Thurmond 82 Hearings, supra note 38, at 39 (testimony of NFL Com-
missioner Pete Rozelle).
231. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
232. See Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 222, at 60 (written statement of
Stephen F. Ross).
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E. INEFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
Another of the myriad benefits of competitive markets is
their tendency to force firms to operate efficiently, providing
the highest quality of goods and services to consumers at the
lowest possible cost.233 Indeed, firms that introduce innova-
tions and quality control are rewarded with greater sales, some-
times at premium prices, and higher profits.234 Firms that
operate less efficiently lose business to rivals.235
Owners of teams in monopoly sports leagues, however,
have substantial room to engage in inefficient behavior.
Mounting a challenge to an entrenched monopoly sports league
through the creation of a new league is costly and difficult.236
As a result, monopoly sports leagues do not face the retribution
of the marketplace for inefficient decisions about expansion,
franchise relocation, player allocation systems, and many other
matters.
In fact, monopoly sports leagues are more harmful to con-
sumers and more inefficient than other monopolies. A single
corporation that monopolizes an industry may enjoy "the quiet
life,"237 but its managers otherwise will strive to maximize
profits for the corporation as a whole. By contrast, franchises
are not organized to maximize overall league profits; rather,
franchisers join a league to maximize their own individual prof-
its. As Professor Lance Davis explained, "[t]he responsiveness
of the cartel to opportunities for profitable innovation will thus
be determined by entrepreneurs whose innovative vision is at
or below the industry average. As a result, some potentially
profitable innovations will be delayed or rejected .... 238 Thus,
owners might reject innovations that would be in the best in-
terest of Major League Baseball or the National Football
League as a whole. Each league's adoption of rules that require
a three-fourths majority to approve any major innovation exac-
233. F. SCHERER, supra note 106, at 13-14.
234. See generally E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 150-82 (discussing theo-
retical effect of technology on production and profits).
235. Id. at 183-229 (discussing effects of fixed and variable costs on product
price).
236. Part III, infra, addresses this point more fully.
237. See Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monop-
oly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (stating "The best of all monopoly profits is a
quiet life."); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2nd Cir. 1945) (stating that "immunity from competition is a narcotic, and ri-
valry is a stimulant, to industrial progress").
238. Davis, supra note 104, at 352.
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erbates this problem.23 9 Other, more specific rules make it vir-
tually impossible to change the status quo to benefit consumers.
For example, the American League's constitution virtually pro-
hibits relocation of a franchise within one hundred miles of an
existing team.
240
Legislative hearings and academic writings recount numer-
ous examples of innovations that a minority of owners blocked
because of their individual self-interest at the expense of the
league and, indirectly, fans.241 For example, a minority of base-
ball owners from the larger markets repeatedly has rejected
proposals to increase revenue sharing242 despite the sports
leagues' contention that revenue sharing promotes competitive
balance and is thus good for the sport.243 A majority of baseball
owners in the 1970s also favored inter-league play; it was never
implemented, however, primarily because of opposition from
Los Angeles Dodgers owner Walter O'Malley.
244
239. The NFL has a general provision requiring a three-fourths vote for
any league action, unless otherwise provided. NFL Const. and By-laws, art. V,
§ 5.6. Major League Baseball requires a super-majority vote for a number of
important decisions. See, e.g., Major League Agreement, art. I, § 7, reprinted
in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 502 (1987) (three-fourths approval, with at least five
clubs from each league to elect Commissioner); id. art. V, § 2(b)(1), reprinted
in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 506 (majority vote of clubs in each league voting sepa-
rately required for decisions regarding All-Star Game, playoffs, World Series,
playing rules, and broadcast rights); id, § 2(b)(2), reprinted in BASEBALL
BLUEBOOK 506-07 (three-fourths vote of clubs in each league, voting sepa-
rately, required for decisions regarding inter-league play, changes in two-divi-
sion structure of each league, or amendments to agreement concerning central
Major League Baseball fund); id. § 2(b)(3), reprinted in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK
507 (three-fourths votes of clubs in league affected and concurrence of major-
ity of clubs in other league required for expansion, sale, or transfer of team
control, or most franchise relocations); see also Davis, supra note 104, at 353;
Noll, Major League Team Sports, in W. ADAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 395 (5th ed. 1977) [hereinafter Noll/Adams].
240. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 59 (testimony of Major
League Baseball General Counsel Ed Durso) (testifying that Yankees' ap-
proval would be required for a franchise to relocate within 100 miles of Yan-
kee Stadium); see also id. at 168 (testimony of Roger Noll) (asserting that
performance of Los Angeles Rams dramatically improved when Raiders
moved into market); cf. Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 112-13 (testi-
mony of National Basketball Association Deputy Commissioner Simon
Gourdine) (complaining that without exclusive territories entry might occur
because owner might think that he could run franchise more efficiently than
incumbent).
241. See supra note 164.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 158.
244. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 451 (testimony of Texas Rangers
owner Robert Short).
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Defenders of the leagues-especially those affiliated with
the NFL-staunchly insist that sports leagues are "single enti-
ties." Commissioner Pete Rozelle has testified that the league
"is as much of a common enterprise and a business partnership
as any law firm partnership." 5 Similarly, Professor Gary Rob-
erts has written that "[o]nly with the total cooperation of every
league member on every aspect of league operations can there
be a league product .... "-24 Whatever significance this argu-
ment may have in other contexts,24 7 the league remains none-
245. Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 189. Professor Myron Grauer
has forcefully made this argument. See Grauer, Recognition of the National
Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Impli-
cations of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1983).
An assessment of the merits of this legal argument is beyond the scope of
this Article. As a practical matter, however, significant differences exist be-
tween sports leagues and law firm partnerships. Principally, it is much easier
for one or more members of a law firm to break off from their partners and to
go into business for themselves. Indeed, this is a common phenomenon among
attorneys who believe their partners are not particularly efficient. See, e.g., $4
Million Head Start for Morrison & Foerster's New Orange County Branch,
AM. LAw., Mar. 1988, at 19 (reporting that 25 attorneys from branch office of
Los Angeles-based firm left to join San Francisco-based firm due to "disagree-
ments ... over management issues"); Borod & Higgins Break Up, Am. LAW.,
Mar. 1988, at 18 (reporting that 22-lawyer Memphis firm with three principal
areas of practice divided into three new firms after each group became dissat-
isfied with cost control in other groups). It is very difficult, however, and un-
precedented in sports history, for sports owners to create a new league in
response to inefficiency. Innovative league owners must remain content with
staying in the existing league and making as much progress as is possible
under the circumstances.
246. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act. The Use and Abuse of
Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219,
230 (1984) (emphasis added).
247. The single-entity argument is principally designed to keep courts from
reviewing league decisions challenged as violating § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which bars combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.
The courts steadfastly have rejected this argument and have held that, because
individual owners do not share profits and losses and act in their own inter-
ests, the league is not a single entity and ownership decisions that are unrea-
sonable restraints of trade do violate § 1. See, e.g., Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389;
North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
459 U.S. 1074 (1982); cf. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 n.18 (1984) (in finding NCAA
television agreement unlawful agreement among competitors, court cited
Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and the 'Single Entity' Defense Under
Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITrIER L. REV. 217 (1982), which sup-
ports Raiders decision).
Resolution of the legal status of sports leagues as single entities is beyond
the scope of this Article. Advocates of the single entity argument do not deny
that monopoly sports league owners can act against the best interests of the
league and consumers. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 246, at 258-60 (arguing
that individual members' economic interests sometimes conflict with league's
interests as whole, and in such cases league decisions cannot be assumed to
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theless a collective of owners who have interests that do not
always serve the league as a whole.248
League officials-most notably NFL Commissioner Pete
Rozelle-have worked tirelessly and with some success to per-
suade owners to act in the interests of the league as a whole, to
engage in "Leaguethink," as author David Harris has described
it. 249 Nevertheless, in many cases, a monopoly league accepts
intolerable inefficiencies because the owners do not wish to act
against one of their own.250 If a competitive league entered the
market with an efficient front-office management team, no in-
cumbent league would permit Baltimore (now Indianapolis)
Colts owner Robert Irsay to call plays from his owners' box
even though he had no experience in football,25 1 or allow a for-
maximize league efficiency or enhance consumer welfare). Rather, they argue
that the standards of § I of Sherman Act are so vague that sound antitrust pol-
icy should defer to league judgments over those of reviewing judges and juries.
See, e.g., id. at 223 (asserting that Raiders decision exposes leagues to wide-
spread liability and thus seriously diminishes their ability to operate); id. at
293 (stating "courts and juries are not well equipped to determine what is in a
league's interests."); Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports
Antitrus4 The Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 943, 946-48 (1988) (arguing that legal issues would be "intracta-
ble" if courts subject monopoly sports leagues to rule of reason antitrust analy-
sis under § 1 of Sherman Act). This argument does not contradict this
Article's thesis. Roberts and league officials who argue for "single-entity" sta-
tus believe that deference to league decisions which do not constitute illegal
monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), is prefera-
ble to "second-guessing" by courts. Whether they are right or wrong, the Arti-
cle argues that the marketplace is the best reviewer of monopoly league
decisions and the force of competition rival leagues cause.
248. The court in Raiders recognized:
Even though the individual clubs often act for the common good of
the NFL, we must not lose sight of the purpose of the NFL as stated
in Article I of its constitution, which is to "promote the primary busi-
ness of League members." Although the business interests of League
members will often coincide with those of the NFL as an entity in it-
self, that commonality of interest exists in every cartel.
726 F.2d at 1389. Compare Roberts, supra note 246, at 263-64 (arguing that ra-
tional league will put teams in close proximity if doing so will promote effi-
ciency and increase product marketability) with Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1397
(holding league's refusal to allow Raiders to move from Oakland to Los Ange-
les unreasonable because, "an owner need muster only seven friendly votes to
prevent three-quarters approval for the sole reason of preventing another
team from entering its market, regardless of whether the market could sustain
two franchises").
249. D. HARRIs, supra note 30, at 14.
250. Commissioner Rozelle testified that "[ulnlike some other team sports,
we have been fortunate in that the NFL has basically moved as one." Id. at
453 (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 478.
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mer owner's wife, who had no experience and had developed a
reputation for incompetence, to manage the franchise in the na-
tion's second largest market.252 Nor would the league tolerate
continued mismanagement of the Philadelphia Eagles by owner
Leonard Tose as he sought to stay one step ahead of creditors
seeking repayment of gambling debts.253 When Commissioner
Rozelle's office was questioned about Irsay's behavior, for ex-
ample, a spokesperson explained that "the League is not in a
position to decide how an owner operates his team."
2M
As with other abuses of monopoly power, fans are the pri-
mary victims of inefficient management. Loyal fans of local
teams, having no marketplace alternative to which they can
turn, have little choice but to endure whatever management
chooses to do. The dilemma facing proud fans who must suffer
or cease patronizing teams they love is precisely the dilemma
that competition, as enforced through antitrust policy, is
designed to avoid.
II. REGULATION IS NOT A WORKABLE MEANS OF
PREVENTING THE HARMS MONOPOLY
SPORTS LEAGUES CAUSE
Goods and services can be allocated in the economy by the
free marketplace, by decisions of monopolists, or by govern-
ment regulation. When society wants a service to be provided
universally-such as telephones-or when resources are partic-
ularly scarce, or when industries might be expected to cut
prices continuously to the point of bankruptcy, legislatures
have enacted regulatory schemes to achieve goals they perceive
to be unachievable through free competition.255 Scholars often
characterize these industries as "natural monopolies," in which
one firm most efficiently can produce the amount of the prod-
uct demanded.256 Because competition is unworkable in these
industries, society must choose between government regulation
and allocation of goods and services by private monopolists.
Regulation is a poor means of addressing the problems mo-
nopoly sports leagues cause. One reason is that a regulatory so-
252. Id. at 465-66, 572 (describing Los Angeles Rams owner Georgia
Frontiere).
253. Id. at 111-21, 292-98, 556-62.
254. Id. at 190.
255. See L. ScHwARTz, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECO-
NOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 26, 65-66 (1985).
256. Id. at 65. Part III, infra, explores whether sports leagues are natural
monopolies.
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lution is unlikely to be effective. Regulatory decisions have a
far more significant impact on the small number of those sub-
ject to regulation-in this case the team owners-than on the
rest of the American people. Owners therefore have strong in-
centives to organize and lobby for regulations that serve their
interests. As a cohesive and interested group, owners will
lobby effectively.25 7 The general populace, with less at stake
and with divergent interests, will be less able to lobby effec-
tively. Thus, those officials assigned to regulate the sports in-
dustry soon may become "captured" by the very owners that
they supposedly are regulating.258
Even if these fears are misplaced, however, regulation can-
not easily remedy the specific harms monopoly sports leagues
cause. Determinations that the regulators would have to make
include the location of football franchises, the proper number
of baseball franchises, the proper allocation of games between
free television and cable, the best method of allocating players
among teams, and what constitutes ineffective management.
These determinations are enormously difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to make in any way other than the way this Article pro-
poses: letting the market decide through competing leagues.
A. REGULATION OF FRANCHISE RELOCATION
Recently, Congress has received a number of proposals to
subject the relocation of sports franchises to government regu-
lation.259 Although such relocations cause significant economic
and emotional harm to the people in the abandoned jurisdic-
tion,260 the economic and emotional benefits to the citizens of
the new jurisdiction may well offset such harms.26 1 Sports
257. See generally M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (ar-
guing that those in large groups with little individually at stake will not have
an incentive to organize to advance their interests, whereas those in small
groups with much individually at stake will actively pursue their common
objective).
258. See generally Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARv. L. REV. 713, 724-26 (1986) (discussing evolution of capture theory of reg-
ulation); see also 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 117 (testimony of Gerald
Scully) (opposing proposal for Federal Sports Commission because prior fed-
eral government regulation of industry has not succeeded).
259. See infra note 264.
260. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 2 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
261. Professor Weistart notes that "[m]uch of the thinking on franchise
moves to date has assumed that fan interests are best served by making the
club accountable to its host city. It would appear, though, that a regulation
that significantly inhibited franchise movements could operate as a disservice
to the interests of other groups of fans." Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at
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teams, however, usually embark upon such relocations only in
response to subsidies that officials of the new jurisdiction offer,
transferring substantial sums from local taxpayers to wealthy
team owners.262 For several reasons, the recent legislative pro-
posals do not meaningfully address this problem.
Serious administrative difficulties arise in evaluating when
to permit teams to relocate.2 63 Most of the recent legislative
proposals respond to these problems by requiring a government
official to determine, under varying standards of review,
whether a relocation is "reasonable," after considering a host of
factors.26 Many of the factors are impossibly vague265 or sub-
79. Indeed, the willingness of taxpayers in a city without a team to outbid the
residents of a team's current home may suggest that a relocation would in-
crease the net economic and emotional benefits to society.
262. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
263. See Thurmond 85 Hearings, supra note 28, at 388-89 (statement of As-
sistant Attorney General Charles F. Rule) (stating that it is extremely difficult
to determine whether a particular franchise relocation benefits or hurts con-
sumers). Rule added:
Proper evaluation of [consumer] trade-offs would require esti-
mates of the likely expansion of output in the city into which the
team moved, along with the increased consumer surplus in that city;
similar estimates for decreases in output and consumer surplus would
be required for the city from which the franchise is moved. Expert
testimony would be necessary in each of these areas; but these are ar-
eas where the ability of economists to make empirical judgments is
limited.
Id. at 389 n.8.
264. Four members of Congress introduced significant regulatory proposals
in 1984 and 1985 in light of the Raiders decision, the move of the Colts from
Baltimore to Indianapolis, and the threatened move of the Eagles from Phila-
delphia.
Senator Danforth's proposal provided that the league make an initial de-
termination, subject to judicial review under the substantial evidence test. See
S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(2) (1985), reprinted in Danforth 85 Hear-
ings, supra note 22, at 14. This proposal would require the league to weigh a
number of factors in determining whether relocation is appropriate and rea-
sonable. Id. The adequacy and potential for improvement of the existipg sta-
dium and neighboring facilities, the extent of prior tax subsidization, profits
and losses, fan support, the extent of ownership contribution to the team's
plight in its current city, the existence of other teams in the current site, and
the willingness of a local owner to purchase the franchise would be among the
factors to be considered. Id. § 6(b).
Under Senator Gorton's bill, relocations could occur only after an arbitra-
tion board determination that the action was necessary and appropriate, in
contrast to reasonable under the Danforth bill. The arbitration board would
include representatives from the league, the home city, and a neutral arbitra-
tor. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(a)(1) (1985), reprinted in Danforth 85
Hearings, supra note 22, at 24. Relevant factors were similar to those in the
Danforth bill. Id. § 104(b).
Senator Specter introduced legislation that would prohibit franchises from
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ject to team or league manipulation. 266 Given these problems,
cities currently hosting sports franchises probably will not be
willing to take the chance that a regulator ultimately will find
a move "unreasonable. '26 7 Faced with the choice of losing
teams unless they prevail in the regulatory proceedings or
agreeing to concessions paid for out of the local treasury, many
cities will opt for the latter solution. Thus, regulation does lit-
tle to check the transfer of wealth from the public to owners by
tax subsidies. 268
Moreover, the legislative proposals fail to address certain
major problems. Most of the proposals provide no meaningful
review of intra-metropolitan relocations, from downtown to a
suburb, for example, which involve the same type of bidding
and exploitation of taxpayers as inter-metropolitan moves.269
relocating unless the stadium authority had significantly breached contractual
promises to the team, the stadium was irreparably inadequate, or the franchise
had lost money during the previous three consecutive years. S. 172, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1985), reprinted in Thurmond 85 Hearings, supra note 28,
at 5-6. Cities that fall victim to relocations would have a cause of action in fed-
eral court to enforce the legislation. A similar approach was proposed by Rep-
resentative Mikulski. See H.R. 5430, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in
lorio Hearings, supra note 59, at 4-16.
For an analysis and critique of these proposals, see Note, Keeping the
Home Team at Home, 74 CALiF. L. REV. 1329, 1361-67 (1986).
265. See, e.g., S. 172 § 4(2), S. 259 § 6(b)(1)&(2), S. 287 § 103(b)(1), H.R. 5430
§ 5(b)(2)(A) ("adequacy" of stadiums and facilities); S. 259 § 6(b)(6), S. 287
§ 103(b)(4) (whether owner has contributed to plight of club that might justify
relocation); S. 259 § 6(b)(9), S. 287 § 103(b)(2) ("extent" of fan support).
266. See, e.g., Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 102-03 (testimony of
Gene Upshaw) (arguing that it is difficult to use financial failure as justifica-
tion for franchise relocation without looking at owners' personal debt and ex-
cessive salaries to family members); id. at 166-69 (testimony of Roger Noll)
(asserting that profit data and other financial information are unreliable);
Thurmond 82 Hearings, supra note 38, at 49 (testimony of Pete Rozelle) (stat-
ing that "manipulative deals on income" in which owner hires family members
or runs club so that consistent loss could be shown is method of evading regu-
latory guidelines); id at 173 (testimony of Kansas City Mayor Richard Berk-
ley) (arguing that owner wishing to relocate could lose money by discouraging
fans); Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 77 (testimony of John Weistart)
(owners could demonstrate lack of profitability necessary to justify franchise
relocation by trading key player, changing coaching staff, failing to pursue free
agents, or selecting poor draft choices).
267. NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle noted that regulatory standards will
"promote bitter and protracted litigation." One can interpret lease provisions,
profitability, and competitiveness in different ways to suit one's view of the
merits. Rozelle pointed out that trial courts in Milwaukee and Atlanta took
predictably different approaches to the propriety of the Braves' move from the
former city to the latter. Thurmond 82 Hearings, supra note 38, at 64.
268. See supra Part I(A).
269. See S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(1) (regulating teams wishing to
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In addition, the standards provide no mechanism for allowing
new cities to obtain a major league franchise even if they could
financially support one. If the regulatory proposals have any
effect, it will be to make it somewhat more difficult for existing
teams to move to new venues by requiring that teams seeking
to relocate justify their decisions. Although supporters of the
proposals assume that deserving new cities will receive expan-
sion franchises and therefore need not "steal" teams from other
cities, few proposals address that issue.270 Thus, the regulatory
solutions do not address the social cost fans suffer in "have-not"
cities.271
B. REGULATION OF EXPANSION
To increase the value of existing franchises and to exploit
taxpayers for subsidies by threatening to relocate a scarce
franchise to another locale, monopoly sports leagues create
fewer than the optimal number of franchises. 272 The principal
regulatory cure for this malady would be a governmental order
requiring Major League Baseball and the NFL to expand. Such
a solution, however, has numerous problems.
First, expansion makes a new league's possible future entry
even more difficult than it is today.273 Modest expansion poses
no difficulty for future entrants when a large number of open
relocate from their "home territitories," as defined in league by-laws); S. 287
§ 103(6) (same); H.R. 5430, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (regulating relocation from
territory or metropolitan area where team has agreed to operate). But see S.
172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (defining relocation as changing municipality in
which team plays its home games, and defining municipality to include city,
county, or other political subdivision).
270. The only proposal to deal with the expansion issue was Senator Gor-
ton's bill, which required Major League Baseball to expand by two teams and
the NFL to expand by four teams, designating Baltimore and Oakland as two
of the NFL expansion sites. See S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(a).
271. Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey remarked:
I, for one, cannot stand by while legislation proceeds that satis-
fies the haves in baseball and not the have-nots. I would guess that
the Senators who represent the long list of cities that are begging for
franchises at the doorstep of baseball and football, and the other
sports will be there with me.
Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 115.
272. See supra Part I(B).
273. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1983) (argu-
ing exclusion of football team from NFL favors competition because it leaves
site and team for a competing league's franchise); J. WEISTART, supra note 44,
at 734 n.318 (arguing that court order which encourages expansion is inconsis-
tent with goal of antitrust laws to foster competition).
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markets exist.274 Entry becomes much more problematic, how-
ever, when a new league must compete against an incumbent
league in many cities where the incumbent already has a
franchise.
Second, no objective standard exists that allows a regulator
to determine when expansion is in the public interest. Expan-
sion is justified when the benefits to the residents of a new lo-
cation of seeing major league play in their locale exceed the
reduced enjoyment to fans in cities with existing franchises. As
the experience of the NHL demonstrated, even significant dilu-
tion of talent through rapid expansion can result in a net in-
crease in societal welfare, where overall attendance
increases.2 7 - Accurately determining the proper balance be-
tween adding teams for the benefit of new fans and maintain-
ing player quality for the benefit of current fans, however, is
extraordinarily difficult.
One proposal would be to make no determination. Any
team that wished to enter a league could do so.2 76 Such govern-
mentally-mandated open entry is undesirable. If anyone could
put together a roster of players and have the legal right to play
against the Washington Redskins or the Los Angeles Dodgers,
the result would be devastating. Henry Demmert notes that a
sandlot baseball team probably could cover the costs of playing
the New York Yankees, but if such teams generally could enter
Major League Baseball, "the legitimacy of athletic competition
and thus the very existence of the professional sport would be
threatened.1277 Thus, he concludes that some undefined "mini-
mum acceptable quality criteria" must be developed before en-
try can be permitted.2 78
Recognizing the difficulties with totally open entry, Con-
gress could adopt a regulatory standard along the lines of Roger
Noll's estimate of a competitively determined price for an ex-
pansion team.2 7 9 Such a proposal would allow any new team to
join Major League Baseball or the NFL if it compensated the
274. See AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. 60, 77 (D. Md. 1962) (noting existence of
many open markets for development by new leagues), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th
Cir. 1963).
275. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing positive experi-
ence of NHL resulting from overnight doubling in franchises).
276. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 448-51 (testimony of Rep. John
Seiberling) (arguing that marketplace should determine where teams locate).
277. H. DESmERT, supra note 85, at 91.
278. Id.
279. See Noll, Alternatives in Sports Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTs BUSINEss 414-15 (1974).
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existing owners for any reduced revenues its new entry caused.
Reduced revenues for existing teams are likely to occur for two
reasons. Expansion would reduce each existing owner's share
of the network television contract. Moreover, an existing
team's live gate revenues usually will decline for contests
against expansion teams.28
0
Requiring new franchises to compensate existing owners
for lost revenues has a number of significant flaws. A recent
NFL network television package provided each of the twenty-
eight owners with $15.6 million in annual revenues.28 1 Under
the proposal, expansion franchises would receive no network
revenue other than the additional revenue that higher ratings
generated in their particular localities. 28 2 This additional reve-
nue, however, will pale in comparison to the existing owners'
shares of the overall network package. If an expansion
franchise could not share equally in the television "pie," it
could not maintain a competitive team that would attract fans.
Network revenue comprises approximately half of total club
revenues.28 3 A franchise cannot realistically spend close to the
league average for players, coaches, scouting, and other ex-
penses if its only revenues are gate attendance, concessions, and
parking. Thus, an "open-entry with compensation" policy is in
essence a "no entry" policy.2
8 4
More fundamentally, an open-entry with compensation pol-
icy would be an administrative nightmare. Compensating ex-
isting owners for their share of network television revenue is
simple enough. Noll correctly understands, however, that an
efficient expansion system requires compensation for reduced
gate attendance. 28 5 Games between the Los Angeles Dodgers
and the San Francisco Giants, for example, probably will draw
more people than contests between the Dodgers and an expan-
280. See id.
281. The Pluses and Minuses of the NFL, L.A. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, Part
III, at 3 [hereinafter L.A. Times Chart].
282. For example, the overall league ratings for Sunday football in Indian-
apolis increased 50% (from 20 in 1983 to 30 in 1984) after the area obtained the
Colts' franchise. Source: ARBITRON RATINGS (1983 and 1984). See supra note
103 (discussing ratings increase after Colts moved to Indianapolis).
283. See L.A. Times Chart, supra note 281 (listing network revenue and to-
tal club revenue for each NFL team).
284. Owners in rival leagues have an incentive to share revenue with ex-
pansion teams to induce such expansion teams to come into their league, in-
stead of another league. Of course, owners in monopoly sports leagues have
no such incentive. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03 (arguing eco-
nomic theory suggests rival leagues will compete for expansion teams).
285. Noll, supra note 279, at 415.
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sion team, for example, the Denver Bears. But how many
more? Denver, of course, will argue that any reduced attend-
ance at Dodger Stadium is the result of factors other than the
mediocre quality of the Denver franchise. Measuring the pre-
cise amount of economic loss due to expansion is extraordina-
rily difficult.
28 6
Another proposal would permit a court to order a monop-
oly sports league to admit an expansion franchise whenever the
court determines from objective evidence that the expansion
site can support a major league team. The trial court in State v.
Milwaukee Braves, Inc.28 7 used this theory to hold that the fail-
ure of Major League Baseball to expand to Milwaukee consti-
tuted illegal monopolization in violation of Wisconsin's
antitrust laws.28 8 Professor John Weistart correctly observes
that, although semantically framed as an antitrust decision, this
holding requires courts to supervise in a quasi-regulatory fash-
ion, substituting their business judgment for the judgment of
the league regarding the profitability of expansion.28 9 As Weis-
tart points out, there are substantial problems with this ap-
proach. First, it assumes that critical issues-such as the
proposed club's ability to generate a reasonable profit in the
286. John Weistart also has criticized the "open entry with compensation"
proposal on the ground that it will ruin competitive balance. Weistart cor-
rectly observes that competitive balance is necessary to maintain the quality of
a league's product and fan enthusiasm and that league owners in larger mar-
kets often provide subsidies to fellow owners in smaller markets to maintain
such balance. See J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 737; see also supra text ac-
companying note 186 (arguing competitive balance is a public good). Weistart
hypothesizes that expansion will exceed the willingness or ability of current
owners to continue this subsidy, and concludes that expansion therefore would
harm competitive balance. J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 737.
Henry Demmert's analysis undercuts Weistart's critique. Demmert notes
that free entry assumes the abolition of territorial rights which franchises now
possess. Accordingly, teams will both enter and relocate into areas with excess
profits, which will eliminate the differences in market strength among the
various franchises. H. DEASMERT, supra note 85, at 82. If a metropolitan area
can support more than one team but not two, franchises might split their sea-
son between two areas. Id. at 88-89. If Demmert is correct, there will be no
need for the cross-subsidy that Weistart seeks to preserve. Indeed, teams such
as the Los Angeles Dodgers or Chicago Bears will not be in a position to subsi-
dize others because they will be competing against one or more new franchises
in their own metropolitan area.
287. 1966 Trade Cas. 71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Branch 5, Civ. Div., Milwaukee
County), rev'd on other grounds, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 990 (1966).
288. Id. at 82,411.
289. J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 737 n.335 (noting trial court undertook
detailed analysis of economic feasibility of locating franchise in Milwaukee).
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market-are capable of objective verification. A regulating
judge evaluating this question would consider not only "hard"
data, such as the population of the city, but also more amor-
phous factors, such as the enthusiasm of the local sports press,
the degree of support from local business, and the general level
of fan interest.290 If the court ordered a league to accept an ex-
pansion franchise against its will, the court also would have to
supervise the price and other terms upon which the franchise
joined the league.2 91 Otherwise, the defendant league could
frustrate the court's order by imposing an excessively high en-
try price, by failing adequately to share revenue from network
contracts, by failing to allow the expansion team to stock its
player roster with adequate talent, or by imposing other terms
so onerous that potential owners would be dissuaded from seek-
ing an expansion franchise. In performing this supervisory
function, however, the possibility of a court erring is great and
the risks of an incorrect decision are significant.
The Milwaukee Braves case-by-case litigation approach has
another flaw. Even if the court were correct in concluding that
Major League Baseball could expand,292 it failed to consider
whether Milwaukee was the best expansion site.29 3 Courts can-
not make such decisions in a vacuum. Allowing those who hap-
pen to win the "race to the courthouse" to prevail does not
serve the public interest. Conversely, if a court were to find
that modest expansion was possible and then left the choice
among the contenders for expansion to the monopoly league, a
bidding war would result among eight to ten cities for the new
franchises, thus exacerbating the tax subsidy problem.
294
Although monopoly sports leagues inflict significant harm
on fans by refusing to expand, regulatory solutions are a highly
suspect means of correcting the problem. The difficulties in de-
termining the optimal number of franchises by judicial regula-
tion are enormous, and should not be tackled absent clear
290. Id. at 738; see also HARVARD Note, supra note 121, at 427 (arguing in
principle, courts should require leagues to base expansion decisions on "how
fast the league can expand without serious injury to the sport as a whole").
291. J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 739 n.344.
292. See State v. Milwaukee Braves, 1966 Trade Cas. at 82,411 (concluding
expansion was feasible).
293. See J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 739 (arguing that if court ordered
expansion it first would have to evaluate franchise locations other than plain-
tiff city).
294. See Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 140 (testimony of Donald
Fehr).
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evidence that a marketplace approach is unworkable. 295
C. ALLOCATION OF PLAYERS
Precisely defining the optimal allocation of players within
a league is an almost insurmountable problem.296 When a de-
sire to exercise monopsonistic power over players does not mo-
tivate a league, the league will select an allocation scheme that
allows for ample play of market forces with some modest limits
to promote competitive balance.2 97 The precise contours of an
optimal allocation scheme are unknown, and are probably sub-
ject to constant change.2 98 Competing leagues will continue to
experiment and innovate with different systems of player allo-
cation in an ongoing effort to achieve the best system.
299
Establishing such a system by regulatory decree has several
major drawbacks. Regulation rigidifies the process of innova-
tion because changes require regulatory approval. In addition,
because the parties most interested in the player allocation sys-
tem are the owners and the players, monopoly sports league
owners and their players have an incentive to agree on a mutu-
ally beneficial collective bargaining package. Such an arrange-
295. See HARVARD Note, supra note 121, at 427-28 (suggesting that "To
avoid the uncertainties of judicial supervision of the details of expansion, it
might be appropriate to leave expansion decisions to the existing league, but
use antitrust policy to foster new leagues."). Because entry is so difficult, how-
ever, new leagues often pose no credible threat to existing monopoly sports
leagues. Thus, divestiture may be necessary to foster new leagues.
296. See supra Part I(C) (discussing incentives favoring and opposing effi-
cient allocation of players); Cairns, Jennett & Sloane, The Economics of Pro-
fessional Team Sports: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, 13 J. ECON. STUD. 3,
33 (1986) (noting that empirical research is probably unable to distinguish be-
tween player allocation rules that increase monopsony power and rules that
foster competitive balance).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98 (arguing competitive sports
leagues would have less incentive to restrict player mobility).
298. For example, legislation the Senate considered in 1960 would have
permitted Major League Baseball to maintain its perpetual reserve clause and
allowed baseball owners to "draft" any player within another team's farm sys-
tem without compensation, excluding those on the expanded 40-man major
league roster and players with four years or fewer of minor league experience.
See 106 CONG. REC. 14,738-39 (1960). Although such a proposal would have
made an inroad against the particularly inefficient practice of "stockpiling"
that richer teams conduct, recent developments demonstrate that this perpetu-
ation of the reserve clause was hardly the optimal solution for player alloca-
tion in baseball. See supra Part I(C) (arguing monopoly sports leagues adopt
inefficient player allocation systems that harm farms).
299. See supra Part I(C) (discussing schemes competing leagues might use
in allocating players).
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ment might not necessarily result in the player allocation most
conducive to exciting league contests.
For example, without the pressure of competing leagues,
the owners and the NFL Players' Association agreed in 1977 on
a package that included neutral arbitration of player griev-
ances, pension benefits for all players, a dues check-off system
desired by the union, as well as an allocation system that pre-
vented any significant player mobility.300 Major League Base-
ball's collective bargaining agreements have allowed for greater
player mobility, but baseball players probably would not insist
upon free agency at any price. If the baseball owners were to
offer players a sufficiently generous package of pension bene-
fits, minimum salaries, guaranteed contracts, injury protection,
and other desirable benefits in return for significant limits on
player mobility, baseball players probably would not decline
the offer out of any concern for its effect on overall competitive
balance. A regulatory board is unlikely to reject a scheme that
a unified phalanx of players and owners presents.301
D. PRESERVING GAMES ON FREE TELEVISION
Because monopoly sports leagues have the ability and in-
centive to exploit new technologies and shift the broadcasting
of games from free television to pay or cable television,30 2
policymakers might consider regulating broadcasting as a
means of preventing the harm to consumers that monopoly
sports leagues might cause. Like regulation of other aspects of
the industry, however, broadcast regulation is likely to be inef-
fective. Indeed, with respect to broadcast regulation, historical
support exists for this conclusion; the federal government al-
300. See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between NFL Players' Associa-
tion and NFL Management Council, reprinted in PRACTICING L. INST., REPRE-
SENTING PROFESSIONAL AND COLLEGE SPORTS TEAMS AND LEAGUES 17-111
(1977) (containing text of collective bargaining agreement); see also Alexander
v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 61,730, at 73,001 (D. Minn. 1977) (restric-
tions on player mobility have "been agreed to by the union as a trade-off or
quid pro quo... in return for numerous other direct benefits to the employees
it represented."), aff'd sub nom. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
301. In contrast, if there were competing leagues, each league's players and
owners should have an incentive to agree on an efficient system of player allo-
cation. If, for example, the American League's system appeared to be more
effective at creating exciting races, this excitement might generate more reve-
nue, resulting in more profits for owners and more money for player compen-
sation. The National League would be foolish not to copy this scheme; their
failure to do so might result in less money for both players and owners.
302. See supra Part I(D).
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ready has tried to regulate sports broadcasting, and has failed
miserably.
In the 1970s, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) attempted to regulate the television industry based on a
policy that sought to "channel . . .sports material to its in-
tended recipients over broadcast television, rather than pay
cable, whenever the economics of advertiser-supported pro-
gramming permit."30 3 The FCC immediately encountered the
problem of predicting which games a league would show on
free television if restricted to that medium and which games
would be televised only if the league could charge for the pro-
gram. For example, the Super Bowl and the World Series are
obviously contests that free television profitably can show. In
contrast, franchises might be unwilling routinely to broadcast
home games that were not sell-outs, unless they received sub-
stantial additional revenues through pay cable. If a regulator
allows cable to show a game based on the incorrect prediction
that advertisers will not sponsor the contests on free television,
consumers will have to pay significant sums of money to watch
a game they otherwise could have watched for free. Con-
versely, if a regulator prohibits cable from showing a game on
the incorrect assumption that advertisers will sponsor the con-
test on free television, fans will be unable to watch the game in
their homes.
In 1975, the FCC adopted a complex regulation preventing
cable from siphoning sports programming from broadcast tele-
vision.30 4 This regulation provided that if more than one-quar-
ter of the league's games traditionally had been televised, the
number of cablecasts could not exceed one-half of the number
of games that traditionally had not been televised.30 5 The
Court of Appeals struck down the regulation as arbitrary.
30 6
This decision was correct-the regulation was both overbroad
and underinclusive. Under the regulation, a significant number
of games would remain untelevised, even if fans willingly
would pay to view those games on cable. Moreover, the regula-
tion did nothing to prevent the league from selecting the most
exciting contests of the season to show on cable-games that
free television previously had broadcast and would have contin-
303. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 49 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (vacating Subscription TV Program Rules,
First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1975)).
304. See id. at 13 (summarizing 1975 regulations).
305. See id. at 20 n.10 (quoting relevant portion of FCC regulation).
306. Id. at 40.
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ued to broadcast, absent the cable option. Nothing suggests
that efforts to regulate would be any more effective today.
E. INEFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
The leagues' tolerance for certain inefficient owners' poor
management examplifies another harm monopoly sports
leagues cause consumers.30 7 To prevent that harm, a regulatory
body daily would have to oversee myriad decisions made by
team executives, who lack the threat of competition from a ri-
val league that would motivate them to make wise and innova-
tive business decisions.30 8 No guarantee exists, of course, that
well-meaning government bureaucrats will make wiser or more
innovative decisions than professional sports executives, even if
the latter group runs monopolies and seeks the "quiet life."
More importantly, neither a monopoly league nor a govern-
ment bureaucracy faces the test of the marketplace to deter-
mine whether decisions are in the fans' best interests. Rival
leagues are therefore superior to either monopolists or govern-
ment regulators in achieving maximum managerial efficiency.
Moreover, regulating and correcting mismanagement is
costly and time-consuming.30 9 Regulation is therefore unwise if
the marketplace is a feasible alternative means of ensuring effi-
ciency in management.
307. See supra Part I(E).
308. To cite just one example, consider revenue sharing. See supra note
158 and accompanying text (arguing revenue sharing could promote competi-
tive balance). Seattle Mariners owner George Argyros, who would benefit sig-
nificantly from the sharing of revenues, advocated federal legislation
mandating such a result. See Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 137-39
(testimony of George Argyros). All leagues, however, share some revenues.
Baseball, for example, shares its network television package revenues on an
equal basis, and visiting teams receive a percentage of road game live gate rev-
enue. Id at 59 (statement of General Counsel Edwin Durso). An optimal rev-
enue sharing scheme provides franchises in smaller markets with sufficient
resources to compete meaningfully with their larger city rivals, and at the
same time preserves sufficient opportunity for individual profit to retain the
incentive that each team should have to maintain its quality and to market its
product effectively in its home area. It will be very difficult for a regulatory
agency to find this balance adequately.
309. Regulatory agencies recently have begun to conduct "prudency re-
views" of public utilities. See Rose, 'Prudency Reviews'Are Changing the Way
Utilities Set Rates, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 1, 17. Reviewing the San Onofre
nuclear power plant, for example, has taken more than four years, will cost
more than $30 million, and will produce 10,000 exhibits and 20,000 pages of
transcripts. Id.
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III. ARE BASEBALL AND FOOTBALL NATURAL
MONOPOLIES?
This Article has argued that several factors favor separat-
ing Major League Baseball and the NFL, respectively, into sev-
eral leagues that compete economically,310 because as monopoly
leagues they impose significant costs upon taxpayers and
fans,31 1 because a free marketplace featuring competing leagues
would correct these economic deficiencies, 312 and because a
competitive marketplace is preferable to regulation as a means
of bringing about an efficiently operated industry.3 3 Neverthe-
less, such a break-up would be ill-advised if each sport were a
"natural monopoly" in which one firm could provide the prod-
uct more efficiently than two or more competing firms.
3 14
Neither football nor baseball is a natural monopoly. In contrast
to markets that economists identify as natural monopolies, sig-
nificant economies of scale do not arise in sports leagues. Thus,
one league cannot serve the entire market at a lower cost than
multiple leagues. Although the most powerful argument sup-
porting the natural monopoly theory is the historical record of
single leagues in each sport,3 5 factors other than the natural
monopoly hypothesis best explain this tradition. Prior exper-
iences of inter-league rivalry do not, upon analysis, support the
310. Although Major League Baseball consists of the National and Ameri-
can Leagues, the leagues do not compete economically with each other. They
act as one cartel with regard to each of the problems that monopoly sports
leagues cause. National League owners need approval from their American
League counterparts, and vice versa, for franchise relocation, expansion, and
sale. Major League Agreement, art. V, § 2(b)(3), reprinted in BASEBALL BLUE-
BOOK 507 (1987). The leagues jointly adopt rules concerning player allocation.
Compare Major League Rules 2-18, reprinted in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 514-68
(1987) (articulating rules governing player contracts) with Major League
Agreement art. IV, reprinted in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 505 (1987) (providing
that "[a]ny rules or regulations .. .shall be binding upon the Major Leagues
and their constituent clubs . . . ."). Any action relating to radio or television
requires the approval of a majority of the clubs in each league. Major League
Agreement art. V, § 2(b)(iv), reprinted in BASEBALL BLUEBOOK 506 (1987).
311. See Part I.
312. See id.
313. See supra notes 257-309 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d
Cir. 1945) (finding "[a] market may, for example, be so limited that it is impos-
sible to produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant large
enough to supply the whole demand."); Thurmond 85 Hearings, supra note 28,
at 398 (testimony of Charles F. Rule) (defining natural monopoly as "a market
in which the minimal optimal scale of production is so large that there is room
in the market for only one firm").
315. See infra notes 327-63 and accompanying text.
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claim that "ruinous competition" inevitably will drive rival
leagues into either merger or bankruptcy.316 Given the proper
legal environment, sports leagues could engage in economic ri-
valry in a stable, competitive market.
A. SPORTS Do NOT FIT THE ECONOMIc DEFINITION OF
NATURAL MONOPOLY
Economists have observed that competition is self-destruc-
tive and undesirable when "one firm of efficient size can pro-
duce all or more than the market can take . . . and can
continually expand its capacity at less cost than that of a new
firm entering the business. '317 The critical characteristic of a
natural monopoly is that "it is only as more output is concen-
trated in a single supplier that unit cost will decline."3 18 For
example, one company can supply electricity to an entire city at
less cost than two companies providing the service. Once the
first firm sets up its plant and wires the city, it is much cheaper
for it to add additional homes to its network than for a second
firm to set up a completely separate plant and network.
319
Two theoretical arguments support the thesis that sports
leagues fit within this economic definition of natural monopoly,
but the facts undermine both. One argument suggests that the
minimum size of a sports league is too large to support two
leagues. If, for example, a league needs at least eight franchises
in order to function,320 a sport might be a natural monopoly if
fewer than sixteen viable franchise locations existed. Because
Major League Baseball now includes twenty-six teams and the
NFL has twenty-eight franchises, this argument does not apply.
The other possible argument suggests that expanding ex-
isting leagues costs less than forming and operating new
leagues. No economic evidence supports this hypothesis. In
316. See infra notes 375-408 and accompanying text.
317. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 191 (1959); see also W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY 54 (1982) (natural monopoly exists "if and only if a single firm can
produce the desired output at lower cost than any combination of two or more
firms"); Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548,
548 (1969) (suggesting that "[i]f the entire demand within a relevant market
can be satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the
market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in it.").
318. 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTI-
TUTIONS 119 (1971).
319. See id. at 120-23 (discussing inefficiency of duplicating high fixed
costs).
320. See supra note 81.
[Vol. 73:643
SPORTS MONOPOLIES
contrast to industries characterized by large fixed costs for
plant and equipment, one economist estimated the annual fixed
cost for a sports franchise at less than $100,000.321 No evidence
suggests that stadium rental, player salaries, and administrative
costs would be any higher for a second league than for a mo-
nopoly league.322
Assessing whether a natural monopoly exists requires dis-
tinguishing costs-that is, the value to society of a resource be-
ing used by a league-and the actual dollar expenses paid out.
Monopoly leagues pay less for players than leagues operating in
a competitive market. 32 3 Therefore, it may be "easier" for a
monopoly league to expand than for a rival league to form.324
Savings resulting from monopoly exploitation, however, do
not benefit society. No one today would suggest, for example,
that the automobile industry is a natural monopoly, even
though the world's automakers undoubtedly could reduce ex-
penses by merging into one monopoly corporation and using
their economic power to suppress wages and obtain favorable
prices for steel and other inputs.325 Unlike the electric utility
paradigm, a monopoly sports league does not better serve the
public. 32 6
B. THE HISTORICAL RECORD
The argument persists, nevertheless, that sports are a natu-
ral monopoly, for the understandable reason that competition
among rival leagues never has existed for any length of time.
Instead, a brief review of the economic history of Major League
321. Noll/Adams, supra note 239, at 384-85.
322. The only cost savings would be the incidental administrative savings
from elimination of duplicate commissioner offices.
323. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
324. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(MacKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (concluding that NFL
"resembles a 'natural monopoly' because it is easier for the NFL to expand
than for another league to form.").
325. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 294-95.
326. Michael Canes argues that there should be only one league per sport,
because "[i]f several leagues compete in a sport, each league will ignore the ef-
fects of additional quality on returns to teams in other leagues, which will lead
again to socially excessive team quality." Canes, supra note 97, at 95. Canes
correctly observes that each league will seek to improve its own quality at the
expense of rival leagues in hopes of higher profits. Canes errs, however, in
concluding that this improvement in quality will be "socially" excessive. If
consumers are paying for higher quality baseball, team owners' wealth may
decrease with competition, but it is difficult to see how this harms society-
most of us, after all, are consumers.
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Baseball and the NFL discloses alternative explanations for the
absence of competitive leagues in each case.
1. Baseball
Although the National League began play in 1876,327 the
entity now known as Major League Baseball was created in
1903 as the result of an agreement ending competition between
the National and American Leagues. 328 In 1913, a new Federal
League was formed. After the National and American Leagues
rebuffed its efforts to join the Leagues' noncompetition agree-
ment, the Federal League engaged in vigorous inter-league ri-
valry.329 The incumbent leagues responded by threatening to
blacklist any players jumping to the Federal League.330 The
Federal League attempted to compete by acquiring players and
constructing new baseball stadiums for each of its franchises,
but could not survive a period when all baseball leagues lost
money as a result of general economic depression and World
War I.331 Although Federal League owners claimed that their
losses were in part attributable to antitrust violations that the
two incumbent leagues perpetrated, a "peace agreement" pro-
viding that the National and American League owners would
make cash payments of $600,000 to their Federal counterparts
and that two Federal owners could purchase existing franchises
mollified most of the owners.332 The agreement did not, how-
ever, satisfy the Baltimore Federal owners, who filed an anti-
trust suit against Major League Baseball and won an $80,000
verdict.333 The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' rejection of this suit,
which concluded that baseball was not commerce subject to
327. THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 137, at 15.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. L. SOBEL, supra note 24, at 2 (citing SUBCOMM. ON THE STUDY OF Mo.
NOPOLY POWER OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED BASE-
BALL, H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-50 (1952)). Blacklisting is a
cause of action under the Sherman Act susceptible to a suit for treble dam-
ages. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 448, 453-54 (1957).
331. L. SOBEL, supra note 24, at 2-3.
332. Id. at 4. In addition, all blacklisted players were reinstated and Fed-
eral League teams could sell their player contracts to American and National
League teams. Id.
333. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball
Club, 269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920) (reversing trial curt judgment trebling
damages to $240,000 with costs and attorneys' fees), aff'd, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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regulation by the Sherman Act.334
Over the next four decades, others occasionally attempted
to compete, either on the major league or the minor legue level.
A series of boycotts, player blacklists, price wars, legal harass-
ment, and deliberate scheduling of conflicting games crushed
these entrants.335 Not surprisingly, almost four decades elapsed
before the next serious new league attempted to enter base-
ball.3 36 Taking on an entrenched monopolist is always a daunt-
ing task; succeeding when the monopolist is not subject to the
restrictions of the Sherman Act poses insuperable obstacles.
337
Thus, when baseball executive Branch Rickey sought to
form a new Continental League in 1960, he initially sought to
join the National and American Leagues as a partner, rather
than a competitor.338 When the terms for admission proved too
steep,3 39 Continental League officials threatened to begin eco-
nomic competition.340 This effort foundered, however, when
the incumbent leagues announced their intention to expand to
four new locales in 1962, including three sites the Continental
League had targeted.341 Major League Baseball subsequently
has added six additional teams, further decreasing the markets
available for a new entrant.
Major League Baseball's method of developing players
compounds the difficulties of forming a rival league. Since
334. Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
335. Comment, Monopsony in Manpower: Organized Baseball Meets the
Antitrust Laws, 62 YALE L.J. 576, 604 & n.150 (1953) (citing H.R. REP. No.
2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1952)). A monopsony exists when a single buyer
controls the entire demand for a service or commodity. Id. at 576 n.3.
336. THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 137, at 18.
337. During the 1940s, organized baseball brought rival leagues in Canada
and Mexico within its control as "minor leagues." Leagues composed of black
players survived until the lifting of the color ban in 1945. Comment, supra
note 335, at 605-07.
338. See Young, Young Ideas, The Sporting News, Jan. 6, 1960, at 1, col. 1,
22, col. 3 (comments of Continental League founder Branch Rickey).
339. Major League Baseball required the Continental League to compen-
sate minor league franchise owners in cities such as Minneapolis, St. Paul, and
Atlanta, because the entrance of a major league team would displace their
teams. King, Talent Supply Success Key for Circuits, The Sporting News, Jan.
6, 1960, at 1, col. 5, 22, col. 3.
340. See, e.g., Foley, B.R Threatens Drastic Steps to Get CL Players, The
Sporting News, Apr. 27, 1960, at 14, col. 3 (William Shea, legal counsel to Con-
tinental League, threatened to raid Major League Baseball rosters to force
court review of the reserve clause, and Continental League founder Branch
Rickey said Continental League would raid as last resort).
341. Prell, Delay Action Until CL. is Counted Out, The Sporting News,
July 20, 1960, at 1, col. 4.
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shortly after World War II, Major League Baseball has been
vertically integrated, with major league teams signing un-
proven free agents and developing them in farm systems.
3 42
While rival football leagues can be staffed fairly quickly by
competing with the incumbent for top college players,3 43 a rival
baseball league either must lure stars away from existing
teams,344 or build its own farm system from scratch. Unless
Major League Baseball cooperates at the minor league level-
which, given its antitrust exemption, it has little incentive to
do-it is virtually impossible for a rival league to attract compa-
rable talent.3 45
This history of the economic structure of baseball does not
suggest that baseball is a natural monopoly.346 Major League
Baseball acquired monopoly power by engaging in mergers and
anticompetitive acts that clearly would constitute illegal mo-
nopolization in violation of section two of the Sherman Act.
3 47
342. Branch Rickey organized the farm system in 1926. By 1951, major
league clubs controlled directly or indirectly 51% of minor league clubs. NA_
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL LEAGUES, THE STORY OF MI-
NOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 77 (1952).
343. King, supra note 339, at 1, col. 5.
344. Id Until the Messersmith arbitration in 1975, supra notes 136-37, Ma-
jor League Baseball took the position that player contracts were indefinitely
renewable. Messersmith, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 112-13. Luring away estab-
lished players therefore has resulted in extensive contract litigation. Of
course, courts may not have enforced the perpetual reserve clause. See, e.g.,
American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 455-56, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 14
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914) (declaring standard contract reserve invalid for lack of
mutuality). Doubts about succeeding, however, could deter many entrants.
345. See King, supra note 339, at 1, col. 5.
346. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying text.
347. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), the
Supreme Court held that the merger of five companies controlling 95% of the
national cigarette market, accompanied by the purchase and closing of the
businesses of other rivals, constituted illegal monopolization. Id& at 181-83.
Major League Baseball's acquisition of monopoly power through the
equivalent of a merger between the National and American Leagues and the
maintenance of its monopoly by its "peace agreement" with most Federal
League owners, supra notes 330-32, appears to constitute similar conduct. In
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), the Supreme Court held that blacklist-
ing football players who played for rival leagues constituted a cause of action
under the Sherman Act. Id. at 448, 453-54. Major League Baseball used black-
listing to contest the entry of the Federal and Mexican Leagues. Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 403 (2d Cir. 1949); National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club, 269 F. 681, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff'd,
200 U.S. 201, 209 (1922); Comment, supra note 335, at 604-07. In Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462
(E.D. Pa. 1972), the court enjoined the NHL from using the reserve clause in
its standard player's contract because it constituted unlawful monopolization
by excluding rival leagues from signing veteran players. Id at 517-18. Until
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Major League Baseball maintained its monopoly by creating
new franchises to deprive new leagues of the base necessary to
begin competition.3 48 This conduct also probably would consti-
tute illegal monopolization absent the exemption.349 It is
nearly impossible for a rival league currently to engage in com-
petition with Major League Baseball. If Major League Base-
ball's current teams were organized into several competing
entities, however, nothing suggests that such entities could not
and would not engage in viable competition.
2. Football
Unlike Major League Baseball, the NFL has faced several
significant challenges to its monopoly position over the last few
decades. Because the NFL does not enjoy baseball's antitrust
exemption,350 the league has limits on the exercise of its eco-
nomic power to maintain its monopoly. Moreover, football has
several characteristics that make entry of a new league some-
what easier than in baseball, including fewer games and major
college programs to develop talent. Nevertheless, the NFL has
maintained its monopoly throughout this period. The circum-
stances surrounding the demise of economic competition in
football do not, however, suggest that establishing rival football
leagues is unworkable.
The All-American Football Conference was formed in
1946, but did not enjoy success as a rival league.351 The league
ignored the now-conventional wisdom that competitive balance
among franchises is desirable, 35 2 and the Cleveland Browns be-
came the overwhelmingly dominant team in the league.353
Nevertheless, several of its teams eventually entered the NFL
in 1949. 354
Inter-league rivalry next existed in professional football
beginning in 1960 when the AFL challenged the supremacy of
1975, Major League Baseball employed a similar reserve clause. See Messer-
smith, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 118.
348. See supra text following note 341.
349. Cf AFL v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1963) (affirming district
court judgment that defendant league did not monopolize professional football
by adding two expansion teams because 20 of 31 potentially desirable sites
were open to plaintiff).
350. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 453-54 (1957).
351. A. RONALD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOTBALL 12-6 to 7 (3d ed. 1963) [her-
inafter FOOTBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA].
352. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
353. FOOTBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 351, at 12-6.
354. I& at 12-7, 12-11.
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the NFL.35 5 At that time, the incumbent NFL had twelve
franchises. 356 A court subsequently found that thirty-one cities
could support major league professional football at that time.3 57
Thus, ample room existed for additional competitors to enter
and compete in large metropolitan areas capable of sustaining a
rival league. This rivalry ended, however, with the merger of
the two leagues in 1966.358
Since this congressionally sanctioned merger, a new foot-
ball entrant must now face a giant incumbent, entrenched in all
the major media markets and most of the largest markets in
the country. This entrenchment may be a critical factor in ex-
plaining the inability of other leagues, such as the World Foot-
ball League (WFL) and the United States Football League
(USFL), to compete. Obtaining a network contract is essential
for a league to compete successfully in the major league mar-
ket.35 9 A league's ability to locate franchises in at least some of
the four or five largest metropolitan areas may be critical to se-
curing a national network contract.360 Moreover, disasterous
managerial decisions by owners of the WFL and USFL may
have contributed significantly to their lack of success.36 1
That recent attempts at entry into professional football
failed does not establish football as a natural monopoly 362 any
more than unsuccessful attempts to enter the aluminum indus-
try prior to the dissolution of Alcoa demonstrated the natural
monopoly status of that industry.363 The experience of a new
league facing an entrenched incumbent is not a reliable indica-
tion of the probable result should the NFL be divided into two
or more competing entities, each with established franchises.
355. Id. at 12-8.
356. Id.
357. AFL v. NFL, 205 F. Supp. at 76-77.
358. See Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (current version codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1293 (1982)) (authorizing merger).
359. USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1353 (2d Cir. 1988).
360. J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 728-29.
361. See USFL, 842 F.2d at 1344 (observing that World Football League
(WFL) underfinanced and located franchises in mostly smaller markets); id. at
1351-52 (noting extensive evidence that strategy of moving from spring to fall,
escalating salary bids, and relocating franchises to markets without NFL
teams in hopes of achieving merger with NFL, caused USFL downfall).
362. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying text.
363. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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C. THE NFL's ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPETING
FOOTBALL LEAGUES
The NFL's merger with the AFL created a monopoly foot-
ball league, and almost certainly would have violated the anti-
trust laws. The leagues, however, obtained a statutory
exemption from Congress.364 The merger's supporters have
justified the merger by asserting that football is a natural mo-
nopoly,36 5 and provide two specific reasons why having one mo-
nopoly football league instead of two rival leagues serves the
public interest. The merger's proponents argue that only a sin-
gle economic entity could provide a championship game and
could assure the competitive balance necessary for exciting
contests.366
The Super Bowl's television ratings certainly support the
notion that fans enjoy a championship game.367 Rival leagues,
however, could agree jointly to produce a Super Bowl or a
World Series.368 Similarly, competing leagues could establish
364. Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (current version codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1291-1293 (1982)).
365. See NFL 66 Hearings, supra note 51, at 119-20 (memorandum of NFL
to House Judiciary Committee); see also Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22,
at 74-75 (testimony of Pete Rozelle).
366. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 74 (testimony of Pete Rozelle)
(explaining that league's competition with rival league seriously impairs effec-
tiveness of rules designed to equalize team strengths within league, resulting
in weaker clubs' inability to sign players in competition with rival league and
ever-increasing competitive imbalance); see also 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note
34, at 164 (testimony of Gerald Scully) (asserting that "[m]aintaining the high-
est possible absolute quality of play and establishing a champion among the
contenders are sufficient justifications for the continuance of sports leagues as
monopolies."); Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 342 (testimony of Roger
Noll) (supporting merger in part because it will allow championship playoff);
Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1, 6 (1964)
(declaring that only single league can produce world champion).
367. According to the Nielsen ratings, the 10 most popular televised sports
events in United States history are all Super Bowls; eight of the 10 most popu-
lar television programs in history have been Super Bowls. NATIONAL FOOT-
BALL LEAGUE, THE NFL AND You 8 (1987).
368. Pete Rozelle argued that leagues could not be expected to "in effect,
hit each other over the head for all but one day of the year. You cannot have
raiding of players and compete as agressively as we have been doing and then
get together and play a football game." NFL 66 Hearings, supra note 51, at 60-
61. Nonetheless, Pete Rozelle managed with some awkwardness, but not too
much difficulty, to preside over a Super Bowl featuring the Oakland Raiders,
whose owner was suing the rest of the league for millions of dollars. See Raid-
ers, 725 F.2d at 1381. Money, along with politics and war, make strange bedfel-
lows. Contrary to Rozelle's assertion, rival leagues, recognizing the
tremendous revenue possibilities for a Super Bowl or World Series, can expect
to take advantage of these opportunities in spite of personal feelings that vig-
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inter-league play if it were popular and demanded by the
fans.
3 6 9
According to the competitive balance rationale for the
merger, balance requires restrictions on player movement, such
as the Rozelle Rule or a draft.370 Again, there is no evidence
that rival leagues cannot meet the legitimate goal of competi-
tive balance. Team rivalry for player contracts actually in-
creases competitive balance because competition allocates
players more efficiently among the teams.371 Rival leagues
would be free to structure their own draft rules to ensure that
the various teams in the league shared rookie stars.3 7 2 Because
maintaining fan interest necessitates competitive balance, each
rival league probably would agree to share revenue among its
own members to allow all franchises to compete for top rookie
players. Moreover, if a common free agent draft among various
competing leagues were truly necessary to assure competitive
balance, the players' union probably would agree to such a
draft, which would then fall within the labor exemption to the
antitrust laws.3 73 The arguments in support of the merger erro-
orous economic rivalry causes. See also Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 229
(testimony of Lawrence Fleischer) (stating that merger is unnecessary to have
championships, all-star games, or even inter-league contests).
369. See Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 229 (testimony of Lawrence
Fleischer). But see id at 1130 (testimony of Thomas Kuchel) (asserting, with-
out explanation, that merger is prerequisite to interleague play).
370. See NFL 66 Hearings, supra note 51, at 117-19 (arguing, in NFL memo-
randum submitted to committee, that merger will permit player restraints so
that "[c]onditions can be created where all clubs, including those in less favor-
ably situated cities, such as Denver or Pittsburgh, can have an equal run at the
league championship in competition with such cities as New York, Los Ange-
les, and Chicago").
371. See supra Part I(C).
372. Cf. Danforth 85 Hearings, supra note 22, at 74-75 (testimony of Pete
Rozelle) (stating that Denver Broncos could not sign either first or second
round draft pick in first seven years and Pittsburgh Steelers drafted lower-
rated players whom they could sign). If the Broncos' and Steelers' inability to
sign players resulted because of economic contraints and seriously endangered
competitive balance, special subsidies could have given them the economic
ability to compete with the rival league.
Melvin Kratter of the NBA's Golden State Warriors believed that the only
reason for a merger with the American Basketball Association was to enhance
competitive balance through a common draft and a modified reserve clause.
Fearful that the NBA would agree to water down these restraints as the price
for congressional support, Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 856-57, he advo-
cated no merger and increased sharing of live gate revenues as a preferred
method of promoting competitive balance. Id
373. Under the labor exemption, restraints imposed on the market for
players are not subject to antitrust scrutiny if the players' union agrees to
them in bona fide arm's-length bargaining. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,
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neously assume that only a single league successfully could im-
plement the player restrictions necessary for competitive
balance. More importantly, these arguments do not establish
football as a natural monopoly.37 4
D. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT OF RuINous COMPETITION
A final argument in support of the natural monopoly the-
ory is that competing leagues invariably will engage in ruinous
competition until one or both are bankrupt. Thomas Kuchel, a
former senator retained as counsel to the NBA and the Ameri-
can Basketball Association in their unsuccessful quest for legis-
lation permitting a merger of the two leagues, articulated this
concern most directly:
The conditions presently confronting professional basketball result
from the annual rites of self-destruction between the two leagues.
Teams are quite literally forced, by the need to maintain major league
status, to bid against each other annually for those college players en-
tering professional ranks with reputations as potential superstars.
The yearly bidding war with its fantastic contracts for a limited
number of untested rookies-contracts which bear no relationship
whatever to basketball economics-will inexorably end in ruin. Yet
neither league can unilaterally retreat from that war, for to do so
would be equally ruinous to it.375
600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir.
1976). The National Basketball Players' Association proposed the concept of a
common draft between rival leagues, which would then compete among them-
selves for veteran players, but the owners of the NBA and the rival American
Basketball Association (ABA), who unsuccessfully sought congressional ap-
proval for a merger, rejected the proposal. See Hoop Hearings, supra note 168,
at 295 (testimony of Lawrence Fleischer).
374. As additional support for the merger, the NFL asserted that competi-
tion forced leagues to end their policy of not signing student athletes still in
college, thus interfering with the integrity of college athletics. NFL 66 Hear-
ings, supra note 51, at 115. Courts have held, however, that agreements not to
sign college athletes constitute illegal restraints of trade. Haywood v. NBA,
401 U.S. 1204, 1206 (1971); Boris v. USFL, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
375. Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 93; see also id. at 665 (testimony of
NBA Commissioner Walter Kennedy) (stating that "[i]t is the necessity to pro-
vide the fans with strongly competitive teams that has driven many clubs in
both leagues to saddle themselves with contracts for untested rookies far ex-
ceeding their ability to pay.").
Later in his testimony, however, Commissioner Kennedy made clear that
the real rationale for the merger was not a natural monopoly theory, but his
desire to permit traditional player restraints such as a draft and a modified re-
serve clause necessary to promote competitive balance. I&L at 666; see aZso id
at 668 (testimony of ABA Commissioner Jack Dolph) (same). Similarly, NFL
Commissioner Rozelle testified that some clubs had "withdrawn from the
player market" and others, "under the pressure of having to remain competi-
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Senator Kuchel did not explain why the NBA was "literally
forced" to pay salaries to untested rookies that bore "no rela-
tionship whatsoever to basketball economics." One would nor-
mally expect that if ABA owners foolishly offered excessively
high salaries to rookies, NBA owners would sit back happily
and watch their rivals lose money.
The specter of ruinous competition often has been invoked
to justify monopolies.37 6 The concern usually is raised with re-
spect to industries with large fixed costs, such as railroads or
airlines.3 7 7 The argument is that firms in these industries will
inevitably lower the price charged for their services until the
price equals only the cost of providing a particular item to a
particular customer, thus preventing the firms from covering
their overhead.378 Bankruptcy is the eventual result.37 9 Sports
leagues, however, are not subject to large fixed costs.38 0 Their
primary costs are player salaries.38 L The Illinois Central Gulf
Railroad must pay off the bonds used to finance its track from
Chicago to New Orleans, regardless of the amount of freight
carried over the track. By contrast, owners usually can release
a player if his continued service is not economically justified.382
Moreover, economic theory and some empirical evidence
suggest that league owners generally will not pay more in
player salaries than they reasonably can expect players to pro-
duce in ticket sales and broadcast revenues.38 3 The natural mo-
tive within their own leagues and with a determination to be among those
clubs which survive, are bidding for players at prices which have no relation to
football economics." NFL 66 Hearings, supra note 51, at 35. Yet the NFL later
made clear that the real argument supporting the merger was not a natural
monopoly argument, but rather the discredited argument that monopoly over
players somehow helps competitive balance. Id. at 116-19 (memorandum to
House Judiciary Committee).
376. See THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 81 (J. Wilson ed. 1980) (explaining
the "destructive competition" argument advanced by those wishing to imple-
ment price regulations).
377. Id. at 44, 81.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (observing that annual
fixed cost for sports franchise are less than $100,000).
381. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing salaries).
382. See supra note 213.
383. See H. DEMMi.RT, supra note 85, at 25 (noting that most observers con-
sider clubs to function as profit maximizers); L. KOPPETT, A THINKING MAN'S
GUIDE TO BASEBALL 217 (1967) (observing that "when a clear-cut choice arises
between more victories and more profit, the path toward more profit is cho-
sen"); Jones, The Economics of the National Hockey League, 2 CAN. J. ECON. 1,
2 (1969) (suggesting that model of profit maximization explains behavior of
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nopoly theorists fail to explained why sports owners, unlike
other business executives, would contract with a player know-
ing that the club cannot possibly profit from that contract.
38 4
Those who claim that bidding wars resulting in bankruptcy
are inevitable support their argument with facts showing that
teams in the midst of inter-league competition are losing
money.38 5 Alternative explanations exist, however, for the evi-
dence used to show that teams are losing money. One explana-
tion is that the figures which advocates of the ruinous
competition theory tout are inaccurate-that one or both
leagues actually maintain profitable operations despite the bid-
ding war for player contracts. In other words, the reason that
teams spend money on player contracts even though they are
losing money is that they are not really losing money at all.
NHL franchises); Noll/Adams, supra note 239, at 388 (noting that during 30-
year period from 1920 to 1950, St. Louis Browns and Brooklyn Dodgers contin-
ued to sell players for cash, despite their mediocre team records, thus prefer-
ring profit to victories).
Some commentators suggest that nonfinancial considerations may moti-
vate some owners, and those owners will continue to pay players at "high, un-
sustainable" levels to avoid public criticism for being cheap or timid. See, e.g.,
J. MARKHAM, supra note 77, at 38-39; see also NFL 66 Hearings, supra note 51,
at 51 (testimony of Pete Rozelle) (observing that money is not motivating fac-
tor for all owners). The evidence cited above suggests that profits generally
motivate owners. Spendthrift owners cause two easily remedied problems. In
the rare event that these owners happen to own teams exclusively in the more
powerful league, the new league may go out of business because of its inability
to sustain an unprofitable salary structure. Such a league probably would
have a valid monopolization claim. The more plausible situation would find
both leagues saddled with a few deep pocket owners who view franchises as
toys. In this case, their willingness to spend will throw off competitive balance
in both leagues. If so, each league independently could employ internal league
rules to rein in their black sheep.
384. Economist Robert Nathan, who testified in support of the basketball
merger, argued that "it would be unsound economics to determine everyone's
salary on the basis of the gross increment in revenues that might be traced to
his efforts." Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 645. Nathan suggested that
"under such a policy the allocation and recovery of overhead and fixed costs
becomes impossible." Id Nathan would be correct if basketball, like railroads,
were an industry characterized by larged fixed costs and declining marginal
costs of additional output, but there is no evidence that this is so. See supra
text accompanying note 321. Moreover, as a practical matter of basketball eco-
nomics, Nathan's suggestion appears incorrect. Any major professional
franchise will attract a sizeable number of patrons merely by opening up the
stadium and playing a talented opposing team. Marketing and promotion by
the front office will attract additional fans. Thus, the owners can compensate
skilled players for their incremental contibutions that add more victories or
otherwise make the team more attractive, and recover a normal profit.
385. See, e.g., Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 157-88 (testimony of econo-
mist Robert Nathan).
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The second possibility is that an incumbent league might be en-
gaging in predatory behavior to rebuff a new entrant.38 6 In
other words, teams may spend more on player contracts than
they possibly can hope to realize in revenue with the expecta-
tion that they will recoup the losses later through monopoly
profits, once they have eliminated the rival league.
The ruinous competition argument posits that teams pay
players excessive salaries bearing "no relation" to the econom-
ics of the sport. But Roger Noll, appointed as special counsel to
advise the Senate subcommittee reviewing the basketball
merger, testified that his "calculations of the revenue value of
superstars suggests that the top players in professional basket-
ball really are worth the salaries they earn .... ,,387 Moreover,
franchises can take advantage of accounting devices and tax
laws so they appear unprofitable even though they remain at-
tractive as investments for their owners. The tax laws permit
owners to suffer paper losses, such as the depreciation of player
contracts, that do not affect the team's actual profitability. 3 s
In addition, owners can use expenses other than player costs,
such as administrative or front office expenses, to take out
profits in the form of salaries paid to themselves or their rela-
tives. The prices of franchises resold at a time when a league is
bemoaning financial losses is probably more indicative of a
league's true financial health. During the period of the "ruin-
ous" professional basketball war to which Senator Kuchel al-
luded, for example, NBA franchises continued to increase in
value.389
The predatory argument requires more elaboration. A new
entrant willingly will lose a lot of money in the early years to
establish itself as an entity of major league quality. Given that
the cost of acquiring an existing or even an expansion franchise
in an entrenched monopoly league is considerable, it is sensible
to join a rival league for a modest entry fee, suffer some initial
386. See generally E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 286-87 (explaining tactic
of predatory pricing to drive rival firm out of business).
387. See Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 403.
388. Noll concluded that tax laws allowed a franchise to reflect a paper loss
of $1 million and a cash flow loss of $600,000 and still be profitable for the
owner. Id. at 341; see also id. at 228 (testimony of Lawrence Fleischer).
389. Id. at 228 (testimony of Lawrence Fleischer) (estimating franchise val-
ues have increased from $1.25 million to $3.8 million); id at 234 (observing
that San Diego Rockets paid fee of $1.75 million to join NBA and receive ros-
ter of expansion players; four years later, owner claimed financial difficulties
and sold team for relocation in Houston for a $4 million profit on his original
investment).
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losses while the league develops credibility, and then merge
with the incumbent league, thereby acquiring benefits of partic-
ipating in a monopoly league.3 9 0 Thus, a new entrant who fore-
sees eventual merger and inclusion in the monopoly sports
league, rather than competition on equal terms, will spend
more-perhaps to levels that Senator Kuchel considers to have
no relation to economics-than an entrant who foresees only
continued vigorous competition.
39
'
390. Cf. 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 263 (testimony of World Hockey
Players' Association head Ronald Roberts) (noting that WHA teams lost $1
million in first year, but paid between $25,000 and $250,000 to join, in contrast
to $6 million price recent NHL expansion franchises paid); Hoop Hearings,
supra note 168, at 292 (testimony of Lawrence Fleischer) (observing that ABA
owners set up new league because it was cheaper to enter NBA through rival
league than to buy in through fee for expansion franchise).
The potential capital gain realized if a franchise in a new league merged
into a single monopoly league explains why 11 franchises remained in opera-
tion in the ABA despite a "record of dismal financial performance." Id. at 191-
92 (testimony of economist Robert Nathan) (finding continued operation "re-
markable"). Indeed, Roger Noll concluded that the ABA deliberately fostered
increased bidding for players prior to consummation of the merger agreement,
to bring the NBA to the merger table. Id. at 369; see also id. at 858-59 (testi-
mony of Golden State Warriors executive Melvin Kratter) (noting that not all
ABA decisions were "pure business judgments" but some ABA officials be-
lieved that "they were going to be able to force their way into free NBA
franchises").
391. See Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 370 (testimony of Roger Noll)
("if competition were permanent, we would predict that the salaries that rook-
ies would sign for would be lower in the long run than they are now because
at least some of the salaries now being paid are not just payments for the
value of players. They are in addition, payments to force costs up and thereby
force a merger."); id. at 859 (testimony of Golden State Warriors executive
Melvin Kratter) (explaining that "businessmen eventually, in both leagues,
will begin to exercise some business restraints instead of indulging in this hys-
terical competition, and I believe that that will lend itself to a self-leveling of
the market, which has, in fact, already occurred" (citing San Diego decision
not to draft Pete Maravich)).
Similar business behavior occurs in the newspaper industry. For example,
Detroit's two newspapers entered into an all-out war of heavy spending and
massive discounting either to drive their rivals out of business or to persuade
Attorney General Edwin L. Meese III to permit them to operate jointly. See
Barnett, Detroit's High-Stakes Failure Game, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Jan./Feb., 1988, at 40, 41. If the newspapers' efforts to obtain governmental
approval of a joint operating agreement fails, Professor Barnett predicts that
both parties would change their policies to end their losses. Id. at 42. Two
lower courts have affirmed Attorney General Meese's finding that the Detroit
Free Press-because it had incurred, and will continue to incur, losses that
would have led to its demise if a large corporate parent did not own it-was a
"failing newspaper" for purposes of The Newspaper Preservation Act's partial
exemption to newspapers that enter into joint operating agreements. Michi-
gan citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 695 F. Supp. 1223
(D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3722
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How will the incumbent league respond? In most indus-
tries, existing firms faced with new rivals react by reducing
prices, but they are not expected to lower the price below the
marginal cost of production.392 A team without hopes of future
monopoly profits may raise salaries, but it has no reason to
raise them above the revenue it expects the players to produce.
In contrast, an incumbent league's owners might choose a
strategy that anticipates future monopoly profits. Expectation
of monopoly profits may explain why the league would pay sal-
aries that bear no immediate relationship to the economics of
the sport, to paraphrase Senator Kuchel.393 If the incumbent
league is more able than the new rival league to withstand
losses, it may pay "unsustainable" salaries in hopes of driving
the new league into bankruptcy.394
For example,3 95 the NFL merely outlasted its WFL and
USFL rivals.3 96 In both of these cases, the new leagues went
out of business and owners in the incumbent NFL were then
free to return to monopoly behavior.397 If a new league were
starting to crumble, the incumbent league might facilitate its
(1989). But see id, 868 F.2d at 1297 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (lamenting fail-
ure of Attorney General to explain cogently why parties would not, absent
promise of "pot of gold" of legally sanctioned joint agreement, adopt profitable
marketing strategies).
392. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 54, at 134-36 (explaining effect of new
firm's entrance into market on existing firm's price).
393. Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 93.
394. Testimony in congressional hearings offered insight on this point:
Since the NBA teams operate in larger cities and have a more estab-
lished following, they can afford to pay higher salaries than their
fledgling competitors. By offering to pay enormous salaries, the NBA
could force the ABA to assume a payroll that precluded a chance for
profit, or could relegate the league to minor league status. Some play-
ers might be offered even more than their expected contribution to
team revenues-just as in the days when predatory price cutting
caused some goods to be sold at prices below cost-because high sala-
ries would lead to higher future profits if they contributed to the fi-
nancial demise of the competition.
I& at 409 (testimony of Roger Noll and Benjamin Okner); see also idE at 292
(testimony of Lawrence Fleischer) (stating that NBA "felt an absolute need to
maintain its monopoly by destroying this new fledgling league").
395. In citing these examples, this Article does not mean to suggest that
the NFL necessarily was behaving predatorily. It is possible that it merely was
sharing some of its monopoly profits with its players.
396. Cf. supra notes 359-61 and accompanying text (discussing USFL and
WFL).
397. NFL salaries escalated sharply after the entrance of the USFL. An-
nual salary increases were much more modest after the rival league's demise.
FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES, AFL-CIO, LAWDIBLE, vol. 8, no. 5,
(Nov. 1987).
[Vol. 73:643
SPORTS MONOPOLIES
decline by offering to accept several franchises into its fold.3 98
When a competing league, such as the AFL, appears well-posi-
tioned to continue vigorous competition, a truce usually is de-
clared,399 the new entrants are allowed to join the incumbent
with little or no entrance fee,400 and the incumbent benefits by
restoring its monopoly.
40 1
Although some dispute the likelihood of predation in a typ-
ical industry,40 2 predation is much more plausible in sports.
Unlike new competitors in most industries, an entrant in a
sports market cannot succeed via price competition, that is, by
offering what may be an inferior product at a lower price.
40 3
Most fans are likely to insist on major league talent.40 4 Most
important, however, a significant portion of revenue comes
from broadcasting on free television.40 5 A new league cannot
possibly persuade fans to watch inferior games, when for the
same price (zero) they can watch the incumbent's superior
product.4 06
398. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 394 (testimony of ABAPA Gen-
eral Counsel Prentiss Yancey) (stating that ABA was on its way up and had
best year in nine-year existence, but was killed by application of New York
Nets and Denver Nuggets for NBA membership). One of the allegations of il-
legal monopolization in USFL v. NFL was that the NFL made overtures to a
few successful USFL owners, such as Donald Trump, concerning possible ad-
mission of their teams into the NFL. 842 F.2d at 1342-43. Although the jury
verdict does not specify the precise conduct that the jury found illegal, the
jury did find that the NFL had unlawfully maintained its monopoly power. Id.
at 1353.
The capital gain to an entrant league's franchises that merge with the es-
tablished league often will be enough to compensate those owners whose
teams were not fortunate enough to obtain permission to merge. See 1 Sisk
Hearings, supra note 34, at 632 (testimony of NBA Commissioner Lawrence
O'Brien) (four ABA teams merging with NBA made "accommodations" with
at least two other ABA franchises).
399. See supra notes 355-58 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
402. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588-91 (1986) (asserting that predatory pricing is "rarely tried .... even more
rarely successful"). But see Ordover & Wall, Proving Predation after Monfort
and Matsushita- What the "New Learning" Has to Offer, ANTITRUST, Summer
1987, at 5 (arguing that many scholars perceive predatory pricing as threat).
403. See 1 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 486 (testimony of WHA Cleve-
land owner Jay P. Moore) (stating that he could not compete against NHL on
price; tried cutting ticket prices but attendance didn't increase).
404. Id.
405. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(McKinnon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting television reve-
nue constituted approximately 30% of NFL teams' total revenue).
406. See 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 474 (testimony of WFL Birming-
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Concern about this problem led one thoughtful student
commentator to suggest that fans "may be unwilling to give
long-term support to two independent leagues in a sport, each
claiming to be 'major.' If support gravitates to one league as
'superior,' that league will be able to outbid the other for play-
ers and will establish a decisive dominance.40 7 Professor John
Weistart has endorsed this theory. He concluded that fans
eventually will decide that one league or the other is superior,
broadcasters will follow consumers' preference, and the inferior
league will decline rapidly.408
This scenario, although entirely speculative, is plausible in
the context of competition between an entrenched league and a
rival, or between two new leagues in a sport undeveloped in the
United States, such as soccer or lacrosse. It is less plausible
that the divestiture of existing monopoly leagues into compet-
ing leagues will result in one dominant league. For example, a
few exciting National League seasons might result in a more lu-
crative television contract for that league, perhaps giving Na-
tional League franchises some advantage in bidding against
American League teams. Unlike new leagues, however, Ameri-
can League franchises have a well-developed base of fan sup-
port. An established league should have little difficulty
obtaining the capital necessary to continue to compete with its
cash-rich rival for quality players. Although a decline in qual-
ity might cause fans across the country to watch fewer televised
American League games, loyal fans would be unlikely to desert
their local heroes to watch allegedly superior contests between
National League teams unless the American League's decline
in quality were substantial.
Predatory practices are thus unlikely to occur in sports in
which well-established rival leagues compete. Imagine a world
inhabited by three baseball entities: the National, American,
ham owner A. E.* Burgess) (fans will not watch unless league plays best
teams). Although fewer fans watched AFL games and their broadcast rights
sold for a smaller amount than the NFL's, the AFL nevertheless, was able to
attract a sizeable audience; see also id at 294 (testimony of Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Joe Sims) ("The NBC contract for the AFL did not produce
anywhere near the kind of money that the CBS contract produced for the
NFL, but the AFL was able to survive and was able to prosper.") If the cur-
rent monopoly leagues were divided into several entities of roughly compara-
ble talent, each league should be able to maintain fan interest, although a
league perceived to be substantially inferior probably risks losing many of its
fans.
407. HARVARD Note, supra note 121, at 432.
408. J. WEISTART, supra note 44, at 728.
[Vol. 73:643
SPORTS MONOPOLIES
and Continental Leagues. If a new United States Baseball
League (USBL) sought to enter the market, it might lose
money during its early years as it signed expensive player con-
tracts and before it had developed a fan following. Absent col-
lusion, the three incumbent leagues would not respond by
raising their salaries to unprofitable levels. National League
owners would have no incentive to lose money in order to keep
out the USBL, because even if they succeeded, they still would
be competing with the American and Continental Leagues.
Only the prospect of future monopoly profits gives league own-
ers an incentive for predatory conduct that is unprofitable in
the short run. If monopoly leagues were clearly illegal, owners
would not engage in predation. Competition would be the
norm in baseball and football.
IV. MONOPOLY LEAGUES, RIVAL LEAGUES, AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
Representatives from both Major League Baseball and the
NFL have complained about the effect of the antitrust laws on
their leagues. In a memorandum submitted to the House Judi-
ciary Committee, Major League Baseball's legal counsel wrote
that the rule of reason analysis which courts used in antitrust
cases would not "provide meaningful protection for the basic
practices of Baseball in the event the sport lost its existing anti-
trust immunity.140 9 NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle has com-
mented that NFL owners are "damned in antitrust if they do,
and damned in antitrust if they don't."410
The criticisms have merit. Courts have not done a particu-
larly good job of analyzing allegations that activities of monop-
oly sports leagues unreasonably restrain trade. When courts
discover monopolistic practices, they prefer to break up the mo-
nopoly so that the market can provide its own self-correcting
form of regulation. Divestiture is likely to maximize welfare
for consumers more accurately than would a judge's well-mean-
ing regulatory edicts. When fashioning antitrust remedies,
courts thus prefer to establish rules that foster competition
rather than to attempt to regulate monopolies. In contrast to
the problems that exist in judging the legality of conduct by
monopoly sports leagues, courts sensibly can apply existing an-
titrust doctrines to regulate competition among competing
409. Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 445 (Memorandum of Arnold &
Porter).
410. 1& at 185.
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leagues. 411
When the defendant is one of several rival leagues, courts
should sustain most of the practices that have been challenged
as antitrust violations over the past thirty years. The antitrust
laws would serve primarily to ensure that agreements between
the leagues did not impair meaningful inter-league rivalry or
prevent new leagues from entering the marketplace. Thus, the
current state of antitrust law justifies a divestiture of Major
League Baseball and the NFL into several competing leagues in
two discrete respects: divestiture will free leagues and courts
from the difficult and possibly intractable regulation of agree-
ments among owners in a monopoly league, while existing law
provides a workable structure for oversight of competition
among rival leagues.
A review of reported cases involving antitrust suits di-
rected against the major professional leagues in baseball, foot-
ball, basketball, and hockey reveals that most cases concern
agreements among the owners of a single league. These cases
raise difficult antitrust issues when the league is a monopolist.
The court either must allow the monopoly league to do as it
wishes or intervene and determine whether the challenged re-
straint is reasonable under the circumstances. 412 Because mo-
nopoly sports leagues, if courts do not restrain them, will cause
significant harm to taxpayers and fans, intervention is desira-
ble.413 Judicial intervention, however, often puts the court in
the role of sports regulator, for which the judge, or for that
matter any governmental official, is ill-suited.
41 4
When rival leagues vigorously compete in the same mar-
ket, however, judges need not so carefully scrutinize agree-
ments among owners in any one league. In such cases, judges
411. See infra notes 448-60 and accompanying text.
412. Major League Baseball officials have expressed a fear that courts
might condemn agreements among members of a league as per se illegal under
the antitrust laws without considering the facts and justifications for such
agreements. See SISK REPORT, supra note 25, at 52-53. The Supreme Court
subsequently has made clear that these fears are unfounded. In NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01, the Court held that courts would evaluate
league rules by the rule of reason-which inquires into the particular market
context and the defendant's justifications-because in sports "horizontal re-
straints on competition, or agreements among competitors, are essential if the
product is to be available at all;" see also id. at 101 (quoting R. BORK, THE AN-
TITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978) ("When a league of professional lacrosse teams is
formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on the ground
that there are no other professional lacrosse teams.")).
413. See generally supra Part I.
414. See supra Part II.
[Vol. 73:643
SPORTS MONOPOLIES
can defer more confidently to independently determined poli-
cies of the defendant league. If the league's policies are ineffi-
cient or otherwise contrary to consumers' interests, the league
will suffer in the marketplace as rivals woo the defendant's
customers.
4 15
The largest number of reported antitrust cases against ma-
jor sports leagues 416 involve players or other employees who
claim that the leagues unreasonably restricted the market for
their services. 417 Even when the defendant is a monopoly
sports league, the courts have analyzed the challenged agree-
ments under the rule of reason.418 The challenged agreements,
however, often have been held illegal.41 9 Most restrictive
415. Cf Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51, 52 &
n.19 (1977) (adopting more relaxed standard of antitrust treatment for certain
agreements because "when interbrand competition exists . . . it provides a
significiant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of
the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same product");
see also 2 Sisk Hearings, supra note 34, at 286 (testimony of Joe Sims) ("Com-
petition between rival leagues in the same sport is very natural, and it does not
involve some of the difficult questions which must be faced when analyzing in-
tra-league restraints" of monopoly sports leagues.).
416. This analysis studies basketball and hockey as well as football and
baseball, in order to explore fully the range of possible litigation that may be
brought against monopoly leagues now and might be brought in the future
against competing leagues. But see supra note 14.
417. Football cases: Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d
606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Powell v. NFL, 678 F.
Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986);
Boris v. USFL, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Hayes v.
NFL, 469 F. Supp. 247 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977); Bowman v. NFL, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn.
1975); Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Beach v. NFL, 331 F.
Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Baseball cases: Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Salerno v. American
League, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Tepler
v. Frick, 204 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1953); Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th
Cir.), aff'd sub noma. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953);
Martin v. National League, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949).
Basketball cases: Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Wood v. NBA,
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987);
Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Saunders v. NBA, 348 F.
Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Hawkins v. NBA, 288 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Pa. 1968);
Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Hockey cases: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.
1979); Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); Boston Professional Hockey
Ass'n v. Cheevers, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972); Linseman v. World Hockey
Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
418. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984); Smith, 593
F.2d at 1181; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619-20.
419. See, e.g., Haywood, 401 U.S. 1204 (striking down league rule against
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agreements not only give a player no opportunity to receive
competing bids for his services, but courts typically have found
them to be much more restrictive than necessary to accomplish
whatever justifiable goals the league purports to have in adopt-
ing them.420
Courts can be more tolerant of restraints on players in a
world of competing leagues. Such leagues are less likely to
adopt rules that are not truly justified by some legitimate com-
petitive goal, such as promotion of competitive balance or more
exciting games.421 If teams from different leagues are bidding
for their services, players will bargain for salaries approximat-
ing their full market value. No single league will depress sala-
ries artificially through player restraints. Similarly, so long as
players can receive truly competitive bids from different
leagues, a player will be unable to demonstrate that one partic-
ular league's rules have harmed him. If, for example, the
USFL and the AFL each had one or more teams actively bid-
ding for the services of All-Pro tight end John Mackey in the
1970s, he could hardly have claimed significant injury because
the National Football League allowed only the Baltimore Colts
to bid on him. Thus, if vigorous inter-league competition actu-
ally existed for players, an intra-league restraint that one
league independently adopted would not usually constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade.422
drafting college underclassmen); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (striking down re-
straints on competition for players' services); Kapp, 390 F. Supp. 73 (holding
NFL draft illegal); Robertson, 389 F. Supp. 867 (striking down NBA draft and
rules limiting competition for players' services); Boris, 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,012 (striking down league rule against drafting college
underclassmen).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
421. See supra Part I(C).
422. Indeed, the bidding war between the NFL and rival leagues such as
the AFL and the USFL was extremely vigorous, although in most cases there
was only one franchise per league entering the bidding. See, e.g., Houston Oil-
ers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1966) (concerning AFL team's attempt
to enjoin college player from contracting with NFL team).
The discussion in the text applies to most of the player restraint cases
cited at note 417, supra. A few cases fall into other categories. Some involve
decisions permitting monopoly leagues to boycott players found to be involved
in gambling or other activities that affect the integrity of the game, or whose
physical conditions involve severe risk of injury. See, e.g., Neeld v. NHL, 594
F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding player with only one eye not permitted to
play); Molinas v. NBA, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (upholding indefinite
suspension for gambling). If monopoly leagues properly can bar such players,
a fortiori rival leagues can do so. Other cases forbid leagues from adopting
rules barring college players from turning pro before the expiration of their
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A second major source of antitrust litigation involves suits
challenging franchise relocation, expansion, or other internal
league decisions.423 When plaintiffs have brought such suits
against monopoly sports leagues, they often have persuaded
courts that without judicial intervention fans will be denied the
opportunity to watch desired contests, and that the defendant's
refusal to expand or permit a relocation is motivated by monop-
olistic self-interest.
Most of these suits never would have been brought in a
world of competing leagues. The bitterly contested litigation
between the NFL and Raiders' owner Al Davis concerning Da-
vis's decision to relocate his team from Oakland to Los Angeles
college eligibility. See, e.g., Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Boris v.
USFL, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012 (C.D. Cal. 1984). These rules would
be easier to sustain legally if done unilaterally by a single league. So long as
rival leagues do not agree jointly to boycott college athletes, however, competi-
tive pressures probably will induce all leagues to go after athletes who wish to
turn pro. The best explanation for why rival leagues would decide not to pur-
sue talented players is fear of concerted retribution from colleges or their
coaches. See, e.g., id. at 68,462. If so, college coaches should be sued along
with the leagues for conspiring to prevent players from turning pro.
423. See, e.g., NBA v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding NBA effort to determine initially proposed relocation of Clip-
pers from San Diego to Los Angeles not capable); Raiders, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984) (overruling league denial of permission
for Raiders to move from Oakland to Los Angeles); Charles 0. Finley & Co.,
Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (concerning Commissioner veto of
cash sale of three star A's players); Washington v. American League, 460 F.2d
654 (9th Cir. 1972) (concerning league approval for relocation of Seattle Pilots
to Milwaukee and refusal to grant expansion franchise for Seattle); Buffalo v.
Atlanta Hawks Basketball, Inc., Civ. No. 76-0261 (W.D.N.Y. June 15 1976) (ap-
proving of planned relocation of Buffalo franchise to Florida), cited in J. WEIS-
TART, supra note 44, at 716-19; Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 1966
Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,738 (Cir. Ct. Milw. Co.) (overruling league approval for
relocation of Braves to Atlanta and refusal to grant expansion franchise for
Milwaukee), rev'd on other grounds, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 990 (1966).
Except for Finley, these cases all concern franchise location or expansion.
Finley involved an antitrust challenge by the owner of the Oakland A's to
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's exercise of power granted to him in the Major
League Baseball Constitution to take steps necessary "in the best interests of
the national game of Baseball." Finley, 569 F.2d at 533 n.11. Kuhn exercised
this power to void a sale of three star players for cash. 1d. at 531. The Seventh
Circuit dismissed the Sherman Act counts because of baseball's antitrust ex-
emption. Id. at 541-42. Were baseball subject to the antitrust laws but broken
into several leagues, Finley's suit probably would not have prevailed. With
various leagues competing, courts would give great leeway to individual league
determinations of whether players should be sold for cash. If barring cash
sales hurts the efficient allocation of players and results in less exciting and
competitive races, other leagues can be expected to permit cash sales and draw
fans-at least on television-to view their contests.
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over the league's objection, 424 serves as a prime example. If
competing leagues existed, the controversy probably never
would have arisen.425 If the AFL had a team in Anaheim, the
Los Angeles Rams probably would not have moved there from
Los Angeles; thus the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission prob-
ably would not have been interested in offering concessions to
lure the Raiders to Los Angeles. Assume, however, that
Anaheim had no AFL team, and the Rams had moved.
Although the NFL still might have prohibited any of its teams
from moving to Los Angeles, the rival AFL would have been
happy to let Al Davis move his Raiders to Los Angeles.426
As a legal matter, the prospect of rival league expansion or
relocation would make it virtually impossible for a city427 or a
maverick owner to prove that the defendant league harmed
competition. If, as the Ninth Circuit found in Raiders, the Los
Angeles market is large enough to support two teams,428 or, as
the Milwaukee County Circuit Court found in Braves, baseball
424. See Raiders, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving suit challenging
NFL's rule requiring approval of Raiders' relocation).
425. Ironically, Al Davis had previously served as Commissioner of the
AFL and was planning to add an AFL expansion team in Anaheim at the time
of the NFL merger. D. HARRIs, supra note 30, at 308.
426. For example, the Raiders court was concerned that the proposed relo-
cation was denied because the league wished to protect the Los Angeles Rams
from competition. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1395, 1397. The court hearing the Mil-
waukee Braves case found that expansion to Milwaukee was denied to perpet-
uate Major League Baseball's monopoly. Milwaukee Braves, 1966 Trade Cas.
at 82,404. Owners in a monopoly sports league have an incentive to bar effi-
cient relocations in order to preserve their own exclusive territories, even if
the league as a whole and fans would prefer that a large metropolitan area
host two or more franchises, see supra text accompanying notes 61-67, and
such owners also have an incentive artificially to restrain the number of
franchises, see supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
427. Raiders also held that the NFL's refusal to authorize the relocation to
Los Angeles unlawfully lessened competition among stadiums to secure NFL
tenants. Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1395. For a withering critique of this holding, see
Roberts, supra note 246, at 285-90. This aspect of Raiders seems incorrect.
Once the league determines that there will be only 28 franchises-a decision
not challenged in Raiders-which stadiums get the leases is of no competitive
significance. Cf. A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th
Cir. 1981) (substituting one exclusive dealer for another is not antitrust viola-
tion). Indeed, from the point of view of a consumer-oriented antitrust policy,
league decisions consistently prohibiting relocations would be beneficial,
rather than harmful. If cities knew that teams could not relocate, the teams
would not be able to obtain massive tax subsidies. Unfortunately, the NFL
has not consistently applied such a no-relocation rule. Raiders, 726 F.2d at
1397.
428. 726 F.2d at 1395.
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can expand and Milwaukee can support an expansion team,429
one can expect rival leagues to fill the void. Thus, unless the
number of teams that a particular metropolitan area can sup-
port exceeds the number of competing leagues that exist, which
is for the forseeable future an unlikely prospect, except for
relocations to the New York area, courts should sustain against
antitrust challenge individual decisions by one of several com-
peting leagues concerning franchise relocation.430  Courts
should not, of course, tolerate collusion among rival leagues on
these issues.
A third source of significant antitrust litigation concerns
the sale of rights to broadcast the monopoly sports league con-
tests. Even though package agreements may promote competi-
429. Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,738,
at 82,411 (Cir. Ct. Milw. Co.).
430. For example, the NCAA attempted to justify its restrictions on college
football telecasts by arguing that such restrictions were necessary to allow
members to compete with other forms of entertainment. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, based on the trial court's finding that there were no
adequate substitutes for college football. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 115. The court
noted, however, that "if the NCAA faced 'interbrand' competition from avail-
able substitutes, then certain forms of collective action might be appropriate in
order to enhance its ability to compete." Id. at 115 n.55; see also Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
296 (1985) (holding cooperative wholesalers could exclude plaintiff where al-
ternatives were available).
Some suggest that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), unduly restricts league regulation of franchise re-
location, and that the Court therefore should overrule it. See, e.g., Lazaroff,
The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Profes-
sional Sports, 53 FORDHAm L. REV. 157, 189-93 (1984). Whether or not the
Court should overrule Topco, the case does not bar antitrust as a workable reg-
ulator of competing leagues. Topco involved an agreement among competing
retailers to use exclusive territories in selling house brand groceries. Topco,
402 U.S. at 602-04. On remand, the district court implemented a less restrictive
territorial scheme to protect the defendant's legitimate goals. Topco, 1973
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,485 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd per curiam, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
Thus, at most, Topco would render suspect a league rule giving members auto-
matic vetoes over relocations into their home territory. A league rule that de-
termined whether to permit relocations on a case-by-case basis thus would be
distinguishable.
Moreover, Raiders strongly implies that the NFL probably could have re-
jected the Raiders move if Los Angeles could not support two football teams.
See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1397. Yet with competing leagues, a plaintiff challeng-
ing a franchise relocation denial would have the difficult task of arguing that a
market is large enough for multiple teams, but for some reason rival leagues
who have chosen not to place franchises there do not share this judgment.
The only circumstance in which franchise relocation decisions might be chal-
lenged is that in which a metropolitan area is so large that it can support more
teams than there are rival leagues.
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tive balance and ensure that franchises in smaller locales have
access to television markets, the courts have been particularly
critical of agreements prohibiting the telecasting of certain
games in specific locations. 431 In response, Congress passed an
antitrust exemption to facilitate package sales.4 32 This exemp-
tion covers only the sale of rights to "sponsored telecasting,"
however, which arguably does not apply to package sales to
cable networks.433 When no exemption applies, courts must de-
termine whether a challenged broadcast rights agreement re-
stricts viewership from what "would otherwise be" the case.
434
Because monopoly leagues have an incentive to enter into anti-
consumer agreements to enhance monopoly profits, 435 courts
must carefully scrutinize nonexempt package sales to protect
consumers.
With competing leagues, however, each league's separate
package sale would be more likely to survive antitrust scrutiny,
regardless of the statutory exemption,436 because viewers could
choose among televised games of the various leagues. Recent
litigation concerning college football telecasting supports this
conclusion. In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board
431. See, e.g., United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
432. Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295) (1982)). Because the NFL package
television contracts might violate the antitrust laws if the exemption did not
apply, there has been some litigation concerning the specific terms of the 1961
Act by those hoping to show that the NFL exceeded the terms of the exemp-
tion. See, e.g., Colorado High School Activities Ass'n v. NFL, 711 F.2d 943
(10th Cir. 1983) (addressing precise scope of provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1293 deny-
ing antitrust exemption to NFL if it telecasts during high school games when
proper notice is given); WTWV, Inc. v. NFL, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982) (ad-
dressing whether station outside 75-mile territory in which blackouts are per-
mitted could broadcast its signal to viewers within Miami territory); Blaich v.
NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (addressing whether Sports Broadcast-
ing Act applies to NFL decision to blackout championship game in New York).
Congress included baseball within the Sports Broadcasting Act's protec-
tion, notwithstanding baseball's general exemption from antitrust scrutiny.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). Before the statute's enactment, two reported at-
tacks on the sale of baseball broadcast rights were unsuccessful. See Ports-
mouth Baseball Corp. v. Frick, 21 F.R.D. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (involving suit by
minor league team for injuries due to broadcast of major league games into lo-
cal territory); Liberty Broadcasting System v. National League Baseball Club
of Boston, Inc., 1952 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,278 (N.D. Ill.) (upholding baseball's
restriction of transmission of official scorer's accounts of games).
433. See Metzenbaum Hearings, supra note 222, at 53-54 (written statement
of Stephen F. Ross) (citing legislative history).
434. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107.
435. See supra Part I(D).
436. Of course, the exemption will continue in place after a divestiture
order.
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of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,43 7 the Supreme
Court struck down an agreement among all the members of the
NCAA that limited college football telecasts to two or three
games each Saturday and which restricted the number of times
any team could appear on television.438 After this decision, sep-
arate groups of colleges that compete with each other for view-
ers entered into restrictive agreements with various
networks.439 Courts have treated these agreements more
favorably.440
The final major source of antitrust litigation is rival
leagues which allege that the entrenched incumbent leagues
unlawfully monopolized the market.441 Although predatory
conduct would, of course, continue to be illegal following a
437. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
438. Id at 120.
439. See e.g., Association of Indep. Television Stations, Inc. v. CFA, 637 F.
Supp. 1289, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (stating that two different groups of col-
leges, CFA and Big Eight Conference, signed television agreements with ABC
sports).
440. See, e.g., ia at 1298-1302 (noting significant difference between chal-
lenge to NCAA exclusive contract and challenge to contract with CFA, which
competes with other college and professional teams for Saturday afternoon
telecasts); cf NCAA, 468 U.S. at 115 n.55 (stating that collective action is per-
missible if defendant faces competition for substitute products). But see Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Corp., 747 F.2d 511, 516-19
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding illegal agreement among members of CFA, which rep-
resents most major college football teams, not to allow games with nonmem-
bers televised except pursuant to its contract with ABC).
441. USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Professional Hockey
Antitrust Litigation, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1976); AFL v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124
(4th Cir. 1963); American Basketball Ass'n Players' Ass'n v. NBA, 72 F.R.D.
594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
A variety of other suits against monopoly sports leagues would not suc-
ceeded against a league without monopoly power. In North Am. Soccer
League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982), the
court struck down an NFL rule barring its owners from also owning soccer
franchises. Id at 1261. The court found that the number of individuals with
the wealth and expertise to operate sports franchises was quite limited and the
rule made it unreasonably difficult for a potentially competitive sport to get
started. Id at 1259-61. If there were several competing football leagues, how-
ever, each one's unilateral decision to forbid cross-ownership simply would not
have had this effect. Given the desire by certain owners to be involved in
more than one sport, see D. HARRis, supra note 30, at 99, the threat of a Miami
Dolphins owner Joe Robbie, for example, to take his talents to a rival football
league probably would deter an independent AFL from preventing Robbie's
ties to a franchise in another sport.
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), involved a boycott of players who
previously had breached NFL contracts to play in the rival All-American Foot-
ball Conference. If Radovich could have peddled his talents to the AFL or the
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breakup of Major League Baseball or the NFL, plaintiffs who
bring monopolization or attempted monopolization suits must
show that the defendants enjoyed monopoly power or a danger-
ous likelihood of success in acquiring such power." 2 Most con-
duct of monopoly leagues that courts view with suspicion, such
as enforcement of a uniform player contract binding players to
their existing clubs for at least three years," 3 expansion into
USFL, however, his case would be weaker. If he had these alternatives, how-
ever, the NFL never would have bothered to blacklist him in the first place.
Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1974), in-
volved a dispute concerning Major League Baseball compensation for the mi-
nor Pacific Coast League (PCL) because of the expansion of the major leagues
into San Diego and Seattle-two areas previously served by the PCL.
Although the court relied on Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972), to dis-
miss the antitrust claims, Portland Baseball Club, 491 F.2d at 1103, it is diffi-
cult to imagine the merit of a similar antitrust suit brought against one of
several competing major leagues which, because of the superiority of its prod-
uct, threatens to displace minor league franchises in the context of expansion.
Finally, several suits against monopoly leagues challenged decisions not to
permit particular owners to join the league. Courts uniformly have rejected
those suits as not stating antitrust challenges. See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey
Club, Inc. v. NHL, 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.) (challenging NHL's decision not to
award franchise to any club in Seattle), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 932 (1986); Mid-
South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983) (alleging antitrust viola-
tions for NFL's refusal to establish franchise in Memphis), cert denied, 467
U.S. 1215 (1984); Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (challenging
NBA Board decision denying new owners of Boston Celtics permission to join
association). The plaintiffs' cases would be even weaker if the defendant
leagues were not monopolists.
442. See, e.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 305 (8th Cir.
1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (holding that 50% market share does
not establish dangerous probability of success); General Communications
Eng'g, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Elecs., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274, 291-93
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (stating that 64% market share is insufficient to establish dan-
gerous probablilty of success when competitive nature of market precludes at-
tainment of monopoly power); see generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 142 n.205 (2d ed. 1984) (citing cases). Even
the more lenient rule in the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., William Inglis & Sons
Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
1981) (permitting an inference of dangerous probability of success from clear
evidence of defendant's intent to monopolize), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982),
would be virtually impossible to satisfy by new leagues suing one of several
established major leagues.
443. In Philadelphia Hockey, the court held that the monopoly NHL use of
long-term contracts unlawfully restricted the ability of a new league to obtain
the services of talented players. 351 F. Supp. at 511. Otherwise, the court con-
cluded, the NHL would have absolute control of the entire market for major
league players. Id. In a world in which rival leagues existed and competed
against one another, no league would have such control, and each league
therefore would be free to compete with others by offering long-term
contracts.
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previously untapped markets, 444 or increasing the number of
players permitted on each team's active roster in order to at-
tract key players from rival leagues445 will be viewed by courts
simply as vigorous competition in a competitive market when
there are several leagues that are roughly balanced, at least ini-
tially.446 The types of conduct that concern most of the major
antitrust litigation brought against monopoly sports leagues
either would be unlikely to occur in a competitive market or
would be sustained against antitrust attack because the conduct
had no anticompetitive effect.447
Although most of the difficult and messy litigation against
monopolists would disappear in a world of competing leagues,
the courts would face a new challenge: regulating cooperation
between the competing leagues. If recent developments in anti-
trust law are applied properly to inter-league agreements, how-
ever, courts will permit those arrangements that serve the
interests of fans, while preventing agreements that reduce com-
petition and can lead to the harms that monopoly sports
leagues now cause.44
The Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws permit
444. See AFL v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
445. See USFL, 842 F.2d at 1343.
446. This leniency would not apply, of course, to agreements among several
leagues jointly to monopolize a market. Such agreements, rather than mani-
festing vigorous competition, would be conspiracies to monopolize in violation
of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
447. A change from a monopoly to a competitive structure in sports leagues
would leave one category of antitrust litigation unaffected. The addition of
competitive leagues is not likely to change most cities' inability to support
more than one baseball or football franchise. Thus, most franchises will con-
tinue to have a local monopoly although, if abused too much, the team might
face entry from a new franchise in a rival league. Suits alleging unlawful uni-
lateral practices by a local monopolist therefore would continue to occupy the
courts. See, e.g., Midwest Communications, Inc. v. Minnesota Twins, Inc., 779
F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1985) (challenging rival television station's package sale of
cable rights to local baseball and hockey games), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163
(1986); Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974) (alleg-
ing that requirement that season ticket holders also purchase tickets for exhi-
bition games is illegal tied-sale), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
448. Mergers between competing leagues would be subject to the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). It is doubtful that any such mergers would receive
approval unless one of the leagues faced imminent bankruptcy and there were
no other buyers. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-
39 (1969) (setting forth standards for "failing company defense"). United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), held that mergers which
give the combined firm a post-merger market share of 30% are presumptively
unlawful. Id. at 364. Unless there were five leagues in a sport, almost any
merger would be likely to trigger this presumptive illegality.
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rival firms to act jointly where cooperation is essential to pro-
duce a new or distinct product.449 Thus, competing leagues law-
fully could agree jointly to produce such events as the World
Series, the Super Bowl, and the All-Star Games. Courts also
would consider lawful any agreement necessary to produce
such events as "ancillary" to bringing about these games.450
The leagues therefore could grant exclusive telecasting rights,
set ticket prices, and determine eligibility for these events.
Under the same theory, the antitrust laws also would per-
mit inter-league play, which would give fans the opportunity to
watch contests and teams they otherwise would be unable to
see. The leagues could agree on the terms essential to bring
about such contests, including agreements governing the divi-
sion of revenues and the sale of broadcast rights. Agreements
that went beyond those terms, however, such as agreements
dictating what each league did with its share of the revenue,
would remain unlawful.
Issues arising from inter-league cooperation in baseball are
more complex because of the minor leagues. A simple agree-
ment between two competing leagues to have their farm teams
play each other would raise no significant antitrust problems.
Rules that went beyond those necessary to sponsor the minor
league contests, however, would be more suspect. For example,
joint decisions by separate major leagues that prescribed when
teams could recall players to a higher league or option them to
a lower one, prescribed when teams could draft players from
another team's minor league roster, or prescribed the terms
and length of minor league player contracts would raise serious
competitive problems.45 1 Although courts would have to deter-
449. NCAA, v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
450. See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (stating that per se violations of
the Sherman Act will not arise automatically from the issuance of a blanket
license); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir.
1898) (holding that no contractual restraint of trade is enforceable unless it is
merely ancillary to some lawful contract), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
Prior to recent antitrust decisions such as NCAA and Broadcast Music,
many were skeptical of the ability of competing leagues jointly to offer unique
championship events. See, e.g., Rodino 82 Hearings, supra note 29, at 447, 451
(testimony of Jesse Markham) (stating that although agreements among
league members concerning home and away split of gate receipts, broadcast ar-
rangements, division of broadcasting revenues, playoffs, and championships
are absolutely necessary for functioning of league and constitute, in economic
terms an "inverted joint product," antitrust laws prohibit such agreements).
These decisions suggest that Markham's prediction is incorrect.
451. See, e.g., Professional Baseball Schools & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d
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mine each case on its own facts, courts are not likely to sustain
such arrangements because they pose a significant risk to free
competition in the player market. Moreover, leagues probably
would have trouble showing that such agreements were neces-
sary to the efficient functioning of the player development sys-
tem. A rule of antitrust liability that permits necessary
restraints would be unlikely to harm either major league fans
who want to see quality talent developed in the minors, or mi-
nor league fans who want to watch entertaining baseball games.
Agreements between competing leagues that excluded one
or more other leagues from joint activities raise questions of
special concern. Suppose, for example, that following divesti-
ture, the football market included the NFL, the AFL, and a
revitalized USFL. If the NFL and AFL agreed to put on the
Super Bowl to the exclusion of the USFL, the USFL might
have a valid antitrust claim.
The USFL would have to prove that the NFL and AFL had
market power and that excluding the USFL from the Super
Bowl would deprive it of its ability to compete with the other
two leagues "on the merits.' ' 452 Although the antitrust laws
usually encourage firms to engage in separate joint ventures, in
the case of deciding who is the champion, fans desire a single
product. In similar cases in which only one product realistically
can exist, the courts require that the product be made available
to all rivals on reasonable terms.4 53
1085 (11th Cir. 1982) (challenging monopolistic system of player assignment
and rule barring minor league members of National Association of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs from playing nonmembers).
452. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (stating that act of expulsion does not
necessarily imply anticompetitive animus).
453. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945)
(prohibiting Associated Press from refusing to furnish its news items to com-
petitors of its members); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383,
411-12 (1912) (directing railroad company to permit non-proprietary companies
equal use of their terminal facilities). Courts have held that antitrust laws
also prohibit unreasonable contract restrictions on essential facilities owned by
a third party that effectively deprive rivals of an opportunity to compete. See,
e.g., Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that
lease provision giving Washington Redskins exclusive right to play football in
RFK Stadium violated antitrust laws), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972). But
see USFL v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that when,
as is usually the case, third party is public stadium authority, restrictive con-
tract is protected from antitrust scrutiny by Noerr-Pennington doctrine ex-
empting anticompetitive influence on governmental action). See generally
Ratner, Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 327, 348-68 (1988).
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This analysis raises the specter of a federal judge determin-
ing whether the AFL and NFL acted reasonably in excluding
the USFL from the Super Bowl. Fortunately, regulatory tasks
of this sort are much more circumscribed than judicial efforts
to supervise all the myriad decisions monopoly leagues make.
454
One legitimate reason to exclude the USFL would be that the
quality of play in the new league is significantly inferior to that
in existing leagues. 455 Fortunately, this objection is subject to
imprecise but somewhat reliable empirical verification. Before
participating in championships, and upon an initial showing
that its teams are qualitatively comparable to NFL and AFL
squads, USFL teams could play NFL or AFL teams in exhibi-
tion contests.456
Assuming new leagues participated in the Super Bowl or
the World Series, disputes also could arise concerning the ex-
tent of their participation. Courts would need to resolve these
issues based on the facts of each particular case. Because the
defendant leagues would claim that their agreements were nec-
essary to carry out the pro-consumer goals of championship
games or other forms of inter-league play, courts would analyze
such agreements under a rule of reason.457 The plaintiff there-
fore would have to prove that the agreements harmed competi-
tion.458 Moreover, courts probably would sustain exclusions
motivated by legitimate business purposes.459 In any event, the
narrow scope of judicial review for these agreements is a far su-
perior alternative to the current alternatives either of allowing
454. See supra Part II.
455. Another possible argument that the NFL and AFL could make to ex-
clude the USFL from the Super Bowl is that the USFL was attempting to
"free ride" on the extensive promotional investment the two other leagues had
made in the Super Bowl. Without the ability to exclude others, the argument
goes, the NFL and AFL would have been unwilling to invest initially in devel-
oping the Super Bowl. Whatever the merits of this argument in other con-
texts, the financial benefits to the league of a championship game or series in
football and baseball are so great, (telling of huge revenues from World Se-
ries) that there is little risk of lessened investment because of a potential free-
rider. See, e.g., In Sports, the Big Time is Getting Even Bigger, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1978, at 61.
456. Certainly, each league would have a great deal at stake and players
might receive hefty bonuses to inspire top play.
457. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1964) (stating that
rule of reason applies when agreements are necessary in order for defendants
to offer their product).
458. See VII P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 397 (1986) (explaining that plain-
tiff bears preliminary burden of proving that defendants have restrained trade
significantly).
459. See USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1360 (2d Cir. 1988).
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monopoly leagues to injure taxpayers and consumers or of re-
quiring judges or other regulators to oversee virtually all as-
pects of the business operations of a sports league.
460
Antitrust laws effectively could preclude agreements be-
tween leagues that do not involve joint activities. Rival leagues
have no pro-competitive reasons jointly to agree on decisions
concerning the issues discussed in this Article: the number and
location of franchises; player restraints;461 broadcast policies;
and other internal operating decisions.4 62 Each league's deci-
sions about these issues therefore would have to be entirely
unilateral. Sports leagues no longer would harm taxpayers and
fans by forcing taxpayers to pay huge subsidies463 and by de-
priving deserving fans of major league teams because of the ar-
tificial scarcity of franchises, 464 by restraining the market for
players so that the result is noncompetitive races and an ineffi-
cient allocation of players,465 by shifting games to cable and pay
television so that fans must pay for games they now view free
of charge, 466 and by implementing the inane decisions of ineffi-
460. To the extent that some have concerns that judges may be unfit to
carry out even this limited regulatory role, Congress could delegate such a
task to an administrative agency.
461. If a restraint operates primarily in the labor market, concerns a topic
that is a mandatory subject of bargaining under federal labor law, and has
been agreed to with a players' union pursuant to bona fide arms-length negoti-
ations, the restraint is exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the so-called
"non-statutory labor exemption." See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600
F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that non-statutory labor exemption ap-
plied when these three criteria were met); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614
(8th Cir. 1976) (finding free agent compensation rule of professional football to
fall outside protection of non-statutory exemption because no bargaining has
occurred), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). Thus, if rival leagues and a
players' union were to agree to engage in multi-employer bargaining, uniform
player restraints could be agreed to. It is unlikely that a players' association
would want to engage in such bargaining, however, for its strength is far im-
proved if it negotiates with management one at a time, similar to the effective
tactic unions such as the United Auto Workers used in negotiating with the
major automobile companies. If players were persuaded, however, that a par-
ticular restraint was desirable, they might agree to a limited multi-employer
agreement. The basketball players' union, for example, offered to agree to a
common draft of college players if unlimited free agency were granted after
two years of play. Hoop Hearings, supra note 168, at 295 (testimony of Law-
rence Fleisher). Union members might prefer to see resources allocated to
proven veterans rather than bid away in speculating on potential stars of the
future.
462. See supra Part I.
463. See supra Part I(A).
464. See supra Part I(B).
465. See supra Part I(C).
466. See supra Part I(D).
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cient managers who are unrestrained by the forces of
competition.46
7
V. IMPLEMENTING A DIVESTITURE: LEGISLATION
PREFERRED, BUT NOT ESSENTIAL
To this point, this Article has argued that a divestiture of
Major League Baseball and the NFL into competing economic
entities would best serve the public interest. This Part argues
that legislation is the preferable way to implement these dives-
titures. "Preferable" is emphasized because the political power
enjoyed by league owners may prevent passage of such legisla-
tion,468 and because the case for a judicially-ordered divestiture
has some merit.469 Nevertheless, three reasons explain why im-
467. See supra Part I(E).
468. The burden of divestiture will fall very heavily on the relatively few
owners of monopoly baseball and football franchises. In contrast, the principal
beneficiaries of divestiture legislation will be taxpayers and fans. The tangible
benefit to each individual citizen, however, is slight. A large body of academic
work demonstrates how the legislative process is not conducive to proposals
that impose costs upon a few and benefits on many; the owners have a strong
incentive to lobby against legislation, while fans and taxpayers feel less in-
tensely and are difficult to organize into a cohesive political force. See M. OL-
SON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 27-36, 60-64, 132-35 (1965) (explaining
how group dynamics provide incentives or disincentives for groups to organ-
ize); W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRiCKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 51-56 (1987) (labeling such situations "distributed bene-
fits/concentrated costs" and explaining that well-organized interests will op-
pose such proposals); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 292 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that whatever political "muscle" baseball
players "might have been able to muster by combining forces with other ath-
letes has been greatly impaired by the manner in which this Court has isolated
them").
469. Whether Congress should reexamine Flood v. Kuhn because its hold-
ing that Congress's failure to overrule Federal Baseball constituted legislative
endorsement of the baseball exemption, see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at 283, is
demonstrably an aberration as a matter of statutory construction, see Eskridge,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1404-09 (1988); or because
the court majority implicitly relied on the widely held view in 1972 that free
agency would destroy Major League Baseball, cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at
269 n.9 (quoting concurring opinion in court below by Judge Moore, 443 F.2d
264, 272 (2d Cir. 1970), that "[i]f baseball is to be damaged by statutory regula-
tion, let the congressman face his constituents the next November and also
face the consequences of his baseball voting record."), a view that subsequent
events have proven incorrect, see supra text accompanying notes 161-76; or be-
cause the majority feared that antitrust precedents would render many rules
deemed essential to baseball's success illegal per se, see, e.g., United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 612-13 (1972) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (concur-
ring reluctantly, based on settled antitrust doctrine, with court judgment that
agreement among small independent grocers was illegal per se despite obvious
procompetitive virtues); is beyond the scope of this Article.
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plementing the breakup of the monopoly sports leagues by leg-
islative action would best serve the public interest. First,
legislation can provide clearer and more certain rules of compe-
tition that would govern competing baseball and football
leagues. Second, a statutory scheme can better establish the
precise means of implementing the divestiture, and protect
owners from liability for previously legal conduct. Finally, sig-
nificant legal obstacles exist to a judicial divestiture order.
A. CLEAR SPORTS ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
Correct application of current antitrust doctrine will per-
mit stable competition among competing leagues and will give
greater leeway to each league in enacting internal rules than
the courts now afford to the monopoly NFL.470 It is not cer-
tain, however, that every judge's ruling in an antitrust sports
case will be consistent with this Article's analysis of "correct"
antitrust doctrine.4 7 1 The threat of treble damages may deter
desirable and probably lawful competitive conduct by rival
leagues.4 7 2 Legislation can avoid these problems by specifying,
for example, that the establishment of the World Series, the
Super Bowl, minor baseball leagues, and other desired joint ef-
forts is lawful.4 73 To ensure that agreements among competing
leagues do not result in the harms monopoly sports leagues im-
pose, the legislation should prohibit any inter-league agreement
concerning the number and location of franchises, rules for al-
locating players among teams, and, except for games involving
teams from rival leagues, the sale of broadcast rights.
B. CLEARLY ESTABLISHED REMEDY
A proper divestiture order will require a careful restruc-
turing of baseball and football. To minimize interference with
470. See supra Part IV.
471. Cf. USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1372 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that "the
antitrust law governing horizontal arrangements among competitors ... has
been fluid").
472. Cf. National Coop. Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat.
1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305) (Supp. 1986)) (clarifying applicable an-
titrust law and limiting amount this Act exemplifies role of legislation in anti-
trust law). The legislative history of the Act shows how unclear antitrust laws
can depress ventures that benefit competition; testimony to Congress indicated
that firms avoided joint research and development ventures out of fear of pos-
sible antitrust liability. See S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984) (bill
intended to rectify "perception problem" that participation in joint research
and development ventures posed significant antitrust risks).
473. See supra text accompanying note 450.
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established patterns, divestiture should maintain existing divi-
sions within Major League Baseball and the National Football
League, if possible. Some significant changes may be necessary,
however, in order to achieve the goal of stable competition be-
tween rival leagues. For example, the NFL's AFC teams play
within smaller markets than those of the NFC.474 As a result,
the NFL's contract with CBS to broadcast road games of NFC
teams is more lucrative than the NBC contract for broadcast of
AFC road games.475 This imbalance may impair the ability of
an independent AFC to compete with its rival. A workable di-
vestiture therefore might require some reorganization in the
current divisional alignment.
Divestiture also must address the issue of the number of ri-
val leagues necessary to permit fans to enjoy the benefits of
competition. The history of inter-league rivalry suggests that
two rival leagues may be sufficient to ensure competition.476
Moreover, the increased ability of the players' unions to bar-
gain for extensive free agency reduces the risk that duopoly
sports leagues would collude on rules concerning player re-
straints. Divestiture into only two leagues also has the advan-
tage of permitting baseball's two traditional leagues to maintain
their identities.
On balance, however, a more extensive divestiture into
three or four leagues is preferable. Agreements for inter-
league play among teams now in the same league can maintain
baseball's traditions. Moreover, the history of previous rivalry
between two leagues may not be a reliable indicator of the po-
tential for oligopolistic behavior 477 following a divestiture. Pre-
474. In 1986, metropolitan areas hosting NFC franchises had an average
population of 4,232,928, while areas with AFC franchises averaged 3,081,535.
Population figures for the rival league teams in the New York and Los Ange-
les metropolitan areas were obtained by allocating half the population of those
areas to each team. The Green Bay franchise population figures include the
Milwaukee metropolitan area. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 28-30 (108th ed. 1988).
475. In 1987, CBS paid $150 million and NBC paid $120 million for NFL
broadcast rights. See NFL rights deal closed, ESPN included, BROADCASTING,
Mar. 16, 1987, at 39.
476. See generally Houston Oilers v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1966)
(discussing heated competition between NFL and AFL); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (discussing rivalry between NHL and WHL); Hoop Hearings, supra note
168 (discussing rivalry between NBA and ABA).
477. "Oligopoly is a market structure characterized by a small number of
firms and a great deal of interdependence, actual and perceived, among them."
E. MANSFIELD supra note 54, at 333.
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viously, such rivalry was between an entrenched incumbent
league attempting to maintain its monopoly status and a new ri-
val seeking to obtain equality quickly and to force a merger.
The incentives to tacit collusion or oligopolistic behavior may
increase when owners realize that the rival league will be
around for the long term.
Moreover, at least three leagues are necessary to gain the
benefits of competition concerning expansion and franchise re-
location that involve the removal or addition of a team in any
area currently having two franchises. For example, the Ameri-
can League is less likely to be deterred by the existence of one
rival, the National League, from allowing the Chicago White
Sox to obtain tax subsidies by credibly threatening to move to
St. Petersburg;478 the probability that the National League
would put two of its own teams in Chicago is slight. Con-
versely, if three leagues existed, the league without a team in
Chicago obviously would be poised to enter that market if the
White Sox departed. To avoid losing the nation's third largest
metropolitan area, American League owners would be unlikely
to permit the White Sox to move south and Illinois taxpayers
would be less likely to make concessions to the White Sox
knowing that they could attract a new team from the third
league.
Another benefit of legislation is that Congress would have
the opportunity to set the precise terms of a divestiture or
could delegate that authority to an expert agency. Although
federal courts have extensive experience with complex reorga-
nizations of monopolized industries,4 79 a legislative or adminis-
trative approach might assuage fears of fans concerning leaving
divestiture to a federal judge. Fans may be concerned that the
federal judge who happens to draw a divestiture suit on his
docket may not have any background or interest in either anti-
trust or sports and may be insensitive to fans' concerns and
traditional loyalties.
Any court-ordered divestiture of Major League Baseball
would have to be based on a judgment that baseball's owners
478. See Chicago Tribune, Nov. 6, 1988, pt. 3, at 1, col. 7.
479. See, e.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
222-28 (D.D.C. 1982) (detailing divestiture of integrated national telephone
network and vesting authority in court to enforce provision on own initiative),
aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); United States
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,553 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(noting more than 500 hearings on implementation of order overseeing motion
picture industry across three decades).
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committed a violation of the antitrust laws. Such a judgment
would expose Major League Baseball to treble damage liability
for past conduct, although these owners reasonably may have
believed they were immune from antitrust liability based on
the judicially-created antitrust exemption for baseball.48 0 Jus-
tice Marshall, in his dissent to Flood v. Kuhn,48s suggested that
the Court could overrule the exemption prospectively, thus
granting injunctive relief while shielding Major League Base-
ball from private antitrust suits for past conduct.48 2 Although
the Court has alluded to the possibility of taking that approach
in other antitrust cases, 48 3 no such decision ever actually has
been issued. Legislation, of course, could remove the antitrust
exemption and limit private remedies for violations occurring
after the effective date of the statute.
C. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO A JUDICIAL REMEDY
The most practical reason for pursuing a legislative remedy
is that a court-ordered divestiture is so uncertain. Such an or-
der would have to rely on a judgment that Major League Base-
ball and the NFL committed unlawful monopolization in
violation of section two of the Sherman Act. A full analysis of
these leagues' compliance with section two is beyond the scope
of this Article. For current purposes, it suffices to note that a
plaintiff seeking a judicial divestiture order faces many signifi-
cant obstacles that do not arise with a legislative remedy.
1. Baseball
A judicial divestiture of Major League Baseball would con-
front only one major obstacle, but it is a daunting one. Major
League Baseball established its monopoly through merger and
480. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972) (5-3 opinion) (upholding
exemption from federal antitrust laws); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346
U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per curiam) (upholding exemption for baseball and
noting any change should be by legislation); Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 207-
09 (1922) (holding business of providing baseball games for profit does not in-
volve interstate commerce and therefore does not fall within antitrust laws).
481. 407 U.S. 258, 289 (1972).
482. Id. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
483. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
496 (1968) (acknowledging possible theory that newly-declared doctrine can be
applied prospectively when party has rules on established doctrine); Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964) (reserving question of whether only
prospective application would be warranted).
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maintained it through predatory practices.4 84 Were it not for
baseball's judicially-created antitrust exemption, courts un-
doubtedly would find Major League Baseball guilty of unlawful
monopolization. The Supreme Court, however, has held on
three occasions that baseball is not subject to the antitrust
laws.485 To order divestiture, the court would have to overrule
these three cases. Although persuasive reasons exist for the
Court to overrule baseball's exemption,48 6 the likelihood that
the court ever will do so is very uncertain. Congress should not
wait for the judiciary to act.
2. Football
Although the NFL is currently subject to the antitrust
laws,48 7 one of the principal causes of its monopoly status is the
federal statute permitting the NFL-AFL merger.488 Thus, the
NFL cannot be challenged for unlawfully acquiring monopoly
power. An organization that obtains power lawfully, however,
still violates section two of the Sherman Act if it unlawfully
maintains such power.48 9
Although the NFL is vulnerable to an antitrust claim based
on section two of the Sherman Act, it is by no means certain
that a plaintiff could win the claim. A successful plaintiff
would have to overcome, for example, prior judicial determina-
tions that the NFL's predatory conduct directed against the
USFL did not cause the latter's demise,490 that the NFL's con-
tracts with all three major television networks were not unlaw-
fully exclusionary,491 or that exclusive lease arrangements
between individual NFL teams and governmentally operated
stadiums were not subject to antitrust scrutiny.492
484. See supra notes 328-49 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 480.
486. See supra note 469 and accompanying text.
487. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
488. Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
489. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274
(2d Cir. 1979) (stating rule that "[e]ven if the orgin of the monopoly power was
innocent,. . . maintaining or extending market control by that power" violates
§ 2), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). But see USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335,
1380 (restructuring of football inappropriate because 1966 Merger Act shows
congressional support for single football league).
490. See USFL, 842 F.2d at 1357.
491. See id. at 1356.
492. Prior to trial in the USFL case, the district court held that evidence
concerning such leases would be excluded at trial because the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine, which immunizes from antitrust scrutiny private efforts to
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If gambling on judicial decisions were legal, the odds-
makers would make those betting on a divestiture of profes-
sional baseball or football through antitrust litigation decided
underdogs. Because properly drafted legislation would insure
that desirable aspects of the games of baseball and football
would survive divestiture, would clearly establish the proper
method for implementing the break up, and would not require
reconsideration of precedents, such legislation is the preferred
course for implementing divestiture.
CONCLUSION
Baseball and football continue to be exciting sports that
capture the interest and arouse the passions of millions of
Americans. These sports are enjoyed by so many fans and are
such a part of American life that society often overlooks the
costs of allowing Major League Baseball and the NFL to oper-
ate as monopolists.
Monopoly sports league owners take advantage of their
economic power to secure massive subsidies from local taxpay-
ers, while depriving fans in many cities of expansion teams
they could economically support and emotionally cherish.
Owners conspire to hold down player salaries through schemes
that inefficiently allocate players among teams, limiting the op-
portunity of individual franchises to obtain the players they
may need to develop winning or championship teams. Both
Major League Baseball and the NFL owe their current success
and popularity to the broadcasting of their games, including the
World Series and Super Bowl, on free television. Yet monopoly
leagues are well-positioned to force fans to pay millions of dol-
lars to view these contests on cable television. Moreover, each
year inefficient executives who are under no market restraints
to manage their teams well cause fans in one or more cities
obtain anticompetitive governmental action, protected this conduct. United
States Football League v. National Football League, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1179-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). For the evolution of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see
Hecht v. ProFootball, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 940-42, 47 (D.C. Cir.) (distinguishing
Noerr and Pennington and holding that lease between Armory Board and pro-
fessional football was subject to scrutiny under antitrust laws), cert denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1971); see also United line Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961) (holding that railroad's solicitation of government action was not vi-
olative of antitrust laws even though it may have had anticompetitive
purpose).
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across the country to suffer by denying them the best possible
product.
Although these harms are real, they are not inevitable.
The existence of rival leagues would solve most of these eco-
nomic problems. The city's option to seek a franchise from a
rival league on more favorable terms would limit a team's abil-
ity to extort tax subsidies. Competing leagues would seek out
expansion cities in order to increase ticket and network reve-
nues. No league would have an incentive to establish ineffi-
cient means of player allocation that depress salaries, because
inter-league competition would raise salaries to a competitive
level. Instead, each league would design its internal rules to
produce the most exciting pennant and championship races.
Leagues contemplating significant shifts to cable television
would hesitate to do so if their audiences could continue to
watch rival league games for free. Finally, leagues could not af-
ford to tolerate extreme mismanagement of individual
franchises, because that would invite direct head-on competi-
tion from a competing league.
Baseball and football are not natural monopolies; two or
more rival leagues can compete in each sport. There is no ap-
parent economic reason why stable competition cannot exist.
That single leagues historically have monopolized these sports
does not suggest they are natural monopolies. Rather, termina-
tion of inter-league rivalry through mergers and predatory
practices and the expansion of Major League Baseball and the
National Football League to a size that now virtually precludes
new entrants explain their persistent monopoly status.
Were baseball and football characterized by competing
leagues, the antitrust laws could effectively regulate competi-
tion in the industry. Indeed, many of the troublesome issues
now raised in antitrust sports litigation would disappear if the
industry no longer featured a monopolistic structure. To care-
fully supervise the transition to a competitive environment and
to avoid difficult judicial obstacles, Congress should act to bring
to the American sports fan the benefits of the free enterprise
system that we expect from other business endeavors.
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX A: BASEBALL EXPANSION
This appendix first explores whether the five smallest mar-
kets in baseball today-Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee,
San Diego, and Seattle-can support major league franchises.
The data suggest that at least four of the five are viable mar-
kets. The appendix next compares these five markets to the
five largest markets currently without baseball franchises:
Denver, Miami, Phoenix, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Washing-
ton, D.C. The evidence suggests that both groups have similar
demographic characteristics. The analysis concludes that ex-
pansion to these five markets is feasible and appropriate.
For the reasons stated in the text, the analysis first re-
quired determining if the franchises in the five current markets
studied can be predicted to attract at least 1.5 million fans
should their teams enjoy a won-loss percentage of .500. A sim-
ple regression was used for each team. The dependent variable
was attendance, and the independent variable was the team's
winning percentage during each season. The study covered the
seasons from 1973 to 1987.
Simple regression analysis493 predicts that Milwaukee, San
Diego, and Cincinnati will draw more than 1.5 million fans if
their teams play .500 ball. The analysis, set forth below in Ta-
ble A-i, shows that each of these estimates is statistically signif-
icant.494 Although the regression is not statistically significant
for Kansas City, the data suggest that Royals' fans are very
loyal, regardless of their team's on-field performance. In any
event, the Royals clearly can draw more than 1.5 million fans.
Indeed, the Royals have drawn between 1.6 million and 2.3 mil-
493. Where there exists reason to believe that one variable (for example,
attendance) is a function of another variable (winning percentage), simple re-
gression analysis is a statistical technique that can be used to estimate the de-
gree of the relationship between two variables; in other words, the degree to
which an increase in winning percentage affects attendance. If the data sug-
gest a general trend of higher attendance for teams with better winning per-
centages, the technique estimates the average effect of the latter on the
former. See generally R. PARSONS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: A DECISION-MAK-
ING APPROACH 685-86 (1974).
494. An estimate is generally deemed to be significant if statistical tech-
niques indicate that there is less than a 5% chance that the results are due to
random occurrences, rather than due to the effect of one variable (winning
percentage) on another (attendance). See R. SENTER, ANALYSIS OF DATA: IN-
TRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 152-54 (1969). One
statistical technique to measure significance is a "t value" (shown in parenthe-
sis under the coefficient in Table A-i). Normally, a "t value" in excess of 1.96
indicates that the particular result is statistically significant. See R. PARSONS,
supra note 493, at 423-24.
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lion fans from 1976 through 1987, including drawing 1.9 million
fans in 1983 while playing .488 ball and drawing 2.3 million fans
in 1986 while playing .469 ball. The data do not suggest that Se-
attle would support a team if it played .500 ball. Indeed, the
analysis for Seattle is statistically significant and predicts that a
.500 Mariner team would draw just over 1.1 million fans. This
analysis, however, may be misleading because Seattle never has
played .500 ball. Its 1987 record (.487) was the best in the his-
tory of the franchise. Therefore, it is difficult to predict how
the team would do if it were not a perennial loser.
Table A-1 4 9 5
Degrees
of
Constant Coefficient RO Att. at .500 Freedom
Milwaukee -838084 4795.6 .564 1,509,721 12
(3.937)
San Diego -1003930 5438.7 .636 1,715,428 12
(4.582)
Cincinnati -593400 4783.2 .616 1,798,201 12
(4.385)
Kansas City 1616961 569.3 .004 1,901,616 12
(0.207)
Seattle 109808 2017.0 .563 1,118,298 7
(3.004)
The author next sought to compare these five cities with
the five largest markets without baseball franchises to deter-
mine if the latter markets possessed characteristics sufficiently
similar to the former group for one to infer that expansion
would be viable. Roger Noll has suggested a number of vari-
ables that determine baseball attendance. 496 In determining ex-
pansion sites, a number of these variables are not relevant
because they depend on management decisions by the
franchise. These variables include ticket price, stadium age,
number of star players, closeness of the pennant race, recent
495. The coefficient resulting from the regression analysis is an estimate of
the degree to which winning percentage affects attendance-the higher the
coefficient, the greater the effect. To estimate the team's attendance with a
winning record of .500, for example, the coefficient is multiplied by 500 and
added to the constant figure. The R 2 value estimates how much winning
percentage, as opposed to other possible variables, explains increases in
attendance. R. SENTER, supra note 494, at 427. Statisticians often view R2
values less than .20 as showing an almost negligible relationship between the
two variables. Values between .40 and .70 are considered to demonstrate that
there is a substantial relationship between the two variables. Id. at 433.
496. See Noll, supra note 85, at 120-21.
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pennant wins, and number of games behind the leader. The
demographic characteristics that Noll analyzed were popula-
tion, per capita income, number of other major league sports
teams, and black population. Note that per capita income,
sports competition, and black population were all negatively
correlated to attendance. Table A-2 sets forth these character-
istics for the five existing markets and the five potential mar-
kets analyzed.
Table A-2
Population P/cap. inc #teams Black pop.
K.C. 1,518,000 $11,153 2 191,268
Cin. 1,690,000 $10,247 2 189,280
Mil. 1,522,000 $ 9,765 2 162,960
S.D. 2,201,000 $11,766 2 123,256
Sea. 2,285,000 $12,919 3 95,970
WashDC 3,563,000 $13,530 3 954,884
Miami 2,912,000 $ 8,904 1 433,888
Tpa-StP 1,914,000 $ 9,628 1 176,088
Phx. 1,900,000 $11,363 1 60,800
Den. 1,847,000 $12,490 2 88,656
As the table indicates, these "have-not" cities have signifi-
cantly larger populations (which is the major variable in Noll's
analysis) than three of the five current markets. The very
large population in Washington, D.C. should offset the high in-
come, existence of other sports franchises, and black popula-
tion, which are negatively correlated variables.
This analysis suggests that Washington, D.C., Miami,
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Phoenix, and Denver possess character-
istics that support the prediction that a Major League Baseball
franchise playing with a .500 record in each of those cities
would attract at least 1.5 million fans. Of course, special cir-
cumstances may exist that would cause a similar number of
fans to attend games in some cities that are smaller than those
analyzed above.
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APPENDIX B: IS ROZELLE RIGHT ABOUT FREE
AGENTS?
This statistical analysis seeks to test the proposition that
absent player restraints free agents will flock to the top teams,
in the largest cities, with the warmest temperatures. League
officials have used this proposition to justify restrictions on the
free market for player contracts.
To test the proposition that free agents will migrate to the
top teams, the author first performed a multiple regression
analysis49 7 for each team for each of the 1976-1985 seasons-the
years following the Messersmith decision and prior to the arbi-
trator's finding that owners had stopped bidding collusively on
players. The dependent variable was the net gain or loss of free
agents by each team from the prior year. The independent
variables were (1) the population for the Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area in which each team played, (2) the team's
place in the standings in the previous year, and (3) the average
high temperature in each city during the month of April.
If Commissioner Rozelle were correct, a strong positive
correlation should exist between the number of free agents
signed by a particular team in a year and that team's place in
the standings. Specifically, the coefficient for prior year stand-
ings should be positive and fairly large, and the results should
be statistically significant. The results (with T values in paren-
theses) were:
Table A-3
Constant -2.06949
(1.710643)
Prior Year Standings .038280
(.756857)
Temperature .030633
(2.082299)
R2  .029128
Degrees of Freedom 254
Contrary to Rozelle's prediction, the data show a very small co-
efficient for prior year standings (indicating that this variable
has little effect on the number of free agents signed), and are
not statistically significant.
497. Where we have reason to believe that one "dependent" variable is a
function of several other "independent" variables, multiple regression analysis
is a statistical technique that can be used to estimate the degree to which each
independent variable has an effect on the dependent variable. See R. PAR-
SONS, supra note 493, at 728.
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The author next sought to determine whether population
or temperature affected the number of free agents signed. To
more accurately discover trends in this area, the author ana-
lyzed each team's net gain or loss of free agents over the entire
ten-year period. A multiple regression analysis was performed.
The dependent variable was the net number of free agents
signed by each team during the 1976-1985 period. The two in-
dependent variables were population and temperature. If Com-
missioner Rozelle's claims were correct, the coefficients for
population and temperature should be positive and large, and
the results should be statistically significant. The results were:
Table A-4
Constant -12.048605
Population (in millions) 0.8567453685
(1.4925011609)
Temperature (in degrees) 0.168379
(1.078237)
R2  0.13607032
Degrees of Freedom 23
As more fully discussed in the text, this shows only a weak pos-
itive correlation between a team's success in the free agent
market and the size of its city and its temperature; the results,
moreover, are not statistically significant.
This analysis does not differentiate among the quality of
free agents in examining the gain or loss of teams. This analy-
sis does not disprove an argument, for example, that all the
high-salary free agents do flock to contending, warm-weather
franchises in large cities. If there were such a movement, how-
ever, these teams would be expected to dominate Major League
Baseball. The post-Messersmith record, however, demonstrates
that competitive balance has improved, not suffered.498 More-
over, the ability of veteran players of modest talent to relocate
can have a significant beneficial effect on competitive balance
by allowing such players to move from teams where they may
be surplusage to teams that place a greater value on their
talent.
498. See supra text accompanying notes 136-50.
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APPENDIX C: BASEBALL GAMES ON FREE AND
CABLE TELEVISION
The following table reflects the number of games that each
team shows on free (over-the-air) and on cable television.
Cable television includes both subscription and pay-per-view
offerings.
Table 5
AMERICAN LEAGUE
TEAM FREE
California 60
Chicago 67
Kansas City 50
Minnesota 68
Oakland 49
Seattle 76
Texas 65
Baltimore 42
Boston 75
Cleveland 60
Detroit 52
Milwaukee 60
New York 53
Toronto 39
CABLE
35
79
25*
60
90
83
80
100
40 or more
NATIONAL LEAGUE
TEAM FREE
Atlanta 131
Cincinnati 47
Houston 76
Los Angeles 50
San Diego 51
San Francisco 40
Chicago 150
Montreal -
New York 75
Philadelphia 85
Pittsburgh 46
St. Louis 56
Information was derived from Baseball bags almost $370 million in rights,
BROADCASTING, Mar. 7, 1988, at 54-63. Note that Atlanta and Chicago local sta-
tions also serve as nationwide cable superstations. Further, the figures given
are for regular season games only.
*With option to pick up eight more.
+These are estimates because exact figures were not settled when the Broad-
cast article went to press.
CABLE
75
35
41
36
75
39
55
50
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